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LOCKHART V. MCCREE" THE "BIASED BUT UNBIASED
JUROR,"

WHAT ARE THE STATES' LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS?
SUSAN WAITE CRUMP*

INTRODUCTION

One of the issues that has lingered in capital cases is the confusing
problem of determining when the state may remove, for cause, a venire
member who opposes the death penalty. In 1968, the Supreme Court in
Witherspoon v. Illinois' held that a state could not challenge for cause a
potential juror who expressed opposition to the death penalty, as long
as the juror did not absolutely exclude assessing it. The Court reasoned
that the jury was the conscience of the community and that the defendant was entitled to have a pool of potential jurors that included individuals who had reservations about the appropriateness of the death penalty
in general, as did a substantial portion of the American population at the
time. 2 The Court recognized that the state could challenge, for cause,
those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would prevent
them from impartially determining guilt or innocence. The state could
also exclude jurors who would automatically reject death as a possible
3
punishment from the sentencing trial.
Witherspoon left open, however, the question whether the state could
constitutionally remove this latter category ofjurors from the guilt-innocence trial if they claimed they were capable of judging guilt or innocence fairly. The Court determined that the record in Witherspoon did
not support holding such an exclusion unconstitutional. In a footnote,
the Court expressly reserved the question in the event of a case with
4
more compelling evidence of a constitutional violation.
The Court's holding prompted numerous attacks upon capital trial
procedures that did not permit this category of Witherspoon excludables
to serve on guilt-innocence juries. 5 The challengers reasoned that these
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. A.B. 1968, University of California, Davis; J.D. 1974, University of Houston,
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2. Id. at 520. According to the Court in Witherspoon, public opinion surveys showed
that in 1960, 51% of the American people supported capital punishment, whereas in 1966,
only 42% supported it. During this same time period, opposition to capital punishment
increased from 36% of the American population to 47%. Id. at 520 n.16. More recent
public opinion surveys conducted in 1982, however, determined that approximately 70%
of all Americans supported capital punishment, indicating a reversal of the trend noted in
Vitherspoon. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1982
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1983).
3. lVitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
4. Id. at 517-18, 520 n.18.
5. E.g., Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573
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venire members would be nullifiers only at the sentencing trial, and, if
they claimed an ability to decide fairly in the guilt-innocence trial, their
exclusion at that stage would deprive the defendant of a constitutionally
composed jury.6 Such a juror would literally be both biased and unbiased. Opposition to capital punishment would be so substantial as to
exclude even the possibility of its imposition, yet such a juror would be
able to set that opposition aside so. completely that it would not influence the decision of guilt or innocence. If this reasoning were accepted,
every conviction and sentence resulting after the exclusion of such a
juror from the guilt-innocence stage of a capital case would be
unconstitutional.
Since no state required the seating of these "biased but unbiased"
jurors in capital cases, this argument could have had dramatic results. It
might have reversed the results of hundreds of capital trials, 7 as well as
abolishing the unitary jury system in future death penalty cases. In more
concrete terms, it could have emptied death rows in most states across
the nation and vacated the convictions in society's most heinous murder
cases adjudicated over most of the preceding generation.
Every appellate court but one, however, rejected the argument. 8
(5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979); United States ex rel Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977).
6. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 131-32; Smith, 660 F.2d at 575; see also Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a ConstitutionalAnalysis,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1982).
7. This holding might have reversed convictions, not merely sentences, if applied
retroactively. For a discussion of this consideration, see Woodard v. Sargent, 753 F.2d
694 (8th Cir. 1985). There were 37 states that provided for capital punishment at the time
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1759 (1986) was decided. Of those 37 states, 33 allowed for
sentencing by juries alone or permitted juries to act in an advisory role. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-47 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West Supp. 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a46a (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025 (1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1984); MD. CRIM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 413 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.030 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1983);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1983); 1985 OR. LAWS ch. 3; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 23A-27A-4 (1979) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203 (1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.

art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2303(c) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (1983); WASH. REV.

CODE § 10-95.080 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1977 and Supp. 1982). As of October 1, 1985, these thirty-three states had custody of 1395 of the 1590 persons on death
row. See, Death Row U.S.A. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (Oct. 1, 1985). It is
difficult to determine with any precision how many of these convictions would have been
reversed if the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Woodard were adopted by the Court. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that exclusion of only one prospective juror in violation

of IVitherspoon is sufficient to require retrial of the defendant in a capital case, so the
number of potential reversals was likely to be significant. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S.
122 (1976).
8. See cases cited supra note 5.
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The exception was the Eighth Circuit, in Grigsby v. Mabry.9 Relying upon
sociological studies that purported to show conviction-proneness in capital juries, the Grisby court disappointed prosecutors, who feared the retroactive results of the decision as much as its future implications. The
decision simultaneously gave systematic effect to the arguments of death
penalty 'opponents who claimed that capital punishment was unjustly
imposed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grigsby to resolve the issue
of the "biased but unbiased" juror. It ultimately reversed the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Lockhart v. McCree.' 0 Almost two decades after the
famous footnote that had left the question open, I I the Court squarely
held that the Witherspoon reasoning could not be extended to prohibit a
state from excluding from the guilt-innocence trial, as well as from the
sentencing trial, those venire members who could not consider the sentence of death.
This article examines Lockhart v.McCree in light of the controlling
constitutional and policy issues, some of which were presented to the
Court but not incorporated into its reasoning. The article begins by exploring the line of cases which set general standards for the exclusion of
venire members opposed to capital punishment. 1 2 Then, in Part II, the
article discusses the Eighth Circuit's opinion in McCree as well as the
Supreme Court's reasons for reversal.' 3 Next, in Part III the article examines the issues underlying the Supreme Court's holding. 14 This Part
first considers the disadvantages to both the state and the accused which
would have resulted from the Eighth Circuit's abolition of the unitary
jury, but which that court did not credit. 1 5 It further evaluates the extent to which "biased but unbiased" venire members can be identified
reliably.' 6 Part III also considers whether the sixth and fourteenth
amendments can be read to prohibit unitary juries in capital cases, and it
examines the Eighth Circuit's use of sociological evidence, which the
Supreme Court rejected as a basis for deciding the constitutional questions.' 7 Finally, Part IV states the author's conclusions, which are that
McCree was properly decided and that the Supreme Court is moving toward a more workable, balanced approach to constitutional issues in
9. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.
Ct. 1758 (1986). McCree's case had been consolidated by stipulation with two other
habeas corpus petitions by James Grigsby and DeWayne Hulsey. Grigsby's case became
moot in 1983, after he died in prison. The district court determined that Hulsey's case was
procedurally barred because he had failed to preserve his allegations of error by objection
under the doctrine of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569
F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
10. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
11. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
12. See infra notes 19-53 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-211 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 147-211 and accompanying text.
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capital cases. 18
The author was counsel of record in the Supreme Court for sixteen
states in Lockhart v. McCree, and argued to the Court that the states could
properly exclude the potential jurors at issue. Consequently, this article
is not an attempt to analyze the issues from a position of impartiality, if
indeed that claim can ever be made in an article on this volatile subject.
However, the article does present arguments that were not fully developed in the Supreme Court's opinion, and for this reason, it may contribute to an understanding of the states' position and perhaps some of
the Court's reasoning.
I.

CAPITAL JURY QUALIFICATION UNDER WITHERSPOON,
ABRAMS AND WITT

Prior to 1968, the Supreme Court routinely refused to impose restrictions on the states' power to enact discretionary death penalty statutes. 19 Witherspoon v. Illinois2° marked the beginning of the Court's
efforts to establish "unique safeguards" for capital defendants by imposing a more stringent standard of due process in such cases. 2 ' In Witherspoon, the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute permitting the
prosecution to exclude jurors who had "conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or . . . [who were] opposed to [the] same.''22

At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution was able to use this statute
to challenge nearly half of the venire for cause on the basis that they had
general hesitation about returning the death penalty. The state made
these challenges without inquiring whether the potential jurors could
impartially determine guilt or consider death as a possible punish18. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
19. By 1962, all American jurisdictions adopting capital punishment statutes permitted the fact-finder unfettered discretion in determining whether to assess death, life, or a
number of years in prison, once the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 commentary at 120-132 (1980). Discretionary statutes of this
nature were not seriously challenged on constitutional grounds until after 1950. S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 518 (4th ed. 1983).
These court challenges were based upon alleged violations of three different constitutional
theories, that of equal protection, procedural due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The equal protection argument focused upon the disproportionate number of
blacks sentenced to die for committing crimes against white victims. This argument was
initially rejected by the Court in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). It was reconsidered by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).
The procedural due process argument, which is based upon the contention that unfettered jury discretion in sentencing violates the 14th amendment, was rejected in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). The same basic argument was recast as an
eighth amendment argument in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and was one of
the bases for the Court's reversal. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring).
20. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
21. It has been argued that the death penalty is qualitatively different from other criminal penalties because it is irrevocable. For this reason, state and federal courts have imposed procedural safeguards that apply only in capital cases to ensure that the correct
decision is being made. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); see also W. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES (1984).
22.
Vitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512 (ruling ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 743 (1959)
unconstitutional).
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ment. 23 The Court, impressed by the large number of jurors excluded
by the statute and the substantial number of Americans in the general
24
population echoing the concerns of the excluded venire members,
concluded that the Illinois procedure produced a "jury uncommonly
willing to condemn a man to die."'2 5 The remaining jurors could not
hope to speak for the community: "Culled of all who harbor doubts
about the wisdom of capital punishment - of all who would be reluctant
to pronounce the extreme penalty - such a jury can speak only for a
distinct and dwindling minority."' 26 The Court reasoned that the discretion given to Illinois jurors in deciding whether to assess life or death
made it of particular importance that the decision be reached by a jury
selected from a fair cross-section of the community, including not only
those who believed strongly that death was an appropriate sentence, but
also those who had substantial reservations about capital punishment.
jurors, the
By indiscriminately excluding the latter category of potential
27
state had violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
Witherspoon recognized that the state could constitutionally enforce
qualifications for a capitaljury. The state could only sustain a challenge
for cause, however, in two instances: first, against venire members who
could never return a verdict of death in any case, and second, against
those who could not impartially view the evidence in determining guilt
in a capital case. 28 The Court rejected as premature the contention that
a "biased but unbiased" juror, that is, one who would automatically vote
against capital punishment but who claimed to be impartial in determining guilt or innocence in a capital case, should be allowed as a constitutional matter to judge guilt alone. Witherspoon contended that
preventing such jurors from determining guilt or innocence resulted in
a jury more likely to convict. The Court declined to adopt this argument
because the petitioner presented only three sociological studies supporting this conclusion, which the Court considered too "fragmentary"
23. Forty-seven venire members were challenged by the prosecution in W1itherspoon in
"rapid succession," according to the Court, on the basis that they voiced general opposition to the death penalty. Thirty-nine of those members were excused without any inquiry
into whether they could consider assessing capital punishment in an appropriate case. Id.
at 514-15.
24. But see supra note 2.
25. HWitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. The Court supports this conclusion by observing
that an amici in the case, the American Friends Service Committee, et al., had argued that
the number of death row inmates was rising but the number of actual executions was declining. These observations led the amici to conclude that there was a widening divergence between capital juries, as they were constituted at the time, and society in general,
making it imperative to reconstitute capital juries to reflect society's views. Id. at 521 n. 19.
While this might be a reasonable deduction, it is also possible that an increase in the
number of court challenges beginning in the 1960's could account for this phenomenon as
individual cases tediously worked their way through the habeas corpus process. See supra
note 13.
26. iVitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
27. Id. at 518.
28. The Court indicated that in order to be disqualified, the prospective juror must
make his views on these two issues "unmistakenly clear." Id. at 522 n.21. But see Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (a juror cannot be excluded under 1'itherspoon unless his
views "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties").
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and "tentative" as evidence. 29 It hinted, however, that if future petitioners could provide more convincing evidence supporting the claim of
conviction-proneness, it might be willing to extend its Witherspoon logic
to require that jurors excluded on sentence, but unbiased on guilt, be
eligible to sit during the guilt phase of a capital trial. The Court suggested that such a holding might require states using sentencing juries
to provide two differently composed juries in every capital case, "using
' 30
one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
Subsequent to Witherspoon, the Court decided another related but
distinct issue involving capital jury sentencing which was to have a subtle
effect on the interpretation of Witherspoon standards. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court concluded that existing death penalty schemes, which permitted juries to use unstructured discretion in sentencing, violated the
Constitution. 3 1 Furman did not suggest how a constitutional death penalty statute could be constructed. Furman itself contained nine separate
opinions giving nine different analyses of the constitutional issues. 3 2 In
attempting to comply with the Court's confusing messages about jury
discretion, some states, such as North Carolina, enacted mandatory
schemes where death was automatic once a defendant was found guilty
of a capital offense. 3 3 The North Carolina statute was eventually held
unconstitutional because it failed to permit ajury to consider mitigating
circumstances. 3 4 Other states enacted "aggravating-mitigating" patterns, where juries or judges were instructed to focus on whether certain
specifically defined facts had been established by the evidence before
35
assessing punishment.
The case of Adams v. Texas 3 6 arose from one of these new statutes.
The Texas legislature, in an attempt to address the concerns of the
Court in Furman, provided for a bifurcated trial with separate hearings
29. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.10. These studies were again before the Court in
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (1986).
30. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
31.

408 U.S 238 (1972).

32. Id. The Court's holding was stated in a brief per curiam opinion and contained no
central analysis.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

34. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Accord Roberts v. Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633 (1976).

35. In Florida, for example, the post-Furman capital punishment statute required the
judge to instruct the jury to determine a capital defendant's sentence by balancing eight
specifically enumerated aggravating factors and seven specifically enumerated mitigating
factors. Examples of aggravating factors included the defendant committing more than
one murder at the same time or committing the murder while in the course of committing
certain felonies. Examples of mitigating factors included the defendant having no prior
criminal history or committing the crime while under the influence of an extreme emotional or mental disturbance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921-141 (West 1985). In Proffitt v.Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the Court determined that this aggravating-mitigating approach
properly focused the jury's inquiry so as to avoid unconstitutional jury discretion in sentencing. In a companion case, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court flatly
rejected the argument that a state was prohibited from enacting any capital punishment
statute no matter how carefully drawn.
36. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).

19881

JUROR BIAS

by the same jury as to guilt-innocence and punishment. 3 7 In the sentencing hearing, the jury decided three fact questions. 3 8 Only positiye,
unanimous answers to all three would result in the judge pronouncing a
sentence of death. 39 Texas also had a provision in its Penal Code that
stated: "A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror
unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of
fact." '40 The Supreme Court held this statute unconstitutional in Adams
on the ground that it violated the limits on jury exclusion set forth in
Witherspoon.
To reach this conclusion, the Adams Court first rejected Texas' contention that Witherspoon concerns did not apply, noting that the new
Texas death penalty statutes imposed limits on jury discretion in sentencing by focusing on three key sentencing factors, unlike the Illinois
statute at issue in Witherspoon.4 ' The Court reasoned that even if Texas
jurors were not directly deciding the defendant's punishment, they were
told in advance the effect of their answers to the three sentencing questions at trial. The Court determined that the Texas provision at issue
violated the constitutional requirements of Witherspoon because it not
only excluded potential jurors who refused to follow the law, but it also
excluded those who might have been able to follow the law but would
42
have weighed their duties as jurors more seriously.
In Adams, however, the Court appeared to retreat from the absolute
standard of exclusion set forth in Witherspoon. Rather than require a
state to demonstrate conclusively that a prospective juror could never
assess death or sit impartially to decide guilt, the Court indicated in dictum that a state could exclude venire members whose "views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [jurors]
in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath."'4 3 By hinting at
a "substantial impairment" test, the Court was tentatively moving in a
new direction permitting states to exclude for cause jurors who were less
than adamant about their opposition to capital punishment but whose
capacity to be fair was impaired by their beliefs. 44 Whether this redefini37.

7

7

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 3 .0 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1979).

38. The three questions posed to a Texas capital jury on sentencing were:
(l)whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2)whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3)if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
Id. at art. 37.071(b).
39. Id.
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
41. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
42. Adams, 488 U.S. at 49-50.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Prior to Adams, one of the first signals that indicated the Court was moving away
from applying the stringent standards of Witherspoon came in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
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tion was inadvertent, as dictum sometimes tends to be, or an intentional
nod toward the concerns of the dissent, 4 5 was difficult to determine
from the opinion. Furthermore, the Court did not address the more
practical problem of how courts or attorneys were to make this distinction from the long and often confused ramblings of prospective
4 6

jurors.

The Adams "substantial impairment" dictum, however, resurfaced in
Wainwright v. Wilt 4 7 as the definitive test for Witherspoon exclusions. The
issue in Witt was whether a prospective juror, who stated during voir
dire questioning in a capital case that her beliefs against capital punishment would "interfere" with her judging the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, could be challenged for cause consistently with Witherspoon.4 s
Witt argued that such a statement fell short of the Witherspoon requirement that potential jurors unmistakably demonstrate that they would automatically vote against the death penalty in all circumstances before the
state could remove them for cause. In rejecting this argument, the
Court recognized that the Witherspoon test for excluding jurors had been
simplified in Adams. 4 9 After Furman, states had enacted death penalty
statutes that limited jury discretion in sentencing, and the Court reasoned that trials of death penalty cases were now similar to other criminal trials in which the jury's mission was to act as a fact-finder. 50 The
liberalization of the Witherspoon test was appropriate, said the Court, because the state as well as the defense was entitled to a jury that was fair
and impartial in making these factual decisions. 5 1 Additionally, the
Court concluded that a requirement of "unmistakable clarity" in the
showing that a Witherspoon excludable was properly challenged for cause
was impractical given the nature of voir dire examinations in capital
cases where many jurors equivocate, fail to articulate their true feelings,
(1978) where the Court declined to apply the "automatic" language of Witherspoon. Instead the Court held that exclusion by the state of certain prospective capital jurors was
proper because the jurors had made it unmistakably clear they could not follow the law in
the case regardless of whether they would automatically vote against imposing death. Id.
at 596. See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985). Thus, in retrospect, the
"substantial impairment" language of Adams should not have been totally unexpected.
45. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Adams argued that as a result of Furman, "the conditions that formed the predicate for Witherspoon no longer exist," and that "the Court
should be reexamining the doctrinal underpinnings of Witherspoon ...
448 U.S. at 5253 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
48. Id. at 415-16.
49. The test had been simplified in the sense that the "tests with respect to sentencing
and guilt, originally in two prongs [in Witherspoon] have been merged ..
" It had been
liberalized in the sense that it had gone from requiring that a juror state he would automatically be opposed to the death penalty in Witherspoon to determining whether he was
"substantially impaired" in the performance of his duties as a juror as a result of his views
on capital punishment before he could be excused for cause. Id. at 421.
50. Id. at 422. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423. The Court supported its conclusion by noting that the
Witherspoon decision was based upon sixth amendment principles requiring a fair and impartial juror, not upon an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
Under the sixth amendment, the Court reasoned that no defendant in any criminal case,
capital or otherwise, is entitled to seat jurors who are biased in his favor. Id.
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or hide them. 52 Finally, the Court determined that trial judges' rulings
on Witherspoon challenges of equivocating venire members should be
as
treated as findings of fact and afforded a presumption of correctness,
53
are state court fact findings generally in habeas corpus review.
Witt signaled that the Court was shifting its view of death penalty
cases in general and of capital jury selection specifically. Witherspoon's
emphasis was on a death penalty defendant's right to a jury that was
more likely to acquit or sentence leniently because of residual doubts
about the penalty to be imposed. Witt's emphasis was on the state's
right, as well as the defendant's, to have jurors who could fairly and
impartially apply the law. In all likelihood, this shift in attitude was due
to the Court's belief that state death penalty statutes, subsequent to
Furman, adequately channeled a jury's sentencing decision, thus reducing the need for stringent restrictions on state challenges for cause.
II.
A.

LOCKHART V MCCREE: "THE BIASED BurT UNBIASED JUROR"

The Eighth Circuit's Reliance on Statistics About Attitudes

On February 14, 1978, Ardia McCree robbed and killed the owner
of a gift shop and service station in Camden, Arkansas. His defense at
trial was alibi. He claimed that a "tall, black stranger" hitched a ride
with him, used his rifle to commit the crime, and later asked to be left off
on a nearby dirt road. Two state eyewitnesses testified that McCree was
alone immediately after the murder until the time the "stranger" was
supposed to have left the car. Ballistic reports determined that McCree's rifle, which had been left by the side of the road, had fired the
fatal shot. The jury disbelieved McCree's testimony, convicted him of
capital murder, but assessed his punishment at life imprisonment without possibility of parole - a reaction that is not unusual in cases in
which proof of guilt is beyond reasonable doubt but is short of
54
ironclad.
At trial, the judge had excluded for cause eight prospective jurors
who stated they could not assess the death penalty under any circumstances. The jurors had not been asked nor had they volunteered
whether they could put aside their strongly-held beliefs and follow the
law in determining McCree's guilt. 55 Arkansas law required that a unitary jury both decide guilt and assess sentence. 56 Consequently, this
52. The Court observed that:
This is because determinations ofjuror bias cannot be reduced to question-andanswer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply
cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been
made 'unmistakably clear.'
Id. at 424-25.
53. Id. at 426.
54. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1761 (1986). See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
55. 106 S. Ct. at 1761.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301(3) (1977); Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 395, 659
S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984).
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inquiry would have been immaterial.
McCree could not claim that the jury was biased against him in assessing punishment, since it chose the lesser of the two possible
sentences. He argued, however, that by excluding from the guilt-innocence trial the eight venire members who could not consider capital
punishment, without inquiring into whether they could fairly determine
his guilt, the state had violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment
57
rights to a fair and impartial jury in the trial on guilt or innocence.
This claim brought him squarely within the unanswered question posed
by Witherspoon, concerning whether these jurors "biased on sentence,
but unbiased on guilt" could constitutionally be excluded from determining guilt or innocence.
At a subsequent habeas corpus hearing, McCree presented conclusions from fifteen social science studies concerning the attitudes and beliefs of Witherspoon excludables. 58 These studies convinced the district
court that preventing "biased but unbiased" Witherspoon excludables
from sitting at the guilt portion of the trial resulted in a jury more prone
to convict capital defendants. The district court vacated both McCree's
conviction and his sentence, concluding that they were obtained in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 59
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
57. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
58. The court categorized the following studies as "attitudinal and demographic"
surveys: Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-QualifiedJury:
An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1970) [hereinafter Bronson
I]; Bronson, Does the Exclusion of ScrupledJurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to
Convict: Some Evidence From California, 3 WOODROW WILSON L. J. 11 (1980) [hereinafter
Bronson II]; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death QualificationandJury
Attitudes, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) [hereinafter Fitzgerald]; Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Study No. 2016 (1971) [hereinafter Harris]; Precision Research, Inc., Survey No.
1286 (1981) [hereinafter Precision Survey].
The court categorized the following studies as "conviction-proneness" surveys:
Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) [hereinafter
Cowan]; Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of
PsychologicalData to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg];Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified"Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971) [hereinafter Jurow]; Wilson, Belief in Capital
Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished) (1964) [hereinafter Wilson]; Zeisel,
Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment (University of Chicago Monograph) (1968) [hereinafter Zeisel].
The court categorized the following studies as "other surveys": Haney, On the Selection
of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-QualificationProcess, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 121
(1984) [hereinafter Haney]; Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984) [hereinafter Thompson]; A.
Young, Arkansas Archival Study (unpublished) (1981) [hereinafter Young]. See Grigsby v.
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). In addition, McCree had presented several other surveys conducted by various national polling organizations, which tended to show that blacks and
women disproportionately opposed the death penalty and were more likely to be excluded
in a capital case because of their views: Harris & Associates, Inc., American Institute for
Public Opinion (Gallup), National Opinion Research Center, and several national polls
from 1953 through 1978. Brief for Respondent at 98, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
59. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1324 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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for several novel reasons. First, the court determined that the sixth
amendment "fair cross-section" requirement applied to petit juries, the
juries actually seated to hear the case, as well as the venire and the original jury list, and that the excluded "biased but unbiased" jurors constituted a cognizable group for sixth amendment purposes. These
conclusions led it to accept McCree's argument that the exclusion of
these jurors violated the sixth amendment. 60 The court also determined
that the fifteen social science studies provided a valid and reasonable
basis from which to conclude that such a group would tend to favor the
prosecution in determining guilt or innocence. The court saw no inconsistency between its holdings and the decisions in Adams and Witt, which
had moved away from the generally stricter standards announced 6in1
Witherspoon for reviewing challenges for cause of equivocating jurors.
B.

Conflict Among the Circuits

The Eighth Circuit's holding was unique. Although other appellate
courts had considered the question, they had unanimously determined
that venire members disqualified on sentence could properly be excluded from the guilt-innocence trial. 6 2 In Smith v. Balkcom, 6 3 for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that exclusion of "biased but
unbiased" venire members was unconstitutional because the resulting
jury was conviction-prone. To support this contention, the petitioner in
Smith had presented thirteen studies similar to those presented in McCree.64 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that even if it assumed that the results
of the studies were accurate, the petitioner had no constitutional right to
have Witherspoon excludable jurors determine his guilt. The court stated:
[The fact that a] death-qualified jury is more likely to convict
than a non-death-qualified jury does not demonstrate which
jury is impartial. It indicates only that a death-qualified jury
might favor the prosecution65and that a non-death-qualified jury
might favor the defendant.
Nor did the court believe that Witherspoon excludables who could claim
to be impartial in determining guilt were a distinctive group whose exclusion by the state violated the "fair cross-section" requirement of the
sixth amendment. Neither the state nor the petitioner was entitled to a
juror whose interests and biases prevented him from considering the
facts with an open mind. "A cross-section of the fair and impartial is
more desirable," reasoned the court, "than a fair cross-section of the
60. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 231-32 revd sub. nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
61. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 415-16 (1985).
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub
nom. Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
64. Compare Smith, 660 F.2d at 577 n.8 (listing studies presented by petitioner) with
Gngsby, 758 F.2d at 232-35 (listing studies presented by respondent, McCree).
65. Smith, 660 F.2d at 578 quoting Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 584 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
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prejudiced and biased." 6 6
The Fourth Circuit reached the same result by a slightly different
analysis in Keeten v. Garrison.6 7 In Keeten, the court questioned the persuasiveness of the statistical data submitted by the respondent because
the state had presented strong statistical evidence showing that the studies were poorly designed, lacked random sampling, and were not monitored for internal consistency. 6 8 Even assuming the accuracy of such
statistics, however, the Fourth Circuit found that a large portion of
Witherspoon excludables were likely to be "nullifiers" when determining
guilt or innocence, and, thus, they could be properly excluded under a
sixth amendment analysis. 6 9 As to respondents' fourteenth amendment
due process argument, the court determined that a capital defendant
was entitled to a fair jury, not a jury biased in favor of a not-guilty verdict. 70 The Eighth Circuit in McCree was the only federal circuit court to
disagree.
C.

McCree in the Supreme Court

Speaking for a six-member majority in the Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist reversed the Eighth Circuit in McCree. The majority first rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding that the fifteen social science studies
supported the thesis that removal for cause of "biased but unbiased"
jurors resulted in conviction-prone juries. The majority pointed out
that only six of the studies in question dealt specifically with the potential effect of striking Witherspoon excludables from the guilt-innocence
phase of the trial, three of which were considered and rejected as insufficient data in Witherspoon itself.7 1 Only one of the three new studies attempted to quantify the effect "nullifiers" would have if permitted to
serve on the guilt-innocence portion of a capital trial. 72 None of the
studies predicted whether the presence of "biased but unbiased" jurors
73
in determining guilt would have altered the result .in an actual trial.
The majority next rejected McCree's sixth amendment argument by
reasoning that the right to a fair cross-section of the community did not
extend beyond jury venires to actual petit juries. The task of providing
66. Smith, 660 F.2d at 583.
67. 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2259 (1986).
68. Id. at 132. Additionally, the state had presented studies of Dr. Steven Penrod, a
psychologist who specializes in researching jurors and their attitudes. Dr. Penrod's studies
concluded that there was little correlation between jurors' attitudes about the criminal
justice system and their verdicts in the mock trials that he had conducted. Other expert
witnesses for the state testified at trial that respondent Keeten's studies failed to show a
strong correlation between jurors' attitudes and their possible verdicts in death penalty
cases. The state contended that they did show, however, that "opposition to the death
penalty strongly increases the likelihood of juror nullification." Id. Many of these same
studies were again presented in Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985).
69. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133. The court reasoned that a capital defendant does not
have a constitutional right to be tried by jurors who cannot follow the law.
70. Id. at 134.
71. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1762-63 nn.4 & 8 (1986).
72. Id. at 1764 n.12.
73. Id.
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each criminal defendant with a truly representative petit jury, as op74
posed to a venire, stated the Court, was a "practical impossibility."
Even if the sixth amendment were extended to petit juries, the majority
would still reject the "death-qualified" challenge because shared attitude groups would not meet the requirement of a "distinct, cognizable
group." The majority observed that the fair cross-section requirement
had always been based upon the ability to recognize a distinct, cognizable group and to show that the group's wholesale exclusion from jury
service was unrelated to individual members' ability to serve. 75 Qualification of jurors with respect to sentence was related to the legitimate
76
state goal of obtaining a jury that would be fair and impartial.
The majority also did not view respondent's fourteenth amendment
argument with favor. Although the majority agreed that respondent was
entitled to a fair and impartial jury under the fourteenth amendment, it
refused to interpret this principle as a requirement that a capital jury be
"balanced" at the guilt-innocence stage by the inclusion of Witherspoon
excludables, who would allegedly view the state's evidence more critically and be less conviction-prone. The fourteenth amendment, reasoned the Court, does not require any particular mix of jurors on the
77
panel.
Lastly, the Court harmonized its holding with the Witherspoon-AdamsWitt 7 8 line of decisions. It rejected the argument that those decisions
implied a constitutional violation whenever the state excludes a group
that might favor the defense. Unlike the Illinois jury system of Witherspoon, the applicable Arkansas procedure served several important functions. These functions included maintenance of a unitary jury system, in
which a capital defendant benefited at the sentencing stage from a jury's
residual doubts about guilt, and which required that the evidence at trial
be presented only once. 79 The Court also referred to the dissent in Adants, which had reasoned that a jury's role at guilt-innocence was primarily that of a fact-finder with limited discretion, unlike its role in
80
sentencing.
D. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dis74. Id. at 1765.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1766.
77. Id. at 1767. The Court observed that if McCree's argument that the 14th amendment required a perfectly balanced jury were adopted, it would necessitate a "Sisyphean
task of balancing juries, making sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats
and Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-collar
laborers, and so on," as well as abandoning the practice of using peremptory challenges.
Id.
78. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
79. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1768.
80. Id. at 1769-70 citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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sented. 8 ' They argued that Witherspoon specifically stated that if a potential death penalty recipient made the proper statistical showing that
exclusion of potential jurists, unbiased on guilt from the guilt-innocence
determination, would result in a more conviction-prone jury, the Court
would find a constitutional violation. 8 2 According to the dissent, McCree had made such a showing. Additionally, the dissent claimed that
"there [were] no studies which contradict the studies submitted by the
respondent; in other words, all documented studies support the district

court's findings." 8 3 Authorizing conviction-prone juries to judge guilt
or innocence in a capital case was particularly unacceptable, reasoned
the dissenters, since death penalty defendants should be protected by
"unique safeguards" against erroneous convictions.
The dissent did not rely upon the sixth amendment or upon a fair
cross-section analysis to support its position, except in passing. 84 Instead, Justice Marshall reasoned that the statistical studies supported a
finding that McCree's jury was conviction-prone, in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 5 In reply to the Court's
assertion that Adams viewed the jury as performing a different function at
guilt-innocence than at sentencing, the dissent interpreted Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Adams to the contrary and argued that both stages of
the trial required juries representative of the conscience of the commu' 86
nity and who are properly "balanced."
The dissent supported these arguments by referring to Ballew v.
Georgia, in which the Court held Georgia's authorization of criminal juries of fewer than six members unconstitutional. 8 7 The Court in Ballew
concluded that this reduction in the number of members made the jury
less conducive to careful deliberation and accurate fact-finding. 8 8 The
dissent reasoned that by keeping venire members disqualified on sentence from determining guilt or innocence, the majority in McCree had
sanctioned juries that were, like the juries in Ballew, "likely to be deficient in the quality of their deliberations, the accuracy of their results,
81. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1771-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1773 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 238
(8th Cir. 1985)', rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)).
84. Id. at 1775 n.6 (MarshallJ., dissenting). In a footnote, the dissent argued that the
wholesale exclusion of any "distinction group" from a jury panel has the same practical
effect as excluding such a group from the venire. For this reason, the dissent agreed with
McCree that exclusion at voir dire of "biased but unbiased" jurors from determining guilt
or innocence in a capital case was a violation of the fair cross-section requirement of the
sixth amendment. Id.
85. Id. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These survey results made the Court's opinion even more troublesome to the dissent because Witt had broadened the definition of
excludable jurors in capital cases, thus making the resulting jury more arguably conviction-prone than it would have been if the Witherspoon test had been applied. Id.
86. Id. at 1777 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
87. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ballew, 435 U.S. 223 (1978)).
88. Id. at 1778-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This conclusion was supported in Battew
by reference to more than 31 studies, all of which concluded that decreasing the number
of deliberating jurors also decreased the quality of their deliberation. Ballew, 435 U.S. at
231-39. The Court discounted the three studies relied upon by the state because of difficulties those studies presented in their methodology. Id. at 242-43.
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the degree to which they favor the prosecution, and the extent to which
they adequately represent minority groups in the community." 89
The dissent also rejected the Court's conclusion that the state had a
substantial interest in identifying and excluding "nullifiers" before the
guilt stage of the trial. In the dissent's opinion, such an identification
procedure could be easily accomplished by allowing the state to ask prospective jurors if they could be fair in judging the defendant's guilt or
innocence, without delving into their views on capital punishment.9 0
The dissenters were not persuaded that practical limitations on the accuracy of such an inquiry were so significant as to justify exclusion of
Witherspoon excludables from the guilt-innocence trial.
III.

ANALYSIS OF MCCREE

There are at least four kinds of analyses to which the Supreme
Court's holding in McCree might productively be subjected. The first
inquiry might be whether the unitary jury used by Arkansas has real advantages, as the majority concluded it did and, if so, whether they can
easily be achieved by other means, as the dissent argued. A second concern might be whether meaningful numbers of venire members substantially biased on sentence, yet unbiased on guilt, can be reliably identified
through voir dire examination, as the dissenters maintained, or, as several states argued as amici curiae, whether this inquiry would be too internally contradictory to produce meaningful results in courtroom
examinations of the real lay members in a venire. Third, it may be useful to compare the "biased but unbiased" venire members at issue with
the kinds of excluded groups of which the Court has taken cognizance
for sixth amendment purposes. Finally, it might be productive to examine the Eighth Circuit's reliance on social scientific studies as the basis for its conclusion that McCree's jury was unconstitutionally
conviction-prone, and the Supreme Court's rejection of that reasoning.
A.

The Value of the UnitaryJury

The dissent in McCree was based upon the argument that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required a neutral jury selection process, rather than upon an argument invoking the sixth
amendment prohibition of invidious discrimination against cognizable
89. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1778 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Although the dissent claimed
that more blacks than whites would be stricken from jury panels under the Court's analysis, the dissent did not rely on this argument to find a violation of the sixth amendment fair
cross-section requirement, but suggested that it might, however, be of constitutional significance under the 14th amendment. Contra Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239.
90. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780 (Marshall,J., dissenting) The dissent stated: "It overlooks, however, the ease with which nullifiers could be identified before trial without any
extended focus on how jurors would conduct themselves at a capital sentencing proceeding. Potential jurors could be asked, for example, 'if there be an) reason why any of them
could not fairly and impartially try the issue of defendant's guilt in accordance with the
evidence presented at the trial and the court's instructions as to the law.' ") Id. (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1310 (E.D, Ark. 1983)).
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groups. 9 1 The dissenters believed that by excluding the "biased but unbiased" juror from determining a capital defendant's guilt or innocence,
the state actually would produce a jury biased in favor of the prosecution. 9 2 In making this argument, the dissent appeared to be balancing
the interests of the defendant against the state's interest in its unitary
jury procedure, rejecting the notion that the state had rational reasons
for preferring a unitary jury system.
In any fourteenth amendment analysis, courts have traditionally
considered the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial in the
context of the state's legitimate interests in the procedure. The weightier the state's legitimate interest in the procedure, the more likely the
procedure will pass constitutional muster. 9 3 In this instance, the procedure at issue was the state's decision to have a single jury decide both
guilt-innocence and sentence in a capital case. The only state interests
the dissent found potentially applicable were its interest in efficiency and
expense and the possibility that a single jury might be less likely to assess death if its members had residual doubts about guilt. The dissent
'94
deemed the first interest "unconvincing" and the second "offensive."
1.

Avoiding the Reduction of Shared Decisionmaking
Responsibility: The Unitary Jury and the
"Residual Doubt"

Contrary to the dissent's position, however, Arkansas did not argue
or recognize efficiency and expense as a justification for its unitary jury
procedure in capital cases. 9 5 If it had, the dissent would have been correct in rejecting the argument because time and cost has proved to be
insufficient to reduce jury size. 96 Arkansas did argue, however, that the
Supreme Court of Arkansas had specifically recognized the theory that
separate juries might have the effect of reducing the individual jurors'
responsibility for deciding a difficult and severe outcome. 97 There may
be more merit to this argument than the dissent was willing to concede.
The responsibility of deciding guilt in a capital case weighs heavily
on jurors. The analysis necessary to decide guilt, followed in sequence
by the responsibility in the same individuals to determine sentence,
prompts significant caution in most jurors at both the guilt-innocence
and the sentencing stages of a capital trial. Conversely, the most effective argument the defense may have against the death penalty in many
cases is that of residual doubt about guilt. 9 8 Even aside from that effect,
91. Id. at 1775-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1778-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1769, 1779. See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
94. HcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. See Brief for Petitioner at 6-8, Lockhart v McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
96. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243-44 (1978).
97. Brief for Petitioner at 14, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (citing Rector v. State, 280 Ark.
385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2370 (1984)).
98. This is a "particularly powerful" argument, according to a publication of the National College for Criminal Defense. The College urges defense attorneys to argue that
death "is an absolute punishment and. . . is not appropriate for one who is not absolutely

1988]

JUROR BIAS

jurors who have shared the moral responsibility for a community finding
of guilt and who have deliberated over the existence of small remaining
doubts are often induced to be more cautious later in considering the
death penalty. Thus the unitary jury can serve as an important additional safeguard against erroneous use of capital punishment. Indeed,
the Arkansas procedure is even a possible explanation for Ardia McCree's own life sentence and his avoidance of the death penalty.
This concern was articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Smith v.
Balkcom. 9 9 The court, while assuming the case of a capital defendant
who had been convicted of a capital crime and who faced the trial that
would determine his sentence, stated:
A new jury, including only those willing to impose the death
penalty, would be selected. They would entertain no doubt
that the defendant before them was, indeed, the guilty party.
Presumably they would be instructed that the defendant was
the guilty party .... Not even a flimsy alibi would disturb their
deliberations; no suggestion of misidentification would be material. Some may conclude that the destruction of the whimsical doubt sought here would involve a more serious
deprivation of the benefits of the constitutionally guaranteed
jury trial than envisioned by Smith's advocates in this
appeal. 100
The dissenters in McCree found such an argument "offensive" and
"cruel."11 They maintained that if the state was sincere in its claim that
it was acting in the defendant's best interests in maintaining a unitary
jury scheme, it should at least permit the defendant to waive this benevolence in favor of having two juries, so that "biased but unbiased" jurors
10 2
could determine guilt or innocence.
Arkansas may have had substantial reasons, however, for avoiding
the choice advocated by the dissenters. For example, it may have concluded that a sentence of death should not be made to depend, or appear to depend, upon a strategic choice of this kind. Granted that
strategy does influence outcomes, and that offering the defendant a
choice is sometimes appropriate, Arkansas may have concluded that it
should not encourage what would amount to an all-or-nothing,
guilty (if there are lingering doubts about the evidence)." Kammen, Final Arguments in a
Death Penalty Case, National Collegefor CriminalDefense Death Penalty Defense 13 (1983). See also
Texas District & County Attorneys Ass 'n, Capital Murder Seminar A- 1 (1980) (evidence of guilt
that is less than ironclad often leads a jury not to return the death penalty). Thus, in one
particularly grisly case involving the rape-murders of two young women, defense counsel's
final argument on punishment was less than 30 seconds long and included the following:
"You've convicted the wrong man. You should have found him not guilty. And since you
shouldn't have convicted him in the first place, I'm not going to plead for his life now."
The jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. Defense counsel
attributed this verdict to the fact that "the jury had a doubt about [whether the defendant]
did it." D. CRUMP & G. JACOBS, CAPITAL MURDER 121-24 (1977) [hereinafter D. Crump].
99. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub
nom. Tison v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 882 (1982).
100. Smith, 660 F.2d. at 581.
101. .MlcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1781-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 106 S. Ct. at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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riverboat gamble on a matter of pure procedure if the defendant were
given the choice. Moreover, Arkansas could sensibly have concluded
that it would be unfair or impractical to force such a choice on a capital
defendant before the guilt-innocence trial and then, in the event of conviction, to consider it as binding him in the sentencing trial. This choice
is likely to benefit only a small number of defendants because most capital cases are not prosecuted unless there is strong proof of guilt due to
the high costs to the state.10 3 It would clearly work to the disadvantage
of a substantial number of those who were found guilty and who had
chosen a two-jury alternative if the dissenters' arguments are accepted.
The strategic position of a person who has made a bad choice, and who
earnestly asks for a second chance in the light of subsequent information, suggests that enforcement of the binding nature of the election
would be difficult.
Even if the dissent's suggestion had merit, one need not conclude
that it is required by the Constitution. Perhaps a legislature could rationally enact the dissenters' proposal allowing for the defendant's risky
choice. Arguments are available, however, to be made against that
model, and due to the state's legislative discretion, they support Arkansas's selection of a different model.
2.

The Defendant's Counter-Proposals: The "Twenty-Four
Member" Jury, Replacement Schemes, and Ad Hoc Size

McCree suggested, on the other hand, that the state's valid concerns could be addressed by other procedures that would retain Witherspoon excludables unbiased on guilt.10 4 For example, he argued that the
state could impanel two juries simultaneously. The first jury would include members who were "biased but unbiased." The second would
not. Both juries would hear evidence of guilt, but only the first jury
would decide that issue. The second jury's function would be to decide
punishment if that issue were reached. In this manner, residual doubts
about guilt still could be entertained by the punishment jury, and the
1 05
trial would need to be held only once.
103. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
104. McCree, in his response to the Petition for Certiorari, stated that Arkansas was
"free to empanel additional jurors, to have two juries hear the case simultaneously, to
move toward judge sentencing, to entrust the jury deliberations to whatever jurors are
selected, or to employ any other procedural device that avoids systematic exclusion of
Witherspoon excludable jurors." Memorandum of Respondent in Response to Petition for
Certiorari, Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
105. See Colussi, The Unconstitutionalityof Death Qualifying aJury Prior to the Determination of
Guilt: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 616-17
(1982) [hereinafter Colussi]. The district court, taking McCree's suggestions into account,
ordered Arkansas to empanel a second jury purged of "biased but unbiased"jurors as well
as Witherspoon excludables, to decide the penalty issue once a defendant was found guilty of
capital murder. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1320 (E.D. Ark. 1983). The Eighth
Circuit modified this requirement by leaving "the procedure to be followed to secure an
impartial jury in the guilt-innocence trial . . . to the states." Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226, 242-43 (1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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The Arkansas legislature might sensibly have decided, however,
that this two-jury procedure would not be fairer to capital defendants
than the unitary jury; arguably, the Arkansas legislature could have concluded such a proposal would be worse for defendants. The presence of
both juries would be a dramatic way of impressing all twenty-four jurors
with their limited roles. Furthermore, the deliberate impaneling of a
separate sentencing jury, before defendant's guilt was established,
would carry an obvious and undesirable message to jurors deciding guilt
or innocence. Perhaps most importantly, the sentencing jurors would
not share the experience of grappling with large and small doubts during deliberations on guilt. 10 6 Arkansas could have sensibly concluded
that the elimination of this experience would remove an important restraint that its system provided against the inappropriate imposition of
capital punishment.
Similar deficiencies are innate in the suggestion, also made by McCree, of partially replacingjury members at the sentencing stage.' 0 7 Arkansas could have reasonably concluded that the new jurors would be
relieved of responsibility for deciding guilt. Those remaining from the
guilt stage would be impressed with the finality of that decision by the
departure of jurors with whom they had shared deliberations, but who
were not fit to determine punishment because their views were too extreme. This system might also work to the disadvantage of capital defendants. McCree also suggested that sentencing juries could be
composed by removing Witherspoon excludables without replacing
them. 10 8 This procedure would leave death penalty decisions to be
made by a jury of ad hoc size, with no clear remedy for the possibility
that the number might be reduced below acceptable levels. It would
also retain most of the disadvantages of the replacement proposal.
Furthermore, the Arkansas legislature might have concluded that
the possible detriments of the two-jury proposal were not confined to
the sentencing stage. It could have considered the possibility that ifjurors knew that their verdict of guilt would lead to the acceptance of responsibility of another body of jurors for determining punishment,
some individuals might also be less restrained in finding guilt precisely
because they could pass on to another body the responsibility for deciding the ultimate disposition. The seriousness of the guilt decision thus
would be reduced, at least in some individuals, by the division of responsibility. Although these are not necessary conclusions, and indeed their
validity or significance may be the subjects of substantial disagreement,
they do seem to be within the realm of considerations that legitimately
can influence a legislature.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 247 (Gibson,
J., dissenting).
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
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The Argument for Elimination of Jury Sentencing

In requiring two differently composed bodies to ensure that "biased
but unbiased" jurors decide guilt or innocence, the dissent did not confront another potentially harmful effect of its proposal. If the dissent
had prevailed, states might legitimately decide that the values of jury
sentencing were outweighed by the probability of hidden nullifiers, the
unfairness to some defendants, the likelihood of ambiguities in the selection process, the resulting increase in appellate reversals, and the diminished accuracy and increased complexity of voir dire examination.
In short, some states might regard the two-jury requirement as so cumbersome that they would prefer to abolish jury sentencing and have capital punishment imposed exclusively by judges.' 0 9
Although the dissent did not discuss this possibility, McCree did. In
his response to the petition for certiorari, McCree argued that Arkansas,
to protect its legitimate interests, was "free . . . to move toward judge
sentencing."' 10 During oral argument, McCree's attorney candidly confirmed that the choice of abolishing juries for sentencing purposes was
constitutionally available to the states.''' However, McCree's attorney
refused to admit that the practical effect might influence the state's interest in retaining a unitary jury.
Although sentencing by judges has been held constitutional" 12 and
has advantages, it is not desired by many capital defendants because of
the result.' 13 The record in McCree demonstrates the "conventional wisdom" that judges generally are more conviction-prone than juries.' 14
This principle would seem to imply, under the reasoning of McCree, that
109. Id. Arguments attempting to make the law regarding jury sentencing so draconian
that it cannot possibly function have also been generally rejected by the Court. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (rejecting an argument that an "automatic" set
of procedures to determine a capital defendant's guilt and punishment should be instituted, with the observation that such a requirement would effectively prohibit capital punishment by imposing impossible conditions for its use).
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Ill. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 92-212).
112. Lockhart v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (reversed on other grounds); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
113. Judge-sentencing has the arguable virtue of greater consistency which is an important value in death penalty cases. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(Douglas, J.,
concurring). Juries, however, have advantages such as community restraint, greater representation, and absence of "professional bias." See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 15556 (1968).
114. The district court record included the following testimony:
The Witness: What I'm saying is it's true of any of us. As a parent, as a teacher,
the first time a student comes to me and says, 'I missed the exam. I have been
sick,' I believe it. And the second time I believe it. The third time. By the time
I've heard it for 15 years university teaching, I must confess I have developed a
certain degree of cynicism. And I'm simply saying a judge who has heard a possible but not probable alibi defense or anyone who has heard these things before
The Court: The conventional wisdom is you don't try your case to the judge
unless your client is innocent.
Ms. Fewell: So you are implying in that statement that judges are more conviction-prone?
The Witness: Well, as I think his Honor was saying, only on the facts.
Record at 674, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1759 (1986)(testimony of witness Bronson);
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judges might also sentence more harshly. Judges are less ethnically diverse than juries, 1 5 and they arguably are underinclusive of minorities
who would be more hesitant in death sentencing. For this reason, it
would be ironic if McCree's arguments resulted in the substitution of
judges forjuries. States may also view judge sentencing as less desirable
because they prefer to have such serious matters decided by a group
more likely to weigh and measure conflicting arguments and decide
them according to community standards. 116 If one concludes that the
use of jurors for capital sentencing should not be made so cumbersome
as to force states to choose judge sentencing when they prefer to retain
juries, the decision of the Court in McCree can be supported by the observation that it tended to retain jury sentencing as a viable alternative.
A.

The Feasibility of Identifying "Biased But Unbiased" Venire Members

The dissent in McCree concluded that venire members biased on
sentence, but unbiased on guilt or innocence, could be identified
through practical procedures. Specifically, the dissenters suggested that
there should be a two-step voir dire examination in capital cases. During the first stage, attorneys should be permitted to ask whether prospective jurors believed they could be fair, without delving into their
views on the death penalty, although presumably not concealing that the
case was a capital one. Jurors qualified by this questioning would determine the defendant's guilt or innocence. During the second stage, attorneys could qualify prospective jurors who would determine
punishment, much in the same manner as is presently done under
Witherspoon and Witt. The dissenters believed that this procedure would
ensure that a death penalty defendant would receive a fair trial as to his
guilt because his jury could contain members who were substantially opposed to capital punishment but who could fairly, if not more sympathetically, view the evidence in his favor. The dissenters concluded,
indeed, that the state could accomplish the result easily by this procedure, and they explained that in their view such an analysis was invited
7
by Witherspoon.'1
The dissent rested upon the assumption that "biased, yet unbiased"
venire members are sufficiently numerous to be significant and can be
identified with reasonable accuracy through voir dire examination. Such
a venire member must, by hypothesis, regard capital punishment as so
repugnant that he cannot conform to the law governing its imposition.
Yet, simultaneously, he must be capable of impartially deciding guilt or
see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-65 (1966)(judges more likely to
convict when judges and juries disagree).
115. A recent survey revealed that in 1985, the average number of minorities in state
judicial positions was 5.4%. Of this figure, Blacks accounted for 3.8%, and Hispanics accounted for 1.2%. NAT'L LAwJ., Dec. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (citing The Success of Women
and Minorities in Achieving Judicial Office, a study done by the Fund for Modern Courts
in New York City in 1985).

116. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
117. ,VcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
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innocence while knowing that his guilty verdict is a step toward the imposition of precisely the penalty he finds so abhorrent, completely free
of that consideration. In the Supreme Court, several states as amici curiae quoted a hypothetical venire member's explanation of this "biased,
yet unbiased" state of mind:' 18
Yes, I do absolutely oppose capital punishment. No, I cannot imagine any case (no matter how aggravated and no matter
how terrifying) in which I could even contemplate a death sentence. Yes, it is absolute. I am not merely opposed to capital
punishment, I categorically exclude, as barbaric and immoral,
even the possibility of it.
However, I could act to find a person guilty of a capital
crime, knowing that I will then participate in making him face
the sentence of death because of my finding. Furthermore,
when I do that, I can remain completely free from any consideration of my opinion that no civilized person would participate
in findings that could lead to capital punishment.
Yes, I could decide the issue of guilt impartially in a capital
case. No, I would not be influenced in the slightest to vote
against conviction because of my revulsion toward capital punishment. Even though I categorically reject even the possibility
of my being a part of a body that imposes the death penalty,
and even though I know that my decision on guilt would be an
inexorable part of that process in that it would lead to a decision on precisely that immoral and barbaric penalty, I would
decide guilt without being influenced at all by my convictions in
this regard.
The existence of persons with this state of mind is possible; perhaps the
dissenters were even justified in concluding that the existence of such
persons was probable." 9 Most individuals, however, would find the two
states of mind incompatible, and the hypothesized responses seem more
likely to be the result of poor communication than of a potential juror's
real attitudes. The difficulty in accepting the dissenter's argument,
therefore, lies in the proposition that numerous individuals of this "biased but unbiased" state of mind can be identified easily and accurately.
In fact, application of the simpler Witherspoon-Witt distinction, to
identify persons qualified as impartial on sentence and to separate them
from those disqualified on sentence, already requires great effort in the
lower court.' 20 It is unusual that a venire member comes to the courtroom with an innately formulated position articulated in precise Witherspoon-Witt terms, even if disqualified. Frequently, the initial response of
such a potential juror is "against" the death penalty. Such a response
may or may not indicate disqualification, and further questioning may be
118. Brief for Amici Curiae Alabama, Connecticut, et al. at 13-14, Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
119. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1772 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25 n.6 (1985). See Schnapper, Taking
1l1itherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 TEX. L. REV. 977 (1984) [hereinafter Schnapper].
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necessary to obtain more precise Witherspoon- Witt information.121
The result is often equivocation. The venire member is being asked
whether he would violate the law if seated on a jury, and such an admission is not easily made. The process of adversary questioning increases
this problem. Even if a prospective juror understands the inquiry completely and accurately, it is often difficult to express a clear answer when
opposing counsel word questions and misconstrue answers strategically.
Jurors frequently feel so pressed that they refuse to answer questions or
are reduced to tears. The record in McCree reflects examples of this be12 3
havior,12 2 as do the opinions of several appellate courts.
For example, in O'Bryan v. Estelle, 124 questioning of some individual
jurors occupied as much as forty pages of transcript. The three venire
members who were the focus of the Fifth Circuit's review were each
asked dozens of times in dozens of different ways about their views, in
an effort to resolve the Witherspoon-Witt inquiry. Their answers were repeatedly evasive, contradictory and nonresponsive. One member of the
jury described himself as a "borderline tinker on the subject."' 12 5 When
asked whether he could decide the facts impartially, notwithstanding his
26
absolute opposition to the death penalty, this potential juror replied: 1
I believe I would, as you say as facts, I don't know. Like I say, I
would have reservations really regardless of what we consider
facts in myself. I mean as far as a personal belief. I wouldn't
elaborate to a greater extent, but I would think other than the
fact...

[sic].

These garbled responses are typical of those that the Witherspoon- Witt
inquiry sometimes produces, even in thoughtful and articulate lay
persons.
Such responses indicate that if capital cases are to be decided with
consistency, there is a need for keeping the inquiry as simple and clear
as possible. The arguments of the McCree dissent,' 2 7 however, would
overlay the existing Witherspoon-Witt inquiry by the addition of a more
finely graded sub-category of "biased yet unbiased" venire members,
which would be defined by another set of legal concepts that courts and
venire members presumably would have even greater difficulty in inter121.

D. Crump, supra note 98, at 541-42.

122. See Record at 643-45, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 ("You can see a very measured
physical response from most people, even the most conservative will have some response;
you can tell the breathing, heaving of chest, some folks will tear, some folks won't make
any eye contact. It's a very difficult situation for a person to be in.") (testimony of expert
witness Piazza).
123. E.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981). The following exchange in
Granviel came after a series of equivocal responses and adversary questioning: "The
Court: 'Mrs. Wallace, I am sure you do feel very deeply about this. It's brought tears to
your eyes; is that right?' Venirewoman Wallace: 'Yes.' " Id. at 687. See also Williams v.
Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1980); D. Crump, supra note 98, at 61.

124. 714 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
125. Record at 877, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
126. Id.
127. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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preting. This more complex inquiry would further decrease the likelihood that venire members would be accurately categorized. It also
would make it more difficult to obtain even-handed and consistent determinations of guilt or innocence in capital cases, a goal so fundameninvalidation
tal in death penalty cases that it was the basis for wholesale
128
of capital punishment statutes in Furman v. Georgia.
Several appellate courts have raised a second concern about the McCree dissenters' proposal. These courts have perceived the possibility
that persons absolutely opposed to capital punishment might consider it
their duty to serve on the jury at the guilt stage and to nullify the possibility of a death sentence by voting for acquittal regardless of the evidence. 129 One judge referred to such an individual as the "lying"
juror.130 While deliberate falsification is possible, it seems more likely
that a venire member would become a hidden nullifier merely because
he has overestimated his or her capacity to decide impartially on the
basis of the evidence, regardless of the consequences. The Fifth Circuit
explained the dilemma facing such a juror as follows:
A juror who has such deeply-seated conscientious scruples
against the death penalty might find himself confronting a
grisly choice. If, because of his scruples, he votes to acquit, he
must risk hanging the jury. Similarly motivated votes by other
jurors in subsequent trials and retrials could, in effect, result in
near immunity from crimes for which the death penalty can be
imposed, which would frustrate Florida's interest in the just
and even handed application of its laws, including the death
penalty statute. '31
The Spinkellink court concluded that Florida's "fundamental" interest in
avoiding this result justified its exclusion of such a3 2venire member from
deciding guilt or innocence, as well as sentence.i
It seems reasonable to conclude, as did the court in Spinkellink, that
there are some states of mind that make impartiality so difficult that the
law is justified in treating them as unattainable. For example, if a defendant's brother were a member of a venire, no court would prohibit a
state from excluding him even if he claimed that he could decide guilt
with impartiality. The moral and emotional effect of family membership
is too likely to countermand the most honest commitment to impartiality
in such a case. For similar reasons, the state may harbor justified skepticism about a Witherspoon excludable's ability to put aside a deeply held
religious, moral or ethical belief against capital punishment and to con128. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 766 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (possibility that such a juror "can hang the jury if he cannot have his way");
Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986);
United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954) (concern that such a jury would be "in
reality a 'partisan jury' ").
130. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 406 (5th Cir. 1983) (Buchmeyer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
131. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979).
132. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d 596-98.
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vict a defendant knowing that the sentence of death is the likely result.
The probability is high that any predictions of this nature would be a
product of poor communication during voir dire examination, confusion, or overestimation by the venire member of his capacity for making
a coldly logical decision. If these conclusions are accepted, a state
should be constitutionally permitted to conclude that Witherspoon excludables who convincingly predict impartiality in determining guilt or innocence would be so few, so difficult to identify, and so likely in any event
to frustrate the evenhanded adjudication of capital cases, that they
should be excluded from sitting in these cases in any capacity.
B.

"Biased but Unbiased' Jurors as a Cognizable Class

Another significant holding of McCree was that jurors who were biased on sentence, but who could be unbiased in determining guilt or
innocence, did not constitute a cognizable class for purposes of the sixth
amendment. 133 The dissent in McCree found it unnecessary to analyze
the issue because it had concluded that the respondent had been de134
prived of a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
The sixth amendment has been interpreted to mean that a criminal
defendant cannot be deprived of a jury selected from a "fair cross-section" of the community. 135 Perhaps more accurately, it has been characterized as prohibiting the systematic or invidious exclusion of any
"cognizable group" from the venire.13 6 This requirement has generally
13 7
been applied only to venires, not petit juries.
There are several reasons for this prohibition. First, venires composed of a "fair cross-section" of the community are thought to "guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power" by the state. Second, if all sections of the community are allowed to participate on the venire, it is
believed that the public's confidence in the criminal justice system will
be preserved. Third, the requirement ensures that all portions of society will share "in the administration of justice" as a "phase of civil
responsibility." 138
Although federal courts have yet to define precisely what constitutes a "cognizable group" for sixth amendment purposes, they have
generally recognized that the group must be identifiable in some objective and discernible way.13 9 Another factor has been whether the larger
community has exhibited prejudice against the group so that its exclusion is based upon reasons other than ability to serve. 140 Under these
133. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
134. Id. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

(1968).
136.
137.
138.
139.
(1979);
140.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
Id. at 363-64.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1986). See also, Duren, 439 U.S. 522
United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977).
Potter, 552 F.2d at 904-05.
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criteria, courts have recognized cognizable groups that have included
14 1
and geographical entities,
economic, social, religious, political,14racial
2
as well as groups based on gender.
Applying these principles, the Court in McCree concluded that "biased but unbiased" jurors were not a cognizable group for sixth amendment purposes.14 3 The Court observed that traditional sixth
amendment groups were generally those who were denied jury service
on a basis other than their abilities under circumstances that gave rise to
an "appearance of unfairness" to them, as would be the case if blacks
were excluded systematically from jury service solely because of their
race. By this exclusion, these groups would be completely denied their
rights as citizens to serve the community in criminal cases. The Court
distinguished these exclusions from exclusion of the sub-group of
Witherspoon excludables at issue, since the latter were disqualified not on
the basis of some immutable trait but rather because of their inability to
follow the law in a particular case. The Court also reasoned that all
Witherspoon excludables, including the "biased yet unbiased" subclass at
issue, can serve in other cases if they can follow the law. Thus, they
suffer no deprivation of their basic rights of citizenship. In this sense,
they are like any other group of persons who possess common attitudinal traits that make them unable to be fair in a particular criminal
44

case. 1

The Court's conclusion also could be justified by the recognition
that there are substantial difficulties in making a common attitude the
basis of membership in a cognizable group for sixth amendment purposes. An attitudinally defined group could be composed of persons
from all economic, religious, racial, sexual and political categories. Its
members would be much more difficult to classify, and the classifications, once made, would be less accurate. Furthermore, attitudes, unlike
most of the characteristics that define cognizable groups under the sixth
amendment, are subject to change. For example, the number of persons
who are Witherspoon excludables in general has decreased significantly
since 1968,145 but no members of the population have changed race and
few have changed gender. Further, classifications on the basis of attitudes can shift easily during voir dire examination itself. Jurors often
change their attitudes or at least the expression of their attitudes during
the course of a trial or in response to lengthy and intense questioning.14 6 Thus, the sharing of an attitude is not a trait that is either fixed
or readily identifiable.
Moreover, the Court observed that when a cognizable group has
been recognized and its members' exclusion held unconstitutional, the
141.

Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328

U.S. 217 (1946).

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Duren, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
Id. at 1764-66.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See D. Crump, supra note 98.
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characteristics that compose the group generally have had no relationship to the performance of a juror's responsibilities. 14 7 For example, a
blanket prohibition against jury service by women or blacks cannot be
defended by any purpose related to those groups' ability to serve. It is
based instead on invidious attribution to the groups of characteristics
shared in widely differing degrees by the individuals within those
groups. By contrast, exclusion of individuals claiming to be "biased but
unbiased," who come from different economic, religious, ethnic, geographical and political backgrounds, is based upon substantial concern
about their ability to follow the law in determining guilt or innocence.
C.

The Relevance of Social Scientists' Findings to ConstitutionalAdjudication:
The Conviction-Proneness Studies

One of the most controversial issues in McCree concerned the
weight the Court should give the fifteen social scientific studies that McCree had presented in the district court. 14 8 These studies suggest that
capital juries from which Witherspoon excludables had been stricken for
cause were conviction-prone. 1 49 Some studies found that, in general,
the remaining jurors were more likely to convict and to view all evidence
more favorably to the prosecution than would Witherspoon excludables.15 0 Some studies also concluded that a jury including Witherspoon
excludable members was more likely to be critical of all witnesses and
remember the facts of the case more accurately than a jury from which
these individuals were excluded. 15 1 On their face, the studies seemed
overwhelmingly to support McCree's due process argument.15 2 Yet, the
Court of Appeals split five to four on the issues, and other courts asby McCree to be valid but consumed that studies such as those offered
15 3
cluded that they made no difference.
1. The Case for McCree: A Uniform Conclusion from SocialScientific Research, Consistent with the "Fireside
Induction" and Ensconced in the Comfortable
Status of a Finding of Fact
McCree's case was appealing, in part,
and simple. All of the studies appeared
unified juries in death penalty cases
number of studies and the uniformity of
tensible reliability of this inference. The

because it was straightforward
to point in a single direction:
were conviction-prone. The
their results enhanced the osAmerican Psychological Asso-

147. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
148. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

149. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d 226, 232-36
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub noma.Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
150. See Zeisel; Wilson; Goldberg; Cowan; Thompson, supra note 58.
151. Cowan, supra note 58.
152. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 238 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
153. E.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2258 (1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1981), modifiedon other grounds,
671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub nom. Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
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ciation, as amicus curiae, informed the Court that cross-methodological
consistency was an important factor supporting the acceptance of social
scientific research within the scientific community. 154 These studies,
moreover, were consistent not only across differences in methodology,
but also across a long period of time and with many independent
researchers. 155
There were additional reasons for accepting McCree's arguments.
First, the Supreme Court has used social science in constitutional decisionmaking; in fact, it has done so precisely in the context of due process issues in jury formation. 1 56 In Ballew v. Georgia, for example, the
Court based its holding in part on scientific studies showing that juries
of fewer than six members deliberated less thoroughly. 1 57 Witherspoon
itself indicated the possible relevance of statistical showings in the nature of those presented by McCree.15 8 Secondly, McCree had obtained
findings of fact supporting his arguments in the lower courts based upon
social scientific literature and testimony as evidence.' 59 Thus, McCree
could invoke the principle that a finding of fact, upheld as against a
"clearly erroneous" attack in a court of appeals, is ordinarily binding on
the Supreme Court.160
Third, the conviction-proneness conclusion was consistent with
what the literature referred to as the "fireside induction."' 16 1 That is,
the conclusion that juries culled of Witherspoon excludables would be
conviction-prone, arguably, was the same inference that an intelligent
nonexpert would draw while sitting by the fireplace, reflecting upon
human experience rather than relying upon statistical data. Finally, McCree's argument gained force from the principle that capital cases, if
they differ from other criminal cases, should differ in providing for less
risk of bias against the defendant rather than more.162 The studies used
by McCree seemed to show the deck stacked against the defendant precisely in those cases in which, if anything, it should be stacked in his
favor. In short, if one accepted the social scientific studies as showing
what McCree persuasively argued they did, it seemed that the only logi154. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 26-7, Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
155. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
156. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
157. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
158. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
159. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1287-1308 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
160. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275
(1949) (The Supreme Court cannot "undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by
two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.")
However, the Court has also indicated that where "constitutional facts" are at issue, it will
review them de novo. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1970).

161. See MEEHL, LAW AND FIRESIDE INDUCTIONS: SOME REFLECTIONS OF A CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, IN LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY (1977).
162. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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cal result was to find Arkansas' unitary jury system unconstitutional in
capital cases.
One need not reject the studies used in McCree, however, to reach
the majority's ultimate conclusion. It is possible for an intelligent nonexpert to accept the fireside induction - that Witherspoon excludables
are more hesitant to convict than other jurors - and still conclude consistently with the majority in McCree that other considerations are paramount and dictate a contrary result. The reason lies in the definition of
the legal issue, a matter which social science cannot address. It also lies
in the nature of social science, which presents a paradox: the Justices
are bound in some cases to defer to it, if they are to avoid becoming
anti-scientific troglodytes; and yet in other cases, they cannot defer to it,
because to do so would violate theories of government fundamental to
the system of which the Court is a part.
2.

The Simpler Case Against McCree: Definition of the Issue and
Deficiencies in the Experimental Method
a.

Defining the Issue: What Excluded Category "Counts?"

McCree's studies were not determinative in the Supreme Court because, in the first place, most of them did not address the determinative
issue. The relevant question was not whether juries without Witherspoon
excludables were conviction-prone. Most Witherspoon excludables would
be excludable in any event precisely because they could not judge guilt
or innocence fairly. It is easy to see that a jury culled of nullifiers, who
would acquit regardless of the evidence, would certainly be more conviction-prone than a jury including nullifiers; but the comparison is trivial.
The latter jury never would convict, and no one, including McCree, argued to the Supreme Court that the state must accept such ajury. Thus,
the venire members that counted were those in the elusive "biased but
unbiased" category. The issue, in other words, was whether a venire
that included those particular Witherspoon excludables, who accurately
claimed the ability to decide guilt or innocence uninfluenced by their
bias against capital punishment, would produce a less conviction-prone
jury than a venire from which all Witherspoon excludables had been
removed.
Significantly, most of McCree's studies failed to distinguish Witherspoon excludables who also would be biased at the guilt-innocence trial,
or who might tend to vote against guilt to prevent the imposition of
capital punishment.1 63 Only one of the studies 164 attempted to identify
or account for the likely effect the presence of these Witherspoon excludables, who were also nullifiers on guilt, would have in determining guilt
or innocence. Thus one way to understand McCree is to view it as a decision that resulted because the majority of the Court simply was un163. For a description of studies and their methodology, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
164. See Cowan, supra note 58.
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willing to give this single experiment controlling constitutional
65
significance. 1
The majority's conclusion also can be defended by reference to the
fireside induction. While it may seem uncontroversial to conclude from
human experience that persons who absolutely refuse to consider capital punishment would also probably require stronger evidence to convict, the conclusion is less easily reached in the case of the "biased but
unbiased" venire member. This individual's mind, by definition, is capable of such cold logic that although her revulsion to the death penalty
leads her substantially to exclude considering it, yet, it does not enter
into her decision to find the defendant guilty and thus subject the defendant to the penalty that she finds so revolting. It seems doubtful that
the intelligent non-scientist, sitting by the fireside, would feel confident
in predicting the behavior of this hypothetical venire member as a juror.
In fact, if the "biased but unbiased" individual exists and can be identified, the possibility also exists that her superhuman capacity for logic,
irrespective of the human consequences, might not make her acquittalprone. It might make her conviction-prone in the extreme, with the result that all of McCree's studies would point in the wrong direction.
Furthermore, when the focus is on these "biased but unbiased" jurors, rather than upon all Witherspoon excludables, definition becomes a
key factor in the measurement. It is difficult to determine how much
"bias" it takes to label a person a Witherspoon excludable in the first
place. After a person is so categorized, it is also unclear how much assurance of freedom from bias on guilt is required to place her in the
smaller category of "biased but unbiased" venire members who must be
part of the jury pool for deciding guilt. The size of the disputed category of venire members depends upon these judgments, which are difficult to define and quantify with the precision necessary to support
66
accurate categorizations, upon which reliable studies could be based. 1
The difficulty in defining the excluded category enhances the importance of yet another consideration. Some potential jurors are excluded from serving upon capital juries because of a bias in favor of the
death penalty. If a capital crime is generally described to them, these
individuals are able to predict the likelihood of their voting for the sentence of death, even in advance of their hearing the evidence. In the
literature, these individuals are characterized as having "automatic
death penalty" bias, or as "ADP's."' 16 7 Presumably, if Witherspoon excludables who are unbiased on guilt can serve at the guilt-innocence
165. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the Cowan study in Grigsby, two
other studies, Fitzgerald and Precision Research, attempted to account for "biased but
unbiased" jurors in their analyses. Although these two studies were conducted subsequent to Witherspoon, they were attitudinal studies only. They did not attempt to determine
the effect "biased but unbiased" jurors would have on a guilt-innocence determination in a
capital case. See Cowan; Fitzgerald; Precision Research, supra note 58.
166. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423-25 n.6 (1985); Schnapper, supra note
119.
167. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), revd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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stage, so can ADP's who are unbiased on guilt.1 68 The crux of the problem is that the removal of ADP's may make the jury less convictionprone; thus, this phenomenon may cancel or even reverse the effect attributed to removal of Witherspoon excludables. The problem is compounded in that the studies show no consistent measure of ADP's; their
numbers, in the studies, vary considerably. In some studies, ADP's unbiased on guilt outnumber Witherspoon excludables unbiased on guilt,
although it must be added that the data are not sufficiently reliable to
support such a conclusion.' 69 In other words, the fireside induction when properly defined and examined - simply may be erroneous, as
many fireside inductions prove to be.
Finally, fragmentary evidence exists in the form of opinions of experienced capital trial lawyers. Expert testimony offered by the state
against McCree on this issue, in fact, suggests that capital juries in fact
are not conviction-prone; instead, they may be more acquittal-prone
than other juries, when their real-world behavior is observed.17 0 If capital juries do lean toward acquittal, the phenomenon may reflect a
heightened burden of proof imposed by jurors contemplating the death
penalty decision, rather than a balance of Witherspoon excludables or
ADP's. That heightened burden of proof, in turn, is one of the cardinal
advantages claimed by supporters of the unitary jury. McCree's supporters, however, vigorously disputed each of these conclusions,171 and it is
impossible to prove or to disprove them from data currently available.
b.

Experimental Methodology

The social scientists' findings that McCree offered were not based
upon statistics gathered from actual juror participants in death penalty
cases, because trial courts are reluctant to permit studies of ongoing trials for fear of tainting the results. Instead, most of the studies were
based on interviews or out-of-court simulations. 172 In some of the
surveys, random subjects were asked to rate on a scale their attitudes
toward the death penalty and then asked certain questions about criminal justice issues. These studies purported to measure the degree to
168. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1,616 P.2d 1301, 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1980); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and

Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 54 n.184 (1982).
The court in Hovey estimated that ADP's could be anywhere from less than one percent to as much as 28% of the general population. Hovey, 616 P.2d at 1344. The district
court in McCree concluded that the number of ADP's would be "negligible when compared
to the number of those who would never under any circumstances vote for the death penalty." McCree, 569 F. Supp. at 1308. On the other hand, Dr. Gerald Shure, an expert
witness for the state in McCree, found that 33% of the population he surveyed were ADP's.
Dr. Shure admitted, however, that his figures appeared to him to be unreasonable. Id. at
1307-08.
169. See D. Crump, supra note 98 at 28-30.
170. Record at 1643-45, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). See D. Crump,
supra note 98 at 28-30.
171. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 29, 42, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
172. See supra note 58. Of the studies listed in-this note, only Jurow, Cowan, Thompson, and Haney attempted in any manner to simulate an actual capital case. The remainder of the studies were based on participant interviews.
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which subjects were conviction-prone.1 7 3 Other studies asked subjects,
who had been exposed to truncated versions of simulated trials, to
render their own verdicts in such cases on the basis of limited deliberation. Their votes were then compared to determine if there was a relationship between guilt determinations and the subjects' stated views of
the death penalty. 174 Some of the studies were based on interviews with
actual jurors who had served in non-death penalty felony cases. These
studies tested the correlation between each juror's first ballot vote and
75
his or her views about the death penalty generally.'
The State of Arkansas saw several significant methodological criticisms in these studies.' 76 Few individuals included in the studies were
likely to have experience from which to simulate the "feel" of a capital
case. 177 The severity of the penalty may play a larger restraining role in
the decision of capital cases than do similar restraints in other kinds of
cases. That factor may, for example, account for reports of greater difficulty for the state in obtaining convictions in capital than non-capital
cases. 178 The effect of actual participation in a capital trial is difficult to
measure and even more difficult to recreate in simulated jury trials; it is
impossible to recreate in general interviews.
Indeed, there is reason to conclude that these kinds of "real world"
factors could have influenced the results of the studies. For example,
173. See Bronson I; Bronson II; Harris; Fitzgerald, supra note 58.
174. See Cowan; Jurow, supra note 58.
175. See Zeisel, supra note 58.
176. Brief of Appellant at 41-44, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
177. The study that came the closest to simulating a real capital trial was the Ellsworth
Study which subjected 288 subjects to a two and one-half hour video-tape of a murder
trial. This study has been characterized by at least one court as "an outstanding piece of
research." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 2, 616 P.2d 1301, 1302, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128, 129 (1980). However, even the Hovey court questioned the data to some degree because it failed to account for the effect of ADP's. Id.
In addition, the subjects of the study came from a limited area in California and were
described as "suburban upper-middle class" with a "median educational level . . . slightly
less than a baccalaureate degree." Cowan, supra note 58. The cultural attitudes and educational levels of these subjects would clearly be unrepresentative of actual jurors in a
capital trial. Secondly, WVitherspoon excludables were classified as being unbiased in determining guilt or innocence on the basis of the following questions asked over the
telephone:
Which of the following expresses what you would do if you were a juror for
the [guilt-innocence] trial [of a capital case]?
(a) I would follow the judge's instructions and decide the question of guilt or
innocence in a fair and impartial manner based on the evidence and the law, or
(b) I would not be fair and impartial in deciding the question of guilt or innocence, knowing that if the person was convicted he or she might get the death
penalty.
By the wording of the questions and the total lack of any attempt to verify the subjects'
responses, it seems very likely that the resulting categorizations are inaccurate. Few people, even those with strongly held beliefs against the death penalty, would be likely to
admit they could not be fair or impartial or follow the law in a mock situation.
Additionally, other studies considered in Grigsby fell far short of this attempt to simulate an actual capital trial. For example, the Jurow study only provided the participants
with audio records of a simulated murder trial and allowed no deliberations. See also
Thompson; Haney, supra note 58.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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during the evidentiary hearing in Lockhart v. McCree179 in the district
court, the state presented testimony from Dr. Gerald Shure, a Professor
of Psychology and Sociology at the University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Shure criticized many of McCree's studies because subjects were
categorized as Witherspoon excludables on the basis of only one question. 180 Shure's own study, which included a short, simulated voir dire
examination, showed that many subjects reclassified themselves after being rehabilitated through additional questioning of the kind that would
occur in an actual trial. 18 1 Another state's witness, Dr. Carl Hummel,
testified that unless studies are conducted in a courtroom with real participants, where all stages of trial are simulated, including deliberation,
18 2
accurate results from simulations are unlikely.
These kinds of deficiencies have caused courts other than the
Eighth Circuit to remain skeptical about the validity of the social scientific surveys at issue in McCree. 183 The confidence that results from consistency in results across different investigators, methods, and studies is
undermined by the exposure of consistently flawed assumptions across
the same range. Thus, the methodological criticisms may have been
valid considerations in determining the weight the studies should have
been given. The question remains, however, whether the studies should
have been rejected as a basis for demonstrating what they purported to
show.
In McCree, these claims of methodological deficiency received
sharply differing treatments from the dissent, the respondent, the majority and the state. The dissent in McCree argued that the studies were
determinative of the underlying issue. Justice Marshall concluded that
guilt-innocence juries were balanced in favor of the prosecution.1 8 4 McCree's attorneys and the American Psychological Association strongly
urged that the studies were utterly reliable. 18 5 The majority of the
Court, on the other hand, devoted a considerable part of its opinion to a
discussion of the alleged deficiencies as a basis for expressing skepticism
about the studies' validity.1 8 6 The State of Arkansas was even more definite in its argument that the studies were entitled to no weight because
18 7
they lacked minimal credibility and were "pseudo-scientific."'
As these differences suggest, the significance of the methodological
criticisms may depend upon the reader's predispositions and may prove
to be the least interesting aspect of the jMcCree decision in the long term.
No sociological study can be designed in such a manner that it is free
from all methodological criticisms. In a pragmatic but imperfect world,
179. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
180. Record at 980-82, 985, 987, 1008, ,11cCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 906, 1009-10, 1230, 1366, 1510.
183. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
184. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Brief of Appellee at 32-35, .1lcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758; Brief ofAmicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 21-30, .1fcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
186. VcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-64.
187. Brief of Appellant at 40-48, AlcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

experiments are like any other engineering undertaking. The effort to
control all other variables without affecting the one variable under study
can never be completely achieved. Yet, such studies are worth undertaking. They can be a valuable guide to behavior in a proper context. Marketing decisions involving hundreds of millions of dollars are frequently
88
based upon surveys that are necessarily imperfect.1
Sociological studies can even be appropriate bases for legal decisions in the right kind of cases. Thus, the studies on jury deliberation in
Ballew, which addressed the intangible balance between the state's legitimate interests and the values advanced by the petitioner, seem an arguably valid basis for a constitutional decision. 189 An easier case is
presented by the statistical evidence used in adjudication, such as the
showing of invidious discriminatory design on the part of a defendant in
a Title VII case. 19 0 The significant methodological flaws and room for
interpretation in studies in many of such cases are counterbalanced by
the need to give controlling significance to the evidence in individual
adjudications if congressional intent underlying laws such as Title VII is
to be honored. Likewise, if the statistics in McCree had addressed the
determinative issue, their deficiencies in methodology should not have
prevented their consideration. It was their failure to ask the correct
question, and, to a greater extent, it was the relationship of that question to the ultimate constitutional issue that furnished the most persuasive basis for the majority's opinion in McCree.
3.

The Better Case Against McCree: Current Sociological Truth
as a Basis for Constitutional Imposition of Theories of
Government in a Federal System

A constitutional question presents a kaleidoscopic inquiry, in which
intangible and immeasurable factors are balanced against other, equally
immeasurable, and often incomparable, factors. Logical or statistical
proofs, on the other hand, result from efforts to narrow and confine the
inquiry. As one author has said, "persistent" errors result from the use
of sociological evidence in court because:
[s]tatisticians do not have to deal with burden of proof, and
hence bury in their use of regression assumptions that a lawyer
would challenge were he or she more keenly aware of them;
and, conversely, that attorneys do not have to deal with the statistical concept of a "null hypothesis".i...191
Sociological or statistical studies generally must begin with the construction of a "model," which has the precise purpose of simplifying a com188. See Seymour, Numbers Don't Lie-Do They?, 27 Bus. HoRIzoNs
Zonderman, Forecasts From Teacups?, 30 DATAMATION 28 (1984).

36 (1984);

189. Bailew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
190. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(I)(1972)).
191.

Campbell, Regression and Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable

Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1301-02, (1984)
[hereinafter Campbell).
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plex and untidy world so that a single variable can be isolated for study.
The model may reflect the investigator's prejudices or preconceptions
and his or her balancing of interests that are not essential to the variable
under study. Furthermore, "it is entirely acceptable within economics,
and other social sciences, to use a model to help explain observed behavior when no other model works better, even though in an absolute
sense, the model does not describe the data very well at all."' 192 For
these reasons, statistical evidence is more appropriate for disproving
19 3
than for proving hypotheses.
Thus, even if they are strong and consistent in addressing the narrowly focused issue, one basic problem with enacting propositions derived from statistical proofs into positive constitutional law is that they
do not provide any guide for weighing considerations outside the idiosyncratic sociological model in question. They may appear to have
"solved" the constitutional dilemma, when in fact all that they have
done is to provide evidence on one of a myriad of considerations that
must be balanced.
In this regard, sociological evidence can be most misleading precisely when it is at its scientific best. By furnishing ostensibly definite
proof of a lesser interest among the myriad considerations to be
weighed, it may be used to draw the courts' attention away from more
important, but less quantifiable, interests. The Supreme Court has had
occasion to reverse circuit courts for precisely this kind of statistically
induced myopia. For example, in Mayor v. EducationalEquality League, the
Court reversed the circuit court's holding that had recognized a prima
facie case based upon sociological and statistical evidence, because it
"did not assign appropriate weight to the constitutional considerations
raised by the Mayor."' 19 4 In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, the Court held that the acceptance of statistical and sociological
evidence must be limited in purpose because such evidence did not address "the legitimate expectations of non-victim employees," for which
' 19 5
a court must draw on "qualities of ... practicality."
Lockhart v. McCree19 6 presented a similar problem. Indeed, part of
the problem may have been that the argument constructed from McCree's studies was simple and appealing. For the reasons set out in preceding sections of this article, McCree's studies were also subject to
serious methodological criticisms, and they failed to address the relevant question because most of them lumped together all Witherspoon excludables indiscriminately. However, a more significant problem would
192. Id. at 1303. See also Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir.
1981) ("[T]he day is long past ... when we proceed with any confidence toward broad
conclusions from crude and incomplete statistics. That everyone who has eaten bread had
died may tell us something about bread, but not very much"); EEOC v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1983) (providing a collection of cases involving judicial rejection of statistical conclusions).
193. See Campbell, supra note 190, at 1304.
194. 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974).
195. 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977).
196. 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986).
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remain even if the studies were accepted as McCree proposed. The statistical evidence did not show whether the proper conclusion was that
unitary capital juries were conviction-prone, or whether the inclusion of
some Witherspoon excludables who might be nullifiers would be unduly
acquittal-prone. Furthermore, the statistics could not tell the courts
whether the advantages claimed for the unitary jury in fact existed, or
how to weigh them in the balance. Indeed, the majority of the Eighth
Circuit fell into a trap. It failed to give any weight to the disadvantages it
created for convicted capital defendants, who arguably lost the advantages of having sentencing jurors who had wrestled with residual
doubts. It also failed to consider the difficulty of identifying the "biased
but unbiased" juror, the inducement it thereby provided for the abandonment ofjuries in favor ofjudge sentencing, and other disadvantages
arguably created by the alternate schemes proposed by the defendant.
There is another, equally fundamental reason for defending the majority's caution in Lockhart v. McCree. 19 7 Sociological studies have
proven to be an inadequate bases for constitutional decision making. In
some cases, even when they have been apparently convincing, studies
have been shown to be inadequate simply because science changes as
does social science. For example, the absence of a deterrence effect in
capital punishment was "demonstrated" by numerous studies prior to
the work of Isaac Erlich. 198 Erlich showed that, in fact, such a deterrent
effect could be computed mathematically from regression models (but
Erlich, a careful sociologist, pointed out that neither deterrence nor
nondeterrence could be "demonstrated" from his study). 19 9 Similarly,
more recent efforts to measure the effect of including the "biased but
unbiased" juror have been more sophisticated, and some of them have
suggested that the earlier research may lead to erroneous conclusions. 2 00 Thus, a major problem with the enactment of sociological
proofs and compositive constitutional law, is that the courts would be
required to reverse their interpretations of the Constitution with each
new study that contradicted the basis of an earlier holding. 2 0 '
This consideration, indeed, may have furnished a countervailing
consideration to McCree's correct assertion that his argument was based
upon findings of fact. The Supreme Court generally accepts findings of
fact made by district courts, particularly when they have withstood attack
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., BEDAU, THE COURT, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 55-57
(1977); SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 21-22, 34, 63 (1959).
199. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON.
REV. 397 (1975)).
200.
201.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See O'Brien, The Seduction of theJudiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE

8, 20 (1980) (by judicial use of social science data "the status of constitutional rights may
actually become more uncertain and precarious"); Tanke & Tanke, Getting Off a Slippery
Slope, 34 AM. PSYCH. 1130, 1138 (1979) ("Few persons, social scientist included, would be
content to have fundamental constitutional liberties turn on the results of the latest experi-

mental study.") See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review in the circuit
courts. 20 2 McCree attempted unsuccessfully to invoke this deferential
approach in the Supreme Court. Such an approach, however, would enable a single district judge, relying upon changeable sociological evidence, not only to bind the nation but to set quasi-legislative facts in the
concrete of a constitutional holding. As a consequence of this problem,
the Court has repeatedly held that "questions of general importance,"
including "constitutional claims," are not controlled by "resolving con20 3
flicting testimony."
A final consideration, and probably the most fundamental, is that
Lockhart v. McCree20 4 was not merely a case in which there was a debate
about conviction proneness; it also was a case about ultimate questions
of federalism. The appropriate balance between the state and the defendant in a capital case, the tolerable level of risk of erroneous conviction, and the weight to be given the arguable advantages of the unitary
jury in the sentencing phase as versus the disadvantages McCree
claimed in the guilt-innocence phase, all are deep philosophical questions, and they cannot be answered by scientific methods, even if those
measurements help to determine relevant facts. The Eighth Circuit invalidated a system for capital sentencing that had been in use for many
years. 20 5 No state requires, and none has ever required, the cumbersome two-jury, replacement, or variable-sized juries that McCree advocated as alternatives. 20 6 Those approaches were certainly not in use
when the fourteenth amendment was adopted. In Marsh v. Chambers, the
"Legislative Chaplain Case," the Supreme Court held that "a practice
[that] has continued without interruption ever since [the earliest] session of Congress" did not violate the Constitution. 20 7 Perhaps the same
argument could be made for the unitary jury, which has persisted in capital cases since a time before the adoption of the amendment under
which it was challenged.
The Supreme Court probably expressed these conclusions best as
follows:
202. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
203. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193 n.3 (1972)(fact findings rejected where "the
dispute between the parties is not so much over the elemental facts as over the constitutional significance to be attached to them"); Derenyi v. Immigration Serv., 385 U.S. 630,
636 (1967) (court is not bound by fact findings "when constitutional claims may depend
on their resolution"); Great At. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 153 (1953).
204. 106 &. Ct. 1758.
205. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977) provides that: "Ifa defendant is found guilty of
capital murder, the same jury shall sit again in order to hear additional evidence ... and to
determine sentence in the manner provided by section 1302 .... " This unitary jury system has always been the law in Arkansas for capital as well as non-capital crimes. Rector v.
State, 280 Ark. 385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2370 (1984).
206. See supra note 7 for a listing of the states which currently provide for jury sentencing in capital cases. In each of these 33 states, the same jury composed of the same members either sentences directly or acts in an advisory role. But cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12C: 11-3
(West 1982) (A unitary jury is the rule but a separate jury is available at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial for "good cause" shown).
207. 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

The phrase "finding of fact" may be a summary characterization of complicated factors of varying significance for judgment .... Findings on so-called ultimate "facts" more clearly
imply the application of standards of law .... Particularly is

this so where a decision here for review cannot escape broadly
social judgments -judgments lying close to opinion regarding
the whole nature of our
government and the duties and immu208
nities of citizenship.
As in Baumgartner,Lockhart v. McCree20 9 involved "judgments lying close
to opinion regarding the whole nature of our government and the duties
and immunity of citizenship," rather than discrete fact findings.
It would be inappropriate, however, to attribute these concerns, as
did McCree's attorneys, to a "desire to denigrate all social scientific evidence. ' '2 10 Instead, this reasoning would place the responsibility for
weighing the statistical evidence of the kind at issue in Lockhart v. McCree2 1 1 in legislatures. The legislative branch has investigative abilities
that better enable it to evaluate methodological and definitional imperfections. The legislature's decisions are not set in the concrete of a constitutional holding, and they can be changed as scientific knowledge
changes without doing violence to stare decisis.
V.

CONCLUSION

At one level, and viewed simply, the decision in Lockhart v. McCree
preserves the values of the unitary capital jury. It recognizes the legitimate interests of the states in avoiding the cumbersome alternatives suggested by McCree. In so doing, it allows the states to remove hidden
nullifiers and to preserve a uniform, as opposed to an ad hoc, procedure
for treating their most serious cases of murder. It also avoids the fruitless and counterproductive effort that would be required to separatejurors simultaneously "biased but unbiased," from other venire members.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the McCree decision protects
procedures that actually may be fairer to capital defendants. It means
that every juror who considers a death sentence will have shared the
salutary community function of grappling with large and small doubts
about guilt before ever reaching that stage. No juror will be able to find
guilt with the assurance that he can pass responsibility for sentencing on
to other jurors. Finally, the decision will remove the inducement to replace sentencing juries withjudges. The decision preservesjury responsibility for criminal cases that merit most community judgment.
At another level, the decision vindicates the American system of
government known as federalism. While the sociological evidence offered by McCree was based upon simple and appealing theories, it was
properly subject to criticisms that limited its effect. More to the point, it
208. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1943).

209.
210.
hart v.
211.

106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
See Memorandum of Respondent in Response to Petition for Certiorari at 8,LockMcCree, 106 S. Ct. 103 (1986).
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
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would have been inappropriate for the Court to enact such studies into
positive constitutional law even if their validity had been clearly established. Such studies provided no guidance on the essential question,
which concerned the relative weights to be assigned the competing theories, interests, and philosophies of government which were at stake.
This question properly belongs before the legislative branch.
In order to accept the Supreme Court's decision, one need not decide that McCree's evidence was unworthy of consideration. Death penalty opponents may still be able to persuade legislatures that their
concerns are appropriate or that one of their suggested models is superior to the traditional unitary jury. 2 12 Furthermore, their arguments
could prompt a legislative discussion resulting in solutions retaining the
benefits of the unitary jury while addressing the concerns McCree
raised. These arguments and the solutions that might result from them,
however, merit some skepticism. It is likely that their origin lies primarily in their use as vehicles to mount a systematic attack on past sentences
and convictions, not in a campaign to improve procedures for future
trials. If that pessimistic view proves incorrect, and if opponents successfully use such arguments to prompt legislatures to create a better
capital jury system, then the fallout from Lockhart v. McCree may continue
to develop for many years to come.

212. In fact, there is an indication that as a result of cases such as McCree and McClesky,
death penalty opponents are refocusing their efforts in an attempt to persuade Congress
to act in some manner to halt executions. These proposals vary considerably. One proposal suggests that Congress pass a non-binding resolution advising states to set a
moritorium on executions until it is "conclusively determined" that capital defendants are
not convicted or sentenced because of racially motivated reasons. Other proposals suggest that Congress should appoint experts to study statistics on race and executions or
pass a law permitting death penalty defendants to use statistical evidence to challenge
their convictions. Hous. CHRON., July 19, 1987, § i, at 21, col. 1.

FORECLOSURE By PRIVATE TRUSTEE: Now Is
THE TIME FOR COLORADO
By

ANDREA

BLOOM*

INTRODUCTION

Two methods of enforcing payment of a debt secured by a mortgage through the sale of the mortgaged property, otherwise known as
mortgage foreclosure, predominate in the United States today. Judicial
foreclosure is available in every state.' Where a deed of trust or mortgage with a power of sale is used, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia recognize the method of nonjudicial foreclosure by the mort2
gagee or trustee.
Colorado's nonjudicial foreclosure procedure is unique in that a
public official conducts the entire process.3 All other states that recognize nonjudicial foreclosure allow a private trustee or the mortgagee to
exercise the power of sale. For a Colorado mortgagee to take advantage
of the relatively simple statutory method to foreclose deeds of trust, 4 the
deed of trust must name as the trustee the public trustee of the county in
which the mortgaged property is located. 5 A deed of trust that names
any other person as trustee is deemed to be a mortgage and may be
foreclosed only through the courts. 6 Colorado is the only state that has
adopted a public trustee system for nonjudicial foreclosures.
* B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Colorado. The author is presently in private practice in Denver, Colorado.
1. G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.11 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN]. The method of judicial foreclosure requires a full judicial
proceeding to determine the existence and extent of the lien and the supervision of the
court in the sale of the mortgaged property. Judicial foreclosure is complex, expensive,
and time-consuming. See Cost and Time Factorsin Foreclosureof Mortgages, 3 REAL PROPPROB.
& TR.J. 413 (1968). Judicial foreclosure of all mortgage instruments is available in Colorado pursuant to COLO. R. Civ. P. 105.
2. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. A power of sale clause in a mortgage or deed of trust
gives the mortgagee or trustee the right and power on default (i) to advertise and sell the
property at a public auction, usually without resort to a court for authority, (ii) to satisfy
the debt to the mortgagee out of the sale proceeds, and (iii) to convey the property by
deed to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Each state's statutes and the terms of the
power of sale clause govern the type and degree of notice given and the manner of the
sale. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at § 7.19. Power of sale foreclosure is generally
more efficient and less costly than judicial foreclosure. Id.
3. The establishment of the public trustee system and the procedures that public
trustees must follow for conducting a foreclosure are set forth in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3837-101 to 144, 38-38-101 to 110, 38-39-101 to 119 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
4. Id.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-101 (1973).

6. Id.
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A dramatic increase in the number of foreclosures in 1986 and 1987
in Colorado, due to a downturn in the economy, emphasized one weakness in Colorado's public trustee system: the inability of public trustees
to deal in a timely manner with large numbers of foreclosures. 7 In
search of a remedy for the public trustees' delays in the commencement
of foreclosure proceedings, the lending community urged the Colorado
legislature to pass a bill permitting private trustees to perform the same
functions as public trustees in power of sale foreclosures. Such a bill8
was introduced in the 1987 session of the Colorado General Assembly.
A committee amendment deleted the bill's provision for private trustees 9 due to the legislators' reluctance to proceed without sufficient information regarding the implications and wisdom of adopting a private
trustee system.' 0 This article considers the issues involved in a private
trustee system with the intent to fill the gap left at the end of the 1987
legislative session.
Private trustees should be permitted to conduct nonjudicial power
of sale foreclosures in Colorado, provided that the extent and manner of
notices and the judicial hearing for an order authorizing the sale are
retained as integral parts of the foreclosure process. The potential improvements to the system resulting from the use of private trustees outweigh any perceived advantages in the current public trustee process.
With minimal statutory modifications, a private trustee system can be
implemented to provide a more efficient system for Colorado."I
This study begins with a discussion of Colorado's nonjudicial foreclosure procedures conducted by the public trustee. The article then
explores the historical and legislative background for the original adoption of the public trustee system in 1894. Next, the beneficial effects of
competition among many private trustees upon the power of sale foreclosure process are addressed, along with suggested statutory modifications to the foreclosure scheme to ensure that a private trustee system is
as workable and beneficial as the public trustee system. Finally, the article discusses constitutional due process defects in the existing statutory
scheme which should be corrected even if a private trustee system is not
adopted.
7. Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 19, 1987, at 90, col. 1; Rocky Mountain News, Sept.
23, 1986, at B6, col. 1-4.
8. H.B. 1197, 56th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 7 (Colo. 1987), as originally introduced, available at the Colorado State Archives. The remaining sections of this bill dealt
with various aspects of the foreclosure procedure.
9. H.R.J., 56th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. 391, 393 (Colo. 1987).
10. Hearingson H.B. 1197 Before the House Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 56th Gen.
Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo., March 3, 1987).
11. This article examines and addresses the public trustee system as a whole, not the
capabilities of individual public trustees. Nothing in this article is intended to suggest that
any particular public trustee has performed less than admirably in his or her job. Recommendations are based on changes needed in the system rather than changes in any particular public trustee's office.
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I.

OVERVIEW OF COLORADO'S NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES

The basic procedures for conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure by
the public trustee are set forth in title 38, articles 37, 38, and 39 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes. 12 The public trustee begins a foreclosure by
recording in the public records the notice of election and demand for
sale stating that the beneficiary has elected to foreclose due to a specified default. 13 The recording of this document places all persons who
might be interested in the property on constructive notice that foreclosure has commenced. 14 The public trustee then publishes a notice of
sale for five consecutive weeks in a local newspaper.' 5 The notice of sale
states that the property will be sold at a public auction on a given date,
time, and place.' 6 The sale date must be set no less than forty-five and
no more than sixty days after the recording of the notice of election and
demand for sale. 17 The public trustee also mails the published notice of
sale and notice of right to cure and to redeem to the appropriate
parties. 18

Prior to the sale date, the beneficiary must obtain an order from a
court properly having jurisdiction to authorize the sale. 19 The public
trustee cannot sell the property prior to the issuance of such a court
20
order.
At the public sale the trustee sells the property to the highest bidder
who receives a certificate of purchase from the public trustee. 2 1 The
amount of the debt secured by the foreclosed property and the expenses
of the sale are immediately paid from the sale proceeds by either disbursement of funds or cancellation of the debt if the foreclosing benefi22
ciary is the successful bidder.
The owner of the property, any person who is potentially liable on a
deficiency, tenants, and junior lienors of record are permitted for a specific period of time after a valid foreclosure sale to redeem the property
12. For an in-depth discussion of all the steps involved in Colorado's procedure of
foreclosure by public trustee, see BLOOM, PUBLIC TRUSTEE
(Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc. 1985).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).

FORECLOSURE IN COLORADO

14. Id. at § 38-35-109(1) (Supp. 1987); see also Delta County Land & Cattle Co. v.
Talcott, 17 Colo. App. 316, 68 P. 985 (1902).
15. COLO. REV. STATE. at §§ 38-37-118, 24-70-106(2)(d) (1973).
16. Id. at § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).
17. Id. at § 38-39-117 (1973).
18. Id. at §§ 38-37-113(2), 38-39-102(4), 38-39-118(l)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1987). The
owner of the property being foreclosed or any party liable under the note or deed of trust
is entitled to cure the default when the default is the nonpayment of any sums due under
the note or deed of trust. On or before twelve o'clock noon on the day before the day of
the sale, the curing party must pay to the public trustee all delinquent principal and interest payments exclusive of that portion of principal which would not have been due in the
absence of acceleration. In addition, the curing party is responsible for all costs and expenses related to the proceedings for collection and foreclosure. COLO. REV. STAT. § 3839-118 (Supp. 1987).

19.
20.
21.
22.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973).
See infra notes 127-137 and accompanying text.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-113, 38-39-115(2) (1973).
Id. at § 38-37-113(6) (1973).
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23
by paying the foreclosure sale price plus certain additional amounts.
If redemption is made by the owner of the property, the sale is annulled. 24 The property remains subject to all liens existing before the
sale in the same order of priority, except that the lien of the foreclosed
deed of trust is extinguished by the sale. 2 5 Any redemption by a lienor
is subject to the rights of junior lienors also entitled to redeem. 26 A
loses his lien and any further rights in
junior lienor who fails to2 redeem
7
the foreclosed property.

Upon the expiration of all periods of redemption, the public trustee
issues the deed to the property to the holder of the certificate of
purchase, or if the property has been redeemed by a lienor, to the last
redeeming lienor. 28 Title to the property from the public trustee is free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances recorded after the foreclosed
29
deed of trust.
II.

ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE SYSTEM

Before 1894, deeds of trust in Colorado were granted to private
trustees who were authorized, upon default by the trustor, to advertise
and to sell the real property in strict compliance with the conditions of
the trust.3 0 Although mortgages had to be foreclosed by a sale decreed
by a court of equity,3 1 trust deeds did not. 32 While a statutory right of
redemption existed for land sold by court decree, 3 3 no right of redemppursuant to a deed of trust
tion was provided when the land was sold
34
unless the parties had otherwise agreed.
In January 1894, Governor Davis H. Waite convened an extraordinary session of the Colorado General Assembly, one delineated purpose
of which was to "abolish and repeal extraordinary remedies now granted
to creditors in Colorado, which have placed a debtor class wholly within
the power of the creditor, and 'deprived him,' unjustly and against public policy, 'of his property, without due process of law.' -35 To accomplish this purpose, Governor Waite proposed the enactment of a law
providing that all deeds of trust be declared mortgages with a right of
23. Id. at §§ 38-39-102, 103 (1973 & Supp. 1987). The statutory right of redemption
gives the debtor or owner additional time after the foreclosure sale to refinance and save
the property, allows junior lienors an opportunity to protect their security in the property
and encourages recovery of the highest price for the property. For a discussion of the
policies underlying the statutory redemption rights, see Comment, Statutory Redemption in
Colorado: 1965 Amendments, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 127 (1966).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-105 (Supp. 1987).
25. Id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Lulu &
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at § 38-39-110 (Supp. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 30 P. 43 (1892).
CoLo. CODE OF CIv. P. ch. XX, § 234, ch. XXII, § 263 (Dawson 1883); Nevin v.
White Silver. Min. Co., 10 Colo. 357, 15 P. 611 (1887).
COLO. CODE OF CIv. P. ch. XXII, § 263 (Dawson 1883).
MILLS' ANN. STAT. OF COLO. ch. 72, § 2556 (1891).

34. Nippel v. Hammond, 4 Colo. 211 (1878).
35. S.J., 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. 21 (Colo. 1894) (Proclamation of the Governor).
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redemption and subject to foreclosure according to the rules and proceedings in equity courts. 36 The Governor wanted to protect debtors by
entirely eliminating power of sale foreclosures and by involving courts
in the entire foreclosure process.
Seemingly in response to the Governor's proclamation, House Bill
48 was introduced on January 16, 1894.3 7 This bill, as originally pro38
posed, did not mention the establishment of a public trustee system,
nor did it mention the treatment of trust deeds as mortgages. The bill
addressed only the granting of a right of redemption for all mortgage
instruments including trust deeds. 39 The House passed this bill
40
unanimously.
As approved by the House, House Bill 48 did not fare well in the
Senate. The Senate initially recommended that it not pass. 4 1 A special
committee and a committee on revisions then studied the bill. After a
committee of the whole Senate and three conference committees of the
House and Senate made substantial amendments, 42 the General Assem43
bly finally passed an act concerning deeds of trust on March 5, 1894.
This act created the office of public trustee in every county of the
state and mandated that all deeds of trust given to secure indebtedness
of any kind must name the public trustee as the trustee. 44 The act provided that any deed of trust that named any other person as trustee
should be deemed to be a mortgage and foreclosed only in and through
the courts in the same manner as mortgages. 4 5 The act provided for the
bonding of public trustees 4 6 and prescribed their salaries and fees. 4 7 In
addition, the act delineated the procedure for notice of sale and advertisement 48 and provided periods of redemption to the grantor4 9 and
junior creditors.

50

The motivation for the adoption of this unique system for power of
sale foreclosure remains unclear because of the dearth of available legislative history. It has been suggested that the act was designed to eliminate and prevent the widespread abuse of foreclosure by individual
trustees revealed after the drastic collapse of property values during the
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 116.
38. As early as 1889, the office of public trustee was established in counties having a
population of greater than 50,000. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 310. The use of a public trustee
was an alternative to a private trustee and appears to have been adopted to provide for an
easy successor to a private trustee who could no longer serve in that capacity.
39. H.B. 48, 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. (Colo. 1894) [hereinafter H.B. 48] (available at
the Colorado State Archives, as originally introduced).
40. S.J., 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. 403 (Colo. 1894).
41. Id. at 193.
42. Id.at 196, 355, 363, 371, 377, 390, 392, 400, 401, 404.
43. Act approved March 5, 1894, ch. 6, 1894 Colo. Sess. Laws 50 (adopting H.B. 48).
44. Id. at § 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at § 2.
47. Id. at § 3.
48. Id. at §§ 4-5.
49. Id. at § 8.
50. Id. at § 9.
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depression of the early 1890's. 5 1 Indeed, there was no requirement that
a private trustee be neutral, disinterested, or unrelated to the mortga53
gee,5 2 thus giving rise to potential conflict and temptation for abuse.
Elimination of abuses of power by private trustees may have been one
concern of the legislature in 1894, but this concern could have been
remedied by the establishment of controls without the drastic action of
adopting a new governmental bureaucracy of public trustees.
Perhaps the public trustee system was adopted as a compromise between the existing method of foreclosure by private trustees, which did
not involve the courts or any public entity, and Governor Waite's proposed requirement that the courts supervise all foreclosures. The use of
public rather than private trustees gave control of the foreclosure process to a public official without eliminating the ease and cost effectiveness of power of sale foreclosures. This involvement of a public official
provided at least a semblance of protection for the debtor, as Governor
Waite clearly desired, by constraining creditors and their chosen private
trustees from taking unfair advantage of an otherwise totally unsupervised foreclosure process.
Since the implementation of the public trustee system, a mandatory
court proceeding to obtain an order authorizing the sale has been added
to Colorado's foreclosure process. 5 4 Further, an interested party has the
right to seek injunctive relief before the foreclosure sale regardless of
the grant or denial of an order authorizing the sale. 5 5 Under certain
circumstances, the court may retain supervisory jurisdiction over the entire foreclosure process. 56 These judicial proceedings amply protect the
debtor and control the mortgagee. With the addition of court involvement in the power of sale foreclosure process, the public trustee system
51. Storke & Sears, Enforcement of Security Interests in Colorado, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1,
20 (1952); see also Lindsay, Foreclosure by the Public Trustee, 9 DICTA 6 (1931).
52. See, e.g., Hamill v. Copeland, 26 Colo. 178, 56 P. 901 (1899) (an officer of a corporation may act as the trustee in a trust deed in which the corporation is the beneficiary);
Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877) (the husband of the beneficiary can serve as the
trustee).
53. No cases were found dealing with the abuse of trust power prior to 1894, but the
existence of cases which reached appellate review a few years later suggests that such
events could have occurred when the public trustee system was adopted in 1894. See BentOtero Imp. Co. v. Whitehead, 25 Colo. 354, 54 P. 1023 (1898) (wrongful sale and misapplication of sale proceeds); Appelman v. Gara, 22 Colo. 397, 45 P. 366 (1896) (wrongful
release of deed of trust).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973) provides that the beneficiary of the deed of
trust being foreclosed must obtain an order authorizing the sale from a court properly
having jurisdiction. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120 sets forth the procedures for obtaining this
order.
55. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(d) (the granting of the motion under Rule 120 is without
prejudice to the right of any aggrieved person to seek injunctive relief, and the denial of
the motion is without prejudice to any right or remedy of the movant); Boulder Lumber
Co. v. Alpine of Nederland, 626 P.2d 724 (Colo. App. 1981) (injunction against public
trustee's sale was proper when priority of liens was in dispute).
56. Bakers Park Mining & Milling Co. v. Dist. Ct., 662 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1983) (Rule
120 does not preclude the court from retaining supervisory jurisdiction over the foreclosure to assure that due process is afforded to the parties).
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is no longer necessary to serve the original purpose for which it was
adopted.
III.

IMPROVEMENTS FROM COMPETITION

The power to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure rests exclusively in
one person in each county, the public trustee. The elimination of this
monopoly of services and the encouragement of competition among
many private parties will improve the quality of performance of trustee
services. 57 The ones who provide a timely, efficient, and cost effective
service will thrive while the others will fail. No such incentive for improvement among public trustees currently exists.
A non-competitive government bureaucracy is hindered in providing timely services because it cannot quickly and efficiently adjust to the
demands created by fluctuations in the economy. For example, the dramatic rise in the number of foreclosures in 1986, as compared to the
year before, resulted in a huge backlog of unfiled foreclosures and thus
prompted the public trustee for the City and County of Denver to cut
back on the office's public hours to give employees time to work on this
backlog. 58 Likewise, the deputy public trustee of El Paso County acknowledged that her office was unable to file the foreclosure notices as
fast as they came in. 59 It is common knowledge in the real estate community that, in 1986, none of the metropolitan county public trustees
could meet the statutory time requirements for the recording of the
60
commencement of foreclosure proceedings.
Although it is certainly possible for private trustees to become
overburdened as well, the total foreclosures that can be efficiently handled will increase if the number of people who offer the service increases. Further, private industry can usually reallocate resources to
accommodate increased demand for a particular service more easily
than the public sector. If trustees can be substituted, one private trustee
who reaches capacity could use another trustee to perform additional
foreclosures. Finally, private trustees are motivated to take the steps
necessary to do a timely job because their failure to do so will result in a
57. It is assumed that competition in the open market, a touchstone of a free enterprise economic system, is favored over a monopoly and should be promoted whenever
possible and appropriate. Indeed, the promotion of competition is the basic objective of
the antitrust laws. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws 1 (March 31, 1955). Supporters of the similar concept of "privatization"
(the public sector contracts for the performance of public services by private industry)
assert that private businesses generally perform the services more efficiently and that competition has reduced the cost to the government. Main, When Public Services Go Private,

May 27, 1985, at 92. But see McEntee, City Services: Can Free Enterprise Outperform
the Public Sector?, 55 Bus. So. REV. 43 (1985).
58. Rocky Mountain News, Sept. 23, 1986, at B6, col. 1. As of September 1986, the
number of foreclosures in Denver was 18.1% higher than for a comparable period in 1985.
Id.
59. Id. at col. 4.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987) provides that the public trustee
shall record a copy of the notice of election and demand for sale in the office of the county
clerk and recorder within seven working days following its receipt.
FORTUNE,
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mortgagee taking its business elsewhere. All of these motivational factors and abilities for resource allocation should enhance the timeliness
of performance by trustees. Few such factors operate within the public
6
trustee system. '
Price competition among private trustees seeking business could re62
sult in lower fees than those currently charged by public trustees
which would benefit the financially troubled debtor. 63 Presently, there
is not and cannot be competition among public trustees to encourage
lower fees, nor can the mandatory fees established for public trustees be
adjusted to coincide accurately with the revenue needs of their particular offices. 64 The statutory fee schedule should be modified to establish
maximum fees that can be- charged for trustee services rather than
mandatory amounts. 6 5 With this flexibility, private trustees could
charge less than the statutory fee amount if the operation of a competitive, cost-efficient business justified such charges.
IV.

ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC TRUSTEE SYSTEM RETAINED BY THE
PRIVATE TRUSTEE SYSTEM

Public trustees act impartially to protect both the debtor and the
beneficiary. They provide a central repository for foreclosure documents in each county, and are also less likely than private trustees to
abuse their power. These perceived advantages of a public official's involvement in the foreclosure process are either non-existent or can be
equally available from a private trustee with minor statutory
modifications.
A.

Impartiality
Arguably, the public trustee acts as an impartial party to protect all

61. A new provision requiring the public trustee to forfeit five percent of his fees for
each day the public trustee fails to meet the statutory time requirements was recently enacted. Id. at § 38-37-143 (Supp. 1987). It remains to be seen whether the threat of this
penalty will result in more timely performance by the public trustees.
62. The mandatory fees that a public trustee must charge for the different services
performed are fixed by statute. Id. at § 38-37-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1987) (if the original principal indebtedness secured by the deed of trust being foreclosed does not exceed
$240,000, then the public trustee fee is $75; where such amount exceeds $240,000, the fee
is 1/32 of 1% of the original principal indebtedness, but in no case less than $75).
63. All public trustee fees, charges, and costs are charged against the grantor of the
deed of trust or those holding under him, and are deducted from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale. Id. at § 38-37-119 (1973).
64. In at least one county the mandatory fees appear to be excessive. In El Paso
County, the fees collected in 1986 for all public trustee services exceeded expenses, not
including office rent, by $272,597.99. This information was obtained from an internal
accounting sheet provided by the public trustee's office in El Paso County.
65. Although this suggested price control may be considered anti-competitive, it is
necessary to protect the debtor from any potential increase in the cost of foreclosure by a
private trustee, one of the major concerns of the opponents of private trustees. California
has enacted such fee limitations. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924c(d), 2924d(a) (West Supp.
1987). Other costs of foreclosure, such as attorneys' fees, may decrease if a private trustee
expands the services it provides for the maximum statutory fee to include services like
document preparation, which are currently performed by the attorney for the beneficiary.
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parties, especially the debtor, and his involvement assures a degree of
fairness in the proceedings. 66 A public trustee, however, provides no
greater neutrality or fairness than a private trustee while performing
under the same statutory scheme. The acts of the public trustee are not
discretionary. 6 7 The procedures that must be followed are prescribed in
68
detail by statute and the deed of trust.
Although the public trustee administers the foreclosure, the mortgagee prepares all of the documents and provides all of the necessary
information, including the list of all notice recipients. 69 The public
trustee has no liability for any errors or omissions in the names and addresses stated on this mailing list. 70 Further, the public trustee has no
responsibility for determining the amount or reasonableness of a bid,
the costs and expenses allowable in computing the debt, or the amount
necessary for cure or redemption. 7 1 Although the public trustee may
give a stronger appearance of impartiality and fairness because he is a
public official, a private trustee, like the public trustee, could be bound
to act only in accordance with statutes and the deed of trust, and would
owe a duty of fairness and good faith to all parties involved. 7 2 Furthermore, the retention of the requirement for a court order authorizing the
sale, regardless of whether a public or private trustee administers the
foreclosure proceedings, assures a degree of fairness to all parties.
B.

Document Repository

Another perceived advantage of the public trustee system is that
each public trustee's office provides one central repository in each
county for all documents relating to each foreclosure conducted in that
county. 73 Admittedly, a central location for documents simplifies review

of the foreclosure proceedings for title and other purposes, and, under
the present statutory scheme, this advantage would be lost if many private trustees were allowed to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures under a
power of sale. The public land records, however, easily could serve as
an effective substitute to the public trustee's office for the central location of all pertinent documents. Currently, the only documents regarding the foreclosure that are filed of record with the county clerk and
recorder are: the notice of election and demand for sale (declaring a
default under the deed of trust and the mortgagee's election to advertise
66. Hearings on H. B. 1197 Before the House Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 56th Gen.

Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo., March 3, 1987) (testimony of Esther Rinard and Felicia Muftic).
67. The courts generally do not evaluate a trustee's performance based on whether he
abused his discretion. Rather, the courts determine whether the trustee was correct in
applying the statutory mandates. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 675 P.2d 307 (Colo. 1984);
Dolan v. Flett, 582 P.2d 694 (Colo. App. 1978).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-105(1), 38-37-113 (1973 and Supp. 1987).
69. Id. at § 38-37-113(l), (9) (Supp. 1987).
70. Id. at § 38-37-113(9) (Supp. 1987).
71. Id. at § 38-37-105(4) (Supp. 1987).
72. J. H. Morris, Inc. v. Indian Hills, 282 Ala. 443, 212 So. 2d 831 (1968); Union
Market Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, 62 N.E.2d 661 (Mass. 1945).
73.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1),(4) (1973 and Supp. 1987).
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the property for sale), 74 the certificate of purchase (identifying the pur75
chaser at the sale and the amount paid at the sale for the property),
the certificate of redemption (containing the name of the person re77
deeming and the amount paid by him) 76 and the public trustee's deed.
Additionally, the recording of one or more affidavits of the trustee stating the names and addresses to whom all notices were sent, the manner
of publication of the notice of sale, the manner of disbursement of sale
proceeds, and a certified copy of the court order authorizing the sale
should be required. With the recordation of all of these documents, an
interested party would have easy access to the pertinent documents to
determine whether any foreclosure was conducted in accordance with
78
the statutory procedures.
Finally, the inclusion of the private trustee's name, address, and
phone number on the notice of election and demand for sale should
inform junior lienors of where to file their notices of intent to redeem,
and mortgagors of where to tender cure payments. This information
would also be available for anyone interested in knowing the location of
the entire foreclosure file.
C. Abuse of Power
Certainly both public and private trustees will make mistakes. 79 No
sure method exists to totally prevent errors or fraudulent conduct by
either public or private trustees. Some limitation on who can act as a
private trustee, however, will bolster the quality of service and discourage abuses by private trustees in the first instance. Some states have
provided that the only ones who can act as private trustees are members of the state bar,80 banks, savings and loan associations, 8 1 corporations authorized to do trust business in the state, 82 title insurance
companies, 8 3 licensed real estate brokers, 84 and licensed insurance
74. Id. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).
75. Id. § 38-39-115(2) (1973).
76. Id. §§ 38-39-104 to 105 (Supp. 1987).
77. Id. § 38-39-110 (Supp. 1987).
78. For examples of statutes requiring the recordation of certain documents regarding foreclosure, see ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.080(d) (1985) (affidavit of mailing notice of default and of publication of notice of sale); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-808(A)(3) (Supp.
1986) (notice of sale); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(7) (Supp. 1987) (affidavit of mailing notice
of sale and of posting and publication of notice of sale); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW

§§ 1421, 1423 (McKinney 1979) (affidavits of sale, publication of notice of sale, and service of copy of notice).
79. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 675 P.2d 307 (Colo. 1984) (public trustee gave incorrect information to a junior lienor regarding the applicable redemption period); Stephens
v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 30 P. 43 (1892) (private trustee provided only 89 days notice instead
of 90 days notice required by the applicable trust deed).
80. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(2) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(1)(a)
(Supp. 1987).
81.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(5) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(l)(b)

(Supp. 1987).
82.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(1) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(l)(c)

(Supp. 1987).
83.
84.

IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(1)(d) (Supp. 1987).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(3) (Supp. 1986).
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agents. 8 5 In addition, prohibiting anyone who is related or affiliated
with the mortgagee from acting as the trustee can reduce the potential
86
for fraud and abuse of the trust power.
Liberal provisions for the appointment of a successor or substitute
trustee if the original trustee is unwilling, unable, or unqualified to serve
or resigns, as well as in the event the mortgagee simply wants to remove
the trustee for failure to perform, are needed to assure the efficient operation of a private trustee system. These provisions should include the
giving of notice of the substituted or successor trustee to both the original trustee and the grantor of the deed of trust. Additionally, these provisions should provide for the recording of the substituted or successor
87
trustee's name and address in the public records.
V.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO REMEDY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS

Unlike the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures used by jurisdictions
recognizing a power of sale in a private trustee with no court authority
for the sale, 8 8 a system in Colorado of nonjudicial foreclosure by private
trustees that retains a court's involvement8 9 constitutes direct participation by the state in the foreclosure procedures. 90 Consequently, the
85. Id. at § 33-803(A)(4).
86. Before entering office, every public trustee must execute a bond from a responsible surety company in the amount of $25,000, $10,000, or $5,000, depending upon the
class of the county. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-102 (1973). Private trustees should also be
required to be bonded, albeit in a larger amount. This might not actually prevent fraud
and abuse of the trust power but would provide a remedy for parties injured by such acts.
87. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-804 (Supp. 1986); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2934a
(West Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(2) (Supp. 1987).
88. A majority of courts have held that a power of sale to a private trustee is derived
from a private contractual agreement and therefore state action is not involved. See Levine
v. Stein, 560 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l. Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23
(6th Cir. 1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Investment Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.
1975); Bryant v. Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 166 U.S. App. D. C. 178, 509 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925 (1978);
Coffey Enterprises Realty & Devel. Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213 S.E.2d 882 (1975);
Federal Nat'l. Mfg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975); Armenta v. Nussbaum,
519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wash.2d
718, 565 P.2d 812 (1977).
89. The major premise of this article is that the court's involvement will be retained as
an integral part of the power of sale foreclosure process by a private trustee. It should be
noted that if the private trustee is allowed to conduct the foreclosure proceedings and the
requirement for a court order authorizing the sale is eliminated, no state action would be
present and the fourteenth amendment would give no protection regardless of how discriminating or unfair the private conduct may be. See supra, note 88 and cases cited
therein.
90. See, e.g., Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (statutory procedure for foreclosure and sale under which the clerk of the court audits the trustee's
report of the sale involves state action for due process purposes). In the following cases,
the involvement by public officials was not enough to constitute state action: Kenly v.
Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz. 1976) (court clerk records the deed and
receives excess funds); Global Industries, Inc., v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (clerk of the court performs the ministerial action of recording the deed); Garfinkle
v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925 (1978) (county recorder ascertains
that documents relating to the property contain the information required by law and the
court enforces the agreement of the parties made with respect to the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures or enforces the purchaser's right to possession after the sale).
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procedures afforded in the process must comply with the due process
constraints of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 9 ' Although the current statutory scheme meets the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the existing statutes fail to meet the
constitutional guidelines regarding the manner in which notice is given.
This constitutional deficiency in the statutory foreclosure procedures
should be remedied as part of establishing a private trustee system to
assure that the private trustee system is fair and comports with due pro92
cess from the outset.
A.

Notice

The Colorado statutory foreclosure scheme adequately provides for
the notice required. 93 Notice by publication alone cannot be relied on
for notice to interested parties whose names and addresses are known
from the public records. 9 4 Notice by mail of the foreclosure sale 95 and
of the hearing 96 to all persons shown by the public records to have an
interest in the property is required. 9 7 This satisfies at least one aspect of
the notice requirements for procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. 9 8
The manner in which these notices are given is suspect under due
process requirements. The foreclosing party must send the published
notice of sale, the notice of redemptive and cure rights,9 9 and the notice
of the hearing only to the address given in the recorded instrument
demonstrating such person's interest in the real estate.1 0 0 The foreclos91. As a factual predicate to any claim under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, a significant degree of state involvement must be established. See Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Malkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
92. Even if the public trustee system is retained, the suggested modifications to remedy constitutional defects should be enacted. The same constitutional deficiencies in the
existing foreclosure procedure are present whether a public or private trustee is involved.
93. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (notice by publication is not reasonably calculated to inform interested parties who can be notified by more
effective means such as personal service or mailed notice); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (prior to an action that will affect an interest in life,
liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause, a state must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973).
96. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
97. Id. at 120(a)-(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973).
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. From 1975 to 1977, Colorado statutes required that the notices of rights to cure
and redeem be mailed to the grantor of the deed of trust and the owner of the premises, at
their last known addresses. See Act effectiveJuly 1, 1975, ch. 333, § 1-2, 1975 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1442, 1443 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-39-102, 118 (1976)). In
response to testimony alleging that the system was creating chaos because it required examining every telephone book and city directory to determine addresses, (Hearings on S.B.
375 Before the Colorado Senate Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 51st Gen. Ass., 1st Reg.
Sess. (March 15, 1977) (testimony of William Horlbeck)), the statute was amended to require notice to be sent only to the address given in the public record. COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 38-39-102(5), 38-39-118(i)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1987).
100. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-113(2), 38-39-118(l)(b), 38-39-102(5) (1973 & Supp.
1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a)-(b).
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ing party only needs to mail the required notices to the county seat
where the county and state are the only address given for any named
person.' 0 ' If the recorded instrument does not give an address, it is not
necessary to mail any notice to that particular person. 10 2 The one exception to this general rule is that the grantor of the deed of trust, the
current record owner of the property to be sold, and persons known or
believed by the movant to be personally liable upon the indebtedness
secured by the deed of trust, must be given notice of the hearing sent to
0 3
their last known address as shown by the movant's records.
In summary, there is no requirement for foreclosing parties to give
anyone, not even the record owner of the property or the grantor of the
deed of trust, notice of the sale at an address other than the address
given of record. Parties with interests in the property have no right to
any notice if their addresses are not of record. Only a limited few must
be given notice of the hearing at their last known address. Junior lienors
whose rights will be extinguished by the foreclosure sale if they fail to
redeem have no right to receive notice at an address other than the address given of record.' 0 4 Colorado's statutory scheme thus fails to provide for actual notice to a party whose property interest may be
adversely affected even when the foreclosing party knows or can ascertain such party's name and address with relative ease.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 1 05 the United States
Supreme Court, purportedly following the Court's previous analysis in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 106 and a long line of cases
thereafter, 10 7 found that the manner of notice of a tax sale provided to a
mortgagee under Indiana law was unconstitutional. The challenged notice provision permitted notice by posting and publishing an announcement of the tax sale and by mailing a notice to the mortgagor by
certified mail. The Court recognized that a mortgagee possesses a substantial, legally protected property interest that is significantly affected
by a tax sale under Indiana law, 10 8 thereby entitling the mortgagee to
notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale.' 0 9 In
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
102. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
103. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
104. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-39-105, 38-39-110 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
105. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
106. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
107. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S.
208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
108. At the time of the case, Indiana law provided for the annual sale of real property
for property tax payments which were delinquent for 15 months or longer. Prior to the
sale, the county auditor had to post and publish notice of the sale. The owner of the
property was entitled to receive notice by certified mail at his last known address, but
mortgagees were not entitled to such notice. After the required notice was provided, the
county treasurer held a public auction. The tax sale was followed by a two year redemption period for the owner, occupant, lienholder, or any other person who had an interest
in the property. Since no one redeemed the property during the statutory redemption
period, the purchaser at the sale was entitled to a deed for the property free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances on the property.
109. Adanms, 462 U.S. at 798.
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Adams, the Court rejected the argument that constructive notice to the
mortgagee was sufficient since the public records identified the mortgagee. 1to The Court stated: "When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication must
be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known available address, or by personal service.""' In making its decision, the
Court in Adams assumed that the foreclosing party could have discovered the mortgagee's address through reasonable diligence.t 12 The
Court acknowledged, however, that a governmental body should not be
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public
record.' 13
In view of Adams, a constitutional due process challenge may prevail
as to two aspects of the existing Colorado foreclosure statutes.' 14 First,
notice of the sale and hearing are not required if the recorded instrument contains no address for the interested party even though that party
is identified in the public records.' 15 Further, a foreclosing party is not
required to make any effort other than a review of the public land
records to determine an address for a notice recipient. This is true even
if sending notice to the address given in the recorded instrument is un1 16
likely to provide actual notice.
To meet the constitutional guidelines stated in Adams, Colorado
should amend its notice requirements to provide for notice of the sale
and hearing to be sent to the address of all persons otherwise entitled to
receive notice (i) as stated in the recorded instruments; (ii) as set forth in
any subsequently recorded document specifically changing the address;
and (iii) to the last known address as shown by the mortgagee's own
records. These requirements will increase the likelihood of the receipt
of notice by those entitled to it without imposing an unreasonable duty
on the mortgagees to undertake efforts to discover their whereabouts.
The ruling in Adams may indicate that a governmental body is required
only to search the public records to determine the "last known available
address" of interested parties.' 7 Yet, under Colorado's statutory
scheme, the governmental body is not responsible for determining who
110. Id.
11.

Id.

112. Id. at 798 n.4.
113. Id.

114. A challenge under the due process clause of the COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25, would
also prevail since the Colorado Constitution requires, at a minimum, the same due process
guarantees as the U.S. Constitution. City and County of Denver v. Eggert, 647 P.2d. 216, 224
(Colo. 1982).
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
116. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
117. At least one court has suggested that a reasonably ascertainable address is one
given in the public land records. Benoit v. Panthaky, 780 F.2d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 1985).
Another court was satisfied that due process had been given by the mailing of notice to the
last known address of the owner of the real estate as it appeared on the records of the
treasurer. Bender v. City of Rochester, N.Y., 765 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1985). In both cases the
governmental body itself was deciding to whom and where notices were to be sent.
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should receive notice and where such notice is sent." 8 The mortgagee
makes these decisions, 1 9 and neither the trustee nor the court has responsibility for the accuracy of the decisions. 120 Under these circumstances, a reasonably diligent effort to ascertain a correct address for the
notice recipient as required by the Court in Adams 12' should include, at
a minimum, a review of the mortgagee's own records.
B.

Hearing

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a fundamental requirement of due process is to afford an individual the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner
before he is finally deprived of a property interest. 12 2 The formality,
procedural requisites, and timing for the hearing vary depending on the
nature of the interest involved and the nature of the subsequent
23
proceedings.'
Prior to 1977, the Colorado statutory foreclosure scheme had no
provision requiring a hearing of any type, either before or after the public trustee's sale of the property. 124 In 1977, the Colorado legislature
enacted a law 1 25 which assures the mortgagor of at least one opportu12 6
nity to be heard before the foreclosure sale.
118. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
119. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(9) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
121. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. at 798 (1983); see also Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
123. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67; Boddie, 401 U.S. 371; Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
124. In 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court in Princeville Corp. v. Brooks, 188 Colo.
37, 533 P.2d 916 (1975), first recognized the trend of restricting ex parte taking of property
without a hearing in order to conform to the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. In analyzing this concern, the court found that the procedure for a hearing as
provided under CoLo. R. Civ. P. 120, although arguably given only to persons in the military, could be broadly interpreted. Under Rule 120, the court could consider factors other
than military status to determine if it could justifiably retain supervisory jurisdiction over
the foreclosure and sale. The court recognized that this was the only opportunity available
for defining factors existing in the foreclosure proceeding. No mention was made whether
anything in the state statutory procedure required the mortgagee to obtain the court order
authorizing the sale. Subsequently, Rule 120 was repealed, amended, and re-enacted, effective October 1, 1976, "to provide for due process safeguards to one who challenges the
entitlement to foreclose a deed of trust containing a power of sale to the public trustee."
Valley Dev. at Vail v. Warder, 192 Colo. 316, 318, 557 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1976).
125. Act effectiveJuly 1, 1977, ch. 492, § 6, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1723, 1726 (codified
as amended at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973 & Supp. 1987)) (requiring a court
order authorizing the sale).
126. See Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure: A Judicial
Dilemma, 43 Mo. L. REV. 25, 32 (1978) (the author concludes that some type of hearing
before the foreclosure sale is probably required by the procedural due process clause); see
also, Hearings on S.B. 375 Before the Senate Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 51st Gen. Ass.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo., Mar. 15, 1977) (testimony of William Horlbeck). But see Union Bank
Co. v. Brumbaugh, 69 Ohio St. 2d 202, 206, 431 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (1982) (relying on
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court determined that due
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Rule 120 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the
procedure used to obtain the order authorizing the sale. This rule allows
any interested person seeking such order to file a verified motion with
the district court. A response opposing the motion is also provided
127
for.
The rule allows an opportunity for a hearing, 128 although the
court may dispense with it if no response is filed and the court is satisfied
that the movant is entitled to the order authorizing the sale.' 29 The rule
limits the scope of the hearing to a determination of whether there is a
reasonable probability of the existence of a default or other circumstances justifying the exercise of the power of sale under the terms of
the deed of trust.' 30 The hearing may also include consideration of issues required by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.13'
Many issues that could vitally affect the rights of the debtor, the
owner of the property, and junior lienors and their ability to cure or to
redeem, cannot be considered in the Rule 120 court hearing. 132 These
types of issues can appropriately be raised and considered in independent actions for declaratory relief 13 3 or injunctive relief 134 regardless of
the outcome of the motion for an order authorizing the sale.' 35 In addition, the court may retain supervisory jurisdiction over the proposed
13 6
foreclosure if circumstances warrant such continued supervision.
These proceedings which provide interested persons the opportunity to
be heard can occur prior to the foreclosure sale but no later than before
13 7
the owner or any lienor is finally deprived of his property interest.
Thus, Colorado's statutory foreclosure scheme, combined with the procedures allowed by the Colorado courts, meets the due process requirements of an opportunity for a hearing prior to the deprivation of a
38
significant property interest.1
process does not require that one must be afforded a hearing prior to a court determination that the foreclosure sale was conducted in conformity with the statutory requisites).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a)-(c).
Id. at 120(d).
Id. at 120(e).
Id. at 120(d).
Id.

132.

These include the reasonableness of foreclosure costs, whether or not the proce-

dures followed were defective, and the priority of liens. See, e.g., Bakers Park Mining &
Milling Co. v. Dist. Ct., 662 P.2d 483, 485 (Colo. 1983) (consideration of attorneys' fees
charged beyond scope of Rule 120 hearing); Boulder Lumber Co. v. Alpine of Nederland,

626 P.2d 724, 725 (Colo. App. 1981) (priority of mechanics' liens is beyond scope of Rule
120 hearing).
133.

Bakers Park, 662 P.2d at 483.

134. Id. at 485; see also Boulder Lumber, 626 P.2d at 725.
135. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(d).
136.

Bakers Park, 662 P.2d at 483; Princeville Corp. v. Brooks, 188 Colo. 37, 533 P.2d 916

(1975).
137.

In Colorado, the owner's and lienor's rights in the property are not terminated

until the expiration of all redemption periods. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-110 (Supp.
1987).
138. At least two courts have stated that the right to bring a suit for injunctive relief
alone is not enough to satisfy due process. However, the right to bring a suit for injunctive
relief combined with a requirement for the mortgagee to bear the burden of proving the

probable validity of his claim and allowing the mortgagor the opportunity to rebut and
defend the charges, is sufficient to comply with the due process requirements for a hear-
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CONCLUSION

The public trustee system has outlived its original purpose. Only a
few changes to Colorado's foreclosure scheme are needed to take advantage of the potential improvements to the power of sale foreclosure
process that competition among private trustees will bring. The Colorado legislature should enact requirements regarding the recording of
several additional documents, the substitution of trustees, and limitations on who can act as a private trustee. The lack of procedural due
process in the manner of notice provisions currently in force should be
corrected. With these changes, the private trustee, like the public
trustee, will be compelled to act in accordance with the existing statutes
and deed of trust. The changes this article proposes would thus create a
more responsive and efficient foreclosure process while continuing to
protect the rights of debtors and others in the property being
foreclosed.

ing. See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1261 (W.D.N.C. 1975): Garner v. TriState Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974).

CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY
RUSSELL K. BEAN*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, directors of corporations have become increasingly
aware that they may be held personally liable for their actions taken as
directors. Often, creditors will look to the directors of an insolvent corporation, hoping to find a deeper pocket from which to recover their
losses, especially during periods of economic downturn. In addition,
stockholders will often turn to the directors of the corporation when the
corporation ceases to perform as expected, and the stockholders have a
weak or nonexistent claim under the securities laws. The potential for
massive liability, when compared with the relatively minimal benefits
that an outside director can expect to receive from his position, often
causes potential outside directors to refuse such invitations. As a consequence, many corporations that need the independent, knowledgeable
advice that an outside director can provide must settle for inside directors or less knowledgeable, less independent outside directors.
This article, while not exhaustive of the topic, will discuss four major areas of potential director liability and discuss the standards involved
under each area. The four major sources of director liability arise from
(1) breach of the fiduciary duty of due care, (2) conflict of interest transactions (self-dealing), (3) usurpation of corporate opportunities, and
(4) statutory liability. In relation to the fiduciary duty of due care, Colorado has passed a new statute which allows corporations to limit the
monetary liability of their directors for their gross negligence. This statute and its relevant history will also be discussed in detail.
I.

BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY

DUTY

OF DUE CARE

Colorado has long recognized that directors are in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation. They owe undivided loyalty to their corporation and "an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
consideration other than the welfare of [their] corporation."' The directors hold an office of trust, and, accordingly, are held to the high
standard of duty required of trustees. The directors have a duty to protect the rights of the company, and to act openly and above board.
"They must manage the corporate affairs in good faith, within the limits
of the law applicable, and give the corporate entity the benefit of their
*
Associate with the law firm of Cogswell and Wehrle, Denver, Colorado.
1. Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1010
(1943), quoted in,Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 54, 58,
377 P.2d 391, 393 (1962). The court in Kullgren noted that directors are held "to the

extreme measure of candor, unselfishness and good faith." 110 Colo. at 461, 135 P.2d at
1010.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65' 1

best judgment and care."' 2 Moreover, directors of a corporation are "liable jointly and severally for losses of the corporation caused by their
bad faith or willful or intentional departures from duties, their fraudulent breaches of trust, their gross or willful negligence, or their ultra
'3
vires acts."
A.

Business Judgment Rule

Although directors are treated as fiduciaries, they need merely act
in accordance with the business judgment rule, which has considerable
vitality in Colorado. The business judgment rule provides that the good
faith acts of directors, which are within the powers of the corporation
and within the exercise of honest business judgment, may not be challenged. 4 Courts will not interfere with or regulate the conduct of directors who act reasonably and honestly in the exercise of their business
judgment and duties. 5 A director has a large amount of discretionary
power which is not subject to control by either the stockholders or the
courts, if exercised honestly and with reason. When the stockholders
are dissatisfied with the management of the company, their recourse is
6
to elect new management rather than to seek redress in the courts.
Although errors of judgment will not be corrected by the courts,
that judgment must be exercised with reason. 7 Colorado law suggests
that the negligent exercise ofjudgment must amount to clear and gross
negligence before the courts will hold a director liable. 8 Generally, Colorado courts require some evidence of fraud or self-dealing before they
will impose liability on directors. 9
The business judgment rule in its purest form only protects directors from liability for errors of judgment. It does not protect directors
from liability for negligence in the process by which they reached their
2. Great Western United Corp. v. Great Western Producers Coop., 41 Colo. App.
349, 353, 588 P.2d 380, 382 (1978), aff'd, 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980). The court
concluded that directors of Great Western United Corporation could not be held liable for
breach of contract in failing to use "best effort" to persuade shareholders to approve the
sale of its subsidiary since the directors had a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, which
included protecting the rights of the company and to act openly and above board. Id. at
353-54, 588 P.2d at 382-83.
3. Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 69, 75, 376 P.2d
162, 165 (1962).
4. See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 337, 526 P.2d 316, 317
(1974). Several property owners within a subdivision brought an action against their
homeowner's association to enjoin it from constructing tennis courts, claiming that the
association board acted arbitrarily in approving the tennis courts. The court determined
that the board's judgment was valid absent a showing of bad faith or fraud. Id. at 337, 526
P.2d at 317.
5. Id. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317.
6. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Colorado
law).
7. See id.
8. Holland, 151 Colo. at 75, 376 P.2d at 166. Mere error in judgment is not enough
to impose liability upon a director.
9. See Rywalt, 34 Colo. App. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317. When a director has committed
fraud or self-dealing then he has breached the duty to act reasonably and honestly in the
exercise of his judgment.
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judgment.' 0 This statement comes as a surprise to most people given
the broad language courts have used in their statement of the business
judgment rule. For instance, in FinancialIndustrialFund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., I I the court stated that the reason for the business judgment rule is that "in order to make the corporation function effectively,
those having management responsibility must have the freedom to make
in good faith the many necessary decisions quickly and finally without
the impairment of having to be liable for an honest error in judgment."' 2 Of course, many decisions cannot be made "quickly and finally" unless they are made without the benefit of a complete and
13
thorough investigation. Further, broad dicta in Rywalt v. Writer Corp.
stated that courts will not "interfere with or regulate the conduct of the
directors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their judgment and
duties."' 14 Such broad statements can give directors a false sense of security in believing that they would not be liable, not only for errors of
judgment, but also for errors in investigating the facts supporting their
judgments.
B.

Smith v. Van Gorkom

A recent Delaware case has demonstrated that false sense of security. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 15 the Delaware Supreme Court determined
that, while the business judgment rule protected the directors from personal liability for an error in judgment, it did not protect the directors
for gross negligence in failing to investigate the facts supporting their
judgment. 16 In Van Gorkom, Trans Union Corporation could not generate a sufficient amount of taxable income to utilize its substantial investment tax credits. Trans Union's earnings were principally generated
from its rail car leasing business which was very capital intensive. As a
consequence, the company had a large amount of fixed assets and a correspondingly large amount of depreciation due to the accelerated cost
recovery program. The accelerated depreciation reduced Trans Union's
taxable income to such an extent that the company could not use its
investment tax credits. This problem was causing considerable concern
for the company. 17
Management's proposed solution was a leveraged buyout in which
10.

Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project -

Of the Duty of Due Careand the Business

Judgment Rule, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237, 1240-41 (1986). The author of this article argues
strongly that the American Law Institute's standard of "due care" is flawed since it literally
requires due care in exercising judgment as well as in the process of forming a judgment.
11. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In an action based on
Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the court referred to the business
judgment rule in determining the timeliness of the special earning report. The court concluded that the decision by directors to release such report was a matter of discretion. Id.
at 518.
12. Id. at 518.
13. 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
14. Id. at 335, 526 P.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
15. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
16. Id. at 872.
17. Id. at 864-65.
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the group acquiring Trans Union would have sufficient taxable income
to make use of the tax credits. Senior management had not yet completed a study to determine the necessary selling price of Trans Union's
stock in the buyout. However, management had done some preliminary
studies which indicated that a leveraged buyout would be easily feasible,
if the stock were priced at $50.00 per share, but difficult if priced at
$60.00 per share. 18 At the time of the proposal, the current market
price for Trans Union stock was approximately $38.00 per share.' 9
Van Gorkom, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, vetoed the
idea of a leveraged buyout but was receptive to the idea of selling Trans
Union to a company with sufficient income to absorb the tax credits.
Accordingly, Van Gorkom, on his own initiative, entered into negotiations for the sale of Trans Union. He did this without the knowledge or
approval of the board or senior management. 20 Van Gorkom eventually
struck a deal whereby Trans Union would merge into New T Company,
a subsidiary wholly owned by Jay Pritzker, at a price of $55.00 per share.
However, Pritzker attached several stipulations to this merger proposal.
First, he would be entitled to purchase one million shares of Trans
Union stock at $38.00 per share. Second, Trans Union could accept, but
could not solicit, other offers for the purchase of Trans Union. Finally,
Pritzker required that the Trans Union board of directors approve the
21
merger proposal within three days.
Van Gorkom called an emergency meeting of the board of directors
at which time he gave a twenty minute oral presentation of the merger
proposal. The board of directors was not given a copy of the proposed
merger documents, and Van Gorkom did not disclose the methodology
by which he determined the $55.00 per share figure. The president of
Trans Union spoke in favor of the merger proposal. The chief financial
officer of the company discussed his leveraged buyout study and stated
that the $55.00 per share figure was at the low end of a fair price range,
but his studies could not conclusively show the intrinsic value of the
company. The board meeting lasted a total of two hours, and ended
22
with the board ultimately approving the merger proposal.
The board was composed of five inside directors and five outside
directors. The five inside directors had backgrounds in law and accounting, with 116 years of collective employment by the company and 68
years of combined experience on its board. The five outside directors
included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist
who was former dean of a school of business. The outside directors had
78 years combined experience as chief executive officers and 50 years of
23
cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union.
Despite the collective experience of the directors, the court deter18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

865.
867.
866.
867.
867-69.
880 n.21.
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mined that the board had been grossly negligent in (1) failing to adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing the sale of
the company and in establishing the per share purchase price, and
24
(2) failing to inform themselves of the intrinsic value of the company.
The court stated that the business judgment rule was a presumption
that, in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the company. 2 5 The business
judgment rule, however, provides no protection for directors who have
made "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment. ' 26 Further, the court
stated that whether a business judgment may be termed as informed
turns on whether the directors "have informed themselves prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them."' 27 The court also noted that gross negligence would be the
standard for determining whether a business judgment was an informed
28
one.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the board was grossly negligent in relying upon Van Gorkom's representations that $55.00 per
share was a fair price. The court further found that the board failed to
read the merger documents prior to approving the transactions, failed
to engage the services of an investment banker, failed to do a study of
the intrinsic value of the company, and approved the merger upon only
two hours of consideration, without prior notice and without the exigencies of a crisis or emergency. The court was not persuaded by the fact
that the merger price was at a substantial premium over the current market price, or that the board, because of its experience and long history
with the company, did not require a full scale study to know that the
$55.00 figure was a fair price for the company, or that the merger had in
fact been very beneficial for Trans Union. 2 9 Rather, the court only focused on the fact that the board of directors accepted the $55.00 price
without conducting a formal investigation to determine whether that
30
price was the best the stockholders could receive.
Needless to say, Van Gorkom has caused considerable concern in corporate board rooms around the country. In essence, Van Gorkom stands
for the proposition that directors can be held personally liable for failing
to conduct a formalized investigatory process before they approve a
merger price. 3 ' Under the decision, a board of directors can no longer
rely upon their business acumen or their intuition that a proposed deal
will be beneficial to the corporation. Instead, the board of directors
must constantly be conscious of all of the factors that go into the deci24. Id. at 874.
25. Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
26. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
27. Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811).
28. Id. at 873.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business judgment, 41
Bus. LAw. 1187, 1191 (1987).
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sion-making process, and must ensure documentation and investigation
of each factor. This may require the unnecessary hiring of an investment banker, performing an audit when corporate records could suffice,
and additional reliance upon lawyers to prepare the documents that
would provide an aura of formalism and circumspection on the part of
32
the board.
In addition, Van Gorkom undermines one of the most stark realities
of the business world. Good business deals often occur under extreme
time constraints. Quick business decisions can often mean the difference between being the first to market a product or business failure.
Business decisions are often made by corporate executives who have
made a career out of taking too little information, adding a little business acumen and intuition, and producing quality decisions.
C.

Legislative Response to Van Gorkom

These concerns, floating in the wake of the Van Gorkom decision,
prompted the Delaware legislature to rewrite its corporate laws to effectively overrule Van Gorkom. The new statute essentially provides that a
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation to provide that corporate directors may not be held liable for monetary damages to the
corporation or to its stockholders for a breach of fiduciary duty, amount33
ing to gross negligence, to the corporation.
Colorado also passed legislation that adopted substantially the
same statute that Delaware enacted. 3 4 The Colorado limitation of director liability also applies to nonprofit corporations,3 5 state banks, 36 and
savings and loan associations. 3 7 The Colorado statute provides that a
corporation may include in its articles a provision limiting or eliminating
the personal liability of directors in the following manner:
If so provided in the articles of incorporation, to eliminate or
limit the personal liability of a director to the corporation or to
its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director; except that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or to
its shareholders for monetary damages for: Any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or to its shareholders; acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; acts specified
in section 7-5-114; or any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall
eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or
to its shareholders for monetary damages for any act or omis32. See id. at 1191-92. The authors comically note that, in addition, directors, who are
more intent on formalism than business, may make poorer decisions.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
34. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly §§ 1-2 (1987)(to be codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-2-102(1.5)(d), 7-3-101(1)(u)).
35. Id. at §§ 3-4 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-21-102(1.5), 7-22-101(l)(r)).
36. Id. at § 5 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-3-101(2.5)).
37. Id. at § 6 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-112(1)(n)).
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sion occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes
38
effective.
Essentially, the statute allows a corporation to eliminate the personal liability of a director for his simple or gross negligence. The Colorado statute is merely a restatement of the business judgment rule with
the exception that it protects against gross negligence. Of course, the
negligent decisions of directors, made in good faith, have always been
protected under the business judgment rule,3 9 unlike intentional misconduct, self-dealing, 4 0 and statutory liability, 4 1 which were not cov-

ered. Accordingly under the business judgment rule, clear and gross
negligence did not survive. 4 2 Although the new statute does protect directors for acts of gross negligence, it does not make an explicit exception for gross negligence, as it does for breaches of loyalty, bad faith,
intentional misconduct, or statutory liability.
The courts might construe gross negligence as an act not taken in
good faith. "Good faith" has been variously defined but is generally
used to describe a state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom
from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful
to one's duty or obligation. It may mean an honesty of purpose, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the actor
upon inquiry rather than diligence or non-negligence. 43 The Uniform
44
Commercial Code defines "good faith" to mean honesty in fact.
Gross negligence, on the other hand, consists of a conscious or voluntary act likely to result in harm of which the actor is or reasonably should
be aware. 4 5 To the extent that gross negligence includes a conscious
disregard of duty, creditors and shareholders could reasonably argue
that such acts are not taken in good faith.
Although it may be argued that negligence constitutes lack of good
faith, the argument should fail because it ignores the history and intent
of the Delaware statute. The new statute was passed by Delaware in
response to a case holding directors personally liable for their gross
negligence. Clearly, if the statute is to add anything beyond what the
38.

Id. at § 2 (to be codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(l)(u)).

39. See Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974)(stating that
the acts must be within the boundaries established by the corporation's articles and the
exercise of honest business judgment); see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
42. Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d
162 (1962); see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
43. See Wendling v. Cundall, 568 P.2d 888, 890 (Wyo. 1977)(the Wyoming Supreme
Court attempted to define the term "utmost good faith" which was present in a contract);
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 623-24 (5th ed. 1979); 18A WORDS & PHRASES 83, 106-09 (1956
& Supp. 1986); cf. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N.C. 465, 76 S.E.2d 538 (1972)(requiring
"good sense and reasonable business prudence").
44. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-1-201(19) (1973).

45. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 931-32. Colorado does not recognize
the concept of gross negligence, but defines willful and wanton negligence similarly. Adams v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 49 Colo. 475, 113 P. 1010 (1922); Foster v. Redding, 97
Colo. 4, 45 P.2d 940 (1935).

DENVER UNIVERSITY 1L W REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

common law has already provided, it must eliminate director liability for
gross negligence.
The new statute also may not protect directors from personal liability for their recklessness. To the extent that the Colorado courts define
recklessness as including some element of intent, such actions could
constitute either intentional misconduct or acts taken not in good faith.
Recklessness is generally defined to be action taken either with knowledge of the danger or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the
danger to a reasonable man. 46 A reckless act is one that is intentionally
done with the knowledge that there is a significant risk of harm to
others. 4 7 Note that the difference between recklessness and gross negligence is minuscule. 4 8 If the courts determined that gross negligence
could not support liability under the new statute, but recklessness could,
courts could with little effort transform a grossly negligent act by a director into a reckless act. Therefore, considering the intent of the legislature and the history of the new statute, recklessness and gross
negligence also should not support personal liability under this statute.
Other than the items specifically excluded from the statute, it is important to note what the statute does not protect against. The statute
does not itself eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors. The
corporation must act by amending its articles of incorporation in order
to shield its directors from liability. 49 A problem of construction arises
from this provision since some corporations already include limitations
of liability in their articles similar to those allowed by the statute. The
question arises as to whether the grossly negligent action of a director,
which was taken after the articles were amended to include the limitation
of liability, but prior to the effective date of the statute, will be protected
from liability. Essentially, can a corporation limit the liability of a director through its articles of incorporation prior to the effective date of this
statute?
Fletcher seems to suggest this is possible although no persuasive
authority for the proposition is cited. 50 The authority cited by Fletcher
is a Colorado case, holding that article provisions relieving directors of
liability for conflict of interest transactions "create no license to steal"
and will not validate unfair transactions. 5 ' In any event, the new statute
seems to presume that such provisions were invalid prior to its
52
enactment.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965); see Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524.
48. Both recklessness and gross negligence require the knowledge or reasonable
knowledge of a danger which is likely to occur. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 43, at 931-32 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 46, at § 500.
49. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly, §§ 2, 4-6 (1987) (to be codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 7-3-101(1)(u), 7-22-101(1)(r), 11-3-101(2.5), 11-41-112(l)(n)).
50. 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1047 (rev.
perm. ed. 1986).
51. Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972).
52. The argument would be that the legislature would not have passed a law allowing
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Second, the new statute will not protect action of a director taken in
a capacity other than that of a director. 53 For instance, if a director who
is also the president of a corporation takes an action in his capacity as
president rather than as director, he will be subject to monetary liability
in the same manner as any other officer of a corporation.
Finally, the statute does not protect a board of directors against declaratory or injunctive relief or a claim for rescission. It only protects
the director against monetary liability. 54 Therefore, a director may still
incur personal attorney fees, and, if appropriate, be assessed attorney
fees for the opposing party, in a suit not seeking monetary liability
against the director personally.
Thus, the new statute should not be construed as the solution for all
the problems presently faced by directors. It contains difficult constructional problems, such as whether gross negligence or recklessness will
constitute acts not taken in good faith. Additionally, it does not protect
directors from personal involvement in litigation seeking non-monetary
damages. To the extent that the new statute prevents the occurrence of
cases such as Van Gorkom, however, it is a step in the right direction to
allow free and unencumbered decision-making by directors.
II.

A.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH

Conflict of Interest Transactions

Directors, as fiduciaries, owe their undivided loyalty to the corporation. In Colorado, this principle was first announced in Kuligren v. Navy
Gas & Supply Co.5 5 The court stated:
A director of a corporation is in the position of a fiduciary; that
is a principle deeply rooted in our law. He owes loyalty and
allegiance to his corporation, a loyalty that is undivided and an
allegiance that is influenced in action by no consideration other
than the welfare of his corporation. He is held in official action,
to the extreme measure of candor, unselfishness, and56good
faith. Those principles are rigid, essential and salutary.
Historically, transactions between an interested director and his
corporation have been considered voidable by the corporation. 5 7 The
rule of strict voidability, however, has been slowly repudiated as courts
the corporation to limit the liability of its directors if it believed that corporations already
had such power.
53. H.R. 142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly §§ 2, 4-6 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 7-3-101(1)(r), 7-22-101(l)(r), 11-3-101(2.5), 11-41-112(1)(n)).
54. Id.

55. 110 Colo. 454, 135 P.2d 1007 (1943).
56. Id. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (quoting Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d
356, 369 (1942), rev'd, 268 A.D. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1944), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y.
822, 66 N.E.2d 591 (1946)).
57.

See de La Garza, Conflict of Interest Transactions: Fiduciary Duties of CoiporationDirectois

Who are also Controlling Shareholders, 57 DEN. U.L. REv. 609, 619-22 (1980); see also. Morgan
v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 555, 63 P. 416, 421 (1900); Glengary Consol. Mining Co. v.
Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 4, 62 P. 839, 840 (1900); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. 454, 458,
79 P. 742, 743 (1905).
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recognized that interested transactions may be beneficial to the corporation. 58 Today, most states, including Colorado, have adopted statutes
repudiating the rule of strict voidability. These statutes provide that no
contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors shall be either void or voidable because of the relationship or
interest of the director if one of several conditions is met. 59
Literally read, Colorado's statute allows a corporation and its directors to retain the benefits of an interested transaction if any of the three
conditions are met. Thus, the director would not be liable on the basis
of the interested transaction if (1) a majority of the disinterested directors voted for the transaction, (2) a majority of the shareholders,
whether interested or not, voted for the transaction, or (3) it was fair to
the corporation. Under this strict interpretation, an unfair transaction
would not be voidable so long as one of the first two criteria was met.
Accordingly, an interested director, who was also a majority shareholder, could engage in an interested transaction which was unfair to
the corporation so long as he, as a majority shareholder, voted in favor
of the transaction.
However, the correct analysis does not involve a strict interpretation of the statute for two reasons. First, the statute itself states that the
transaction will not be voidable solely because it is an interested transaction. 60 If the transaction is both interested and unfair, a court of equity
may void the transaction even though it is supported by disinterested
director approval or shareholder approval. 6 1 Second, a transaction is
not necessarily validated simply because one of the three criteria is met.
The statute only states that the transaction will not be voidable solely on
the basis that the transaction was interested. 62 It does not state that the
58. E. BRODSKY & N.P. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3:01
(1984).
59. Colorado's statute provides:
(1) No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which one or more of its directors or officers are
directors or officers or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely
for that reason or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction solely because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose if:
(a) The material fact as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes, approves, or ratifies the
contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of a majority of the disinterested
directors, even though the disinterested directors are less than quorum; or
(b) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote
thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically authorized, approved, or
ratified in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(c) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors, a committee thereof,
or the shareholders.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1) (1986).
60. Id.
61. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
62.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1).
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transaction is valid if the criteria are met. Although the technical requirements of the statute are fulfilled, transactions that are unfair and
unreasonable may still be considered invalid. 63 Indeed, it would be incongruous for the courts to hold that a majority shareholder, simply by
disclosing his purpose to injure the majority shareholders, could make
his interested transaction not voidable under the statute.
If each interested transaction must be fair to the corporation and
the minority shareholders, does the director or the challenging share-

holder have the burden with respect to fairness? Under Colorado law,
the burden has always been on the director to prove the fairness of his
transaction with the corporation. 64 Section 7-5-114.5 does not alter that
burden. 6 5 The fact that the transaction received disinterested director
the
approval or shareholder approval does not and should not relieve
66
corporation.
the
to
fairness
proving
of
burden
the
director of

In this regard, the American Law Institute has proposed changes to
its Model Business Corporation Act, upon which Colorado's statute is

based, which allows the burden of proof of fairness to shift to the shareholder under certain circumstances. In the case of disinterested shareholder approval, the burden will be on the party challenging the
transaction to prove that the transaction constituted a waste of corporate assets. 67 In the case of disinterested director approval, the challeng63.

Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d

1300 (5th Cir. 1985)(a mere disclosure of impropriety does not remove the taint of unfairness nor allow director to take advantage of an opportunity at the expense of the corporation); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952)(a director is not allowed to obtain an unfair advantage or profit at the expense of
the corporation).
64. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 1, 403 P.2d 758 (1965).
65. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985)(applying Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1
(1977), which is substantially similar to Colorado's statute).
66. Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221; see also Gelb, CorporateDisloyalty - A Wyoming Case and the
ALI Project, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 111, 119-27 (1986).
67. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02
(Tent. Draft No. 5 1985). The draft reads as follows:
(a) General Rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction
with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills his duty of loyalty to the corporation with respect to the transaction
if:
(1) Disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is
made to the corporate decisionmaker who authorizes or ratifies the transaction; and
(2) (A) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or
(B) the transaction is authorized, following such disclosure, by disinterested directors, and could reasonably be believed to be fair to the corporation at the time of such authorization; or
(C) the transaction is authorized or ratified, following such disclosures, by disinterested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof"Ratification of Defective Disclosure. A party who challenges a
transaction between the director or senior executive and the corporation has the
burden of proof, except that the director or the senior executive has the burden
of proving that the transaction is fair to the corporation if the transaction was not
authorized by disinterested directors, or authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders, following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the
transaction. The disclosure requirements of § 5.02(a)(1) will be deemed to be
satisfied at any time (but no later than a reasonable time after suit is filed chal-
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ing party will have the burden of proving that the disinterested directors
could not reasonably have believed the transaction to be fair to the
68
corporation.
B.

Usurpation of a Corporate Opportunity

Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, a corporate officer or director must refrain from entering into activities in competition with the
corporation or from acquiring assets in which the corporation has an
interest. The general rule is stated as follows:
An officer of a corporation is duty bound to purchase property
for the corporation, or to refrain from purchasing property for
himself, if the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the property or if the purchase of the property by the
officer or director may hinder or defeat the
plans and purposes
69
of the corporation's legitimate business.
Before a director is prevented from acquiring such assets, the corporation must show an interest or expectancy in the property. To demonstrate this, the corporation must establish that not only did the property
possess value to it, but that it had a practical, not a mere theoretical, use
for it. 70 Further, the director owes no specific duty to use or pledge his
personal funds to enable the corporation to take advantage of the
opportunity.71
Merely because a corporation is negotiating for the purchase of the
property does not establish an expectancy or interest. The corporation
must show not only that it was interested in the property, but that it had
a specific use for the property. 72 Thus, although a corporation would
like to have an asset and is negotiating for it, the company does not have
an opportunity capable of protection unless it has a defined use to which
the property could be put. This is a very difficult standard for the corporation to meet, for it must show not only that it had the financial resources to acquire the opportunity but that it had a present intention to
purchase, and that it could use the property once it exercised the
opportunity.
The extent to which Colorado courts go to avoid the corporate opportunity doctrine is evidenced by Carperv. Frost Oil Co. 73 In this case,
W.H. Malone, the corporation's attorney, one of its directors, and its
general manager, was dispatched to Louisiana to negotiate for the
lenging the transaction) the transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by
the board, the shareholder, or the corporate decisionmaker who initially approved the transaction or his successor.
68. Id.; see also Gelb, supra note 66, for a full discussion of this topic.
69. Three G Corp. v. Daddis, 714 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Colo. App. 1986). Three G Corporation had brought an action against the former officer and controlling shareholder for
recovery of damages and real property. However, as the court found, Three G Corporation had no intention to purchase the real property because of its financial condition.
Thus, the corporation had no interest in the property. Id.
70. Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 313, 49 P.2d 429, 431 (1935).
71. Three G Corp., 714 P.2d at 1336.
72. See Colorado & Utah Coal Co., 97 Colo. at 310-11, 49 P.2d at 430-31.
73. 72 Colo. 345, 211 P. 370 (1922).
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purchase of oil lands for the corporation. During the trip, Malone
purchased oil producing property for himself and the president of the
corporation. When the corporation attempted to recover that property,
the court determined that no corporate opportunity existed. 74 The
court held that the evidence did not establish that the corporation could
have acquired the same land at a reasonable price. Furthermore, the corporation could not be certain that it could have purchased the land even
if Malone had not. Moreover, Malone was sent to Louisiana not as a
purchaser of oil lands but as a general manager of the company. In that
capacity, he was not authorized to purchase oil lands for the corporation. From these facts, the court determined that no corporate opportunity existed. Under current law in states other than Colorado, Malone
would have been ordered to hold the oil property in constructive trust
75
for the corporation.
Under the widely accepted rule of corporate opportunity:
[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation is financially able to
undertake, is from its nature, in the line of the corporation's
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and by
embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation,
the law 76will not permit him to seize the opportunity for
himself.
Applying this standard to the Frost Oil case, the oil producing properties
were in the line of business of the corporation, it had an interest in the
property, and the interest of the corporation and the officer were in conflict because of the officer's purchase. Under the Guth v. Loft, Inc. 7 7 test,
the interest of the corporation need not be actual and practical but need
only be "reasonable."- 78 Colorado, therefore, has departed from the
general rules of the corporate opportunity doctrine, and will allow directors wide latitude in choosing the properties that they buy.
Colorado case law also prohibits the director from engaging "in enterprises directly in competition with, and necessarily having injurious,
' 79
crippling, or detrimental effect upon, the corporation's business."
This duty is similar to the corporate opportunity doctrine since a competing business takes away opportunities that a corporation ordinarily
would have. Only one Colorado case, however, has affirmatively imposed this duty upon a director.8 0 It is unclear to what extent Colorado
74. Id. at 348-49, 211 P. at 371.
75. See Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974)(opportunity and
any property acquired becomes subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the
corporation).
76. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Cas. 255, 263, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939).
77. Id.
78.

Id.

79. Williams v. Stirling, 40 Colo. App. 463, 466, 583 P.2d 290, 292 (1978).
80. Id.; see also Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935)
(if the director owes no duty to act or contract for the corporation with respect to property

in question, he is at liberty to act for himself).
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courts will enforce this fiduciary duty not to compete.
III.

STATUTORY LIABILITY

In Colorado, under section 7-5-114, a director will be liable to the
corporation if one of four circumstances are found to exist: 8 1 (1) if the
director allows the corporation to pay dividends while it is insolvent;
(2) if the director allows the corporation to purchase its own shares
when it has no surplus to do so; (3) if the director allows the corporation
to distribute assets to its shareholders in liquidation without providing
for known debts; and (4) if the director allows the corporation to make a
loan to the director of the corporation without the affirmative vote of
82
two-thirds of the shareholders.
Under section 7-5-114(1)(a), if a director votes for or assents to a
dividend or other distribution to the corporation's shareholders "contrary to the provisions of this code or contrary to any restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation," he will be liable to the
corporation jointly and severally with the other directors voting for the
dividend or distribution. 8 3 A dividend would be contrary to the provi81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1) (1986). Section 7-5-114, in part, states:
Liability of Directors on Certain Cases. (1)In addition to any other liabilities, a
director shall be liable in the following circumstances unless he complies with the
standard provided in this code for performance of duties of directors:
(a) A director who votes for or assents to the declaration of any dividend
or other distribution of the assets of a corporation to its shareholders contrary to the provisions of this code or contrary to any restrictions contained
in the articles of incorporation shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and
severally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for the amount of
such dividend which is paid or the value of such assets which are distributed
in excess of the amount of such dividend or distribution which could have
been paid or distributed without a violation of the provisions of this code or
restrictions in the article of incorporation.
(c) A director who votes for or assents to any distribution of assets of a
corporation to its shareholders during the liquidation of the corporation
without the payment and discharge of, or the making of adequate provision
for, all known debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation shall be
liable to the corporation, jointly or severally with all other directors so voting
or assenting, for the value of such assets which are distributed, to the extent
that such debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation are not thereafter paid and discharged.
(d) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the making
or guaranteeing of a loan to a director of the corporation (unless the voting
procedure specified in § 7-3-101(l)(f) has been followed), or the making or
guaranteeing of any loan to a director secured by shares of the corporation,
shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of such
loan or guarantee until the repayment thereof.
(2) Any director against whom a claim is asserted under this section for the
payment of a dividend or other distribution of assets of a corporation and who is
held liable for such claims shall be entitled to contribution from the shareholders
who accepted or received any such dividend or assets, knowing such dividend or
distribution to have been made in violation of this code, in proportion to the
amounts received by them.
(3) Any director against whom a claim is asserted under this section is entitled to contribution from the other directors who voted or assented to the action
upon which the claim is asserted and who could be liable under the circumstances
stated in subsection (1) of this section.
82. Id. at § 7-5-114(1).
83. Id.
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sions of the code if it were made when the corporation was insolvent, or
when payment of the dividend would render the corporation insolvent,
would be contrary
or when the declaration or payment of the dividend
84
incorporation.
of
articles
the
in
restrictions
any
to
The directors of the corporation are absolutely liable for violations
of this and the other provisions of section 7-5-114.85 The director's only
method of avoiding liability is to prove one of the statutory defenses. 86
In the case of dividends, the director would have to prove that one of
the exceptions to the proscription against dividends while insolvent was
met.87

Under section 7-5-1 14(l)(b), a director who votes for or assents to a
purchase by the corporation of its own shares "contrary to the provisions of this code" is liable to the corporation jointly and severally with
the other directors voting for the purchase of any amount in excess of
the amount that could have been paid in accordance with the provisions
of the statute.8 8 Generally, the corporation may purchase its own shares
only to the extent that it has unreserved and unrestricted surplus. 8

9

No

showing of fraud is required to impose liability under this section.9 0
The liability of the directors, however, is limited. The directors are only
liable to the extent that the amount paid upon the repurchase exceeds
the amount statutorily allowed. 9 ' In fact, under all of the statutory liability sections, the directors are only liable to the extent that their actions exceed the provisions of the code. Under prior law, a violation of
84. Id. at § 7-5-110(1) (1986). This statutory rule is subject to several provisions
which limit its effect. First, corporations engaged in the business of exploiting natural
resources may pay dividends out of depletion reserves, so long as those dividends do not
reduce the net assets of the corporation below an amount required to pay preferred stockholders. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(b). Second, the corporation may declare a dividend in its own
treasury shares. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(c). Third, any corporation may pay dividends in excess
of its stated capital, so long as that dividend does not reduce the net assets of the corporation below an amount equal to stated capital plus any amounts other than stated capital
sufficient to liquidate the interest of preferred shareholders. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(d). Finally, the company may make a dividend of its own authorized but unissued shares out of
any unreserved and unrestricted surplus, so long as the board assigns to the stated capital
the par value or the assessed value of any shares so issued. Id. at § 7-5-110(l)(e)(I).
85. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer and Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344,
569 P.2d 875 (1977)(under the present statutes, damages are based directly upon injuries
suffered by corporation as opposed to a liquidated measure without regard to injury).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(l)(b) (1986).
89. Id. at § 7-3-102(1) (1986). Once again, this general restriction is subject to several
exceptions. Section 7-3-102(3) states:
Notwithstanding the limitation of subsection (1) of this section, a corporation
may purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of:
(a) Eliminating fractional shares;
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation;
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares under
the provisions of this code;
(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this code, the retirement of
its redeemable shares by redemption or by purchase so as not to exceed the redemption price.
90. Secrity Natl Bank, 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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provisions substantially similar to section 7-5-114 would have subjected
the director to liability for all debts of the corporation. 9 2 The prior statute was considered penal in nature while the current statute is consid93
ered remedial.
The third method of statutory liability is self-explanatory. If the directors allow the corporation to liquidate and distribute assets to the
shareholders without first providing that all of the debts of the corporation are satisfied, then the directors will be liable for those debts not
paid. 9 4 In essence, the directors must ensure that the corporation retains assets sufficient to satisfy all known obligations of the
95
corporation.
The final method by which the directors may become liable is when
the directors allow the corporation to make or guarantee a loan to a
director in violation of the statute, or make or guarantee a loan to a
director secured by shares in the corporation. 96 Unless the articles of
incorporation state otherwise, a loan to a director must be affirmed by a
vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote. 9 7 It is important to note that if the directors make a loan to another director secured by shares of the corporation, the directors are personally liable on
the debt until it is paid, regardless of whether the shareholders voted in
98
favor of the loan.
When any of the above provisions are violated, creditors of the corporation, as a group, may sue to recover the funds. 99 While each of the
above provisions state that the liability of the director is "to the corporation," the courts have reasoned that the creditors, as a group, may enforce the rights of the corporation so that they may have a fund from
which to satisfy their obligations.' 0 0 This does not mean that any creditor may sue for a violation of the above provisions. A creditor may not
sue individually since such a suit would be to the detriment of other
creditors.' 0 l While the creditors must sue as a whole, they need not
prove that the violation actually caused their damages. 10 2 Liability is
predicated solely upon violation of the statute, and not upon damages
caused thereby.
92. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-110 (1986), § 31-5-10 (1963), § 31-31-10 (1953 &
Perm. Supp. 1960), § 31-2-12 (1953); Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Holzwarth, 148
Colo. 366, 366 P.2d 377 (1961); Fitzgerald v. Marshall, 161 F. Supp. 470 (D. Colo. 1958).
93. Security Nat'l Bank, 39 Colo. App. at 349, 569 P.2d at 879.
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1)(c) (1986).
95. Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 394-95 (Colo. 1982).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1)(d).
97. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly § 2 (1987) (to be codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 7-3-101(l)(0).
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
99. Ficor, Inc., 639 P.2d at 393.
100. Id.
101. Id. (distinguishing Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 39 Colo. App. 84, 561 P.2d 367
(1977)).
102. Ficor, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 409, 611 P.2d 578 (1980), afftd, 639 P.2d 385 (Colo.
1982).
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CONCLUSION

Corporate directors may face liability from several different angles.
The four that have been discussed in this article - due care, conflict of
interest, usurpation of corporate opportunity and statutory liability are the most common. The new Colorado statute can give directors
some security with regard to violations of the duty of due care. They
now know that they may not be held personally liable for their negligent
exercise of judgment. The question remains whether they will be protected if they are grossly negligent or reckless. In conflict of interest
situations, the trend is towards favoring such transactions, provided that
they are fair to the corporation. If there has been disinterested director
or disinterested shareholder approval, the trend is to place the burden
of proving unfairness upon the challenging party. Colorado seems to
refuse to invoke the corporate opportunity doctrine unless the circumstances are particularly egregious. Directors should be aware that they
must give the corporation a chance to purchase the property although
they may proceed with their own acquisition if the corporation has no
expectancy or interest, and the director need not pledge his own funds
to aid the corporate acquisition. The statutory liability of directors is
straightforward in prohibiting them from committing certain acts. The
liability is absolute, if there has been an injury to the corporation.

KOHL V. UNION INSURANCE

COMPANY.

INTERPRETATION AND

APPLICATION OF THE "ARISING OUT OF THE USE"
CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY

INSURANCE POLICY
INTRODUCTION

Few activities in modern society are carried out without the use of
an automobile. Although an automobile liability policy is not intended
to cover all accidents, auto insurance is frequently the only means of
recovery for the plaintiff or the only source of financial insulation for the
negligent defendant.' As a result, there has been an increase in the volume of litigation regarding the scope of coverage extended by automo2
bile insurance policies.
Among other things, this litigation has focused upon the meaning
of the policy terms "arising out of the use" and "using" the insured
vehicle. 3 In particular, this language has plagued numerous cases in4
volving the accidental discharge of weapons in or about motor vehicles.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the application of the particular
facts of Kohl v. Union Insurance Co., 5 to the term "arising out of the use"
of a vehicle as contained in the context of the basic automobile insurance agreement, and to explore the logic inherent in the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

History and Interpretation of the Colorado Auto Accident ReparationsAct

In 1973, the Colorado State General Assembly passed the "Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act.''6 The General Assembly declared
that the purpose of this Act was to "avoid inadequate compensation to
victims of automobile accidents; to require registrants of motor vehicles
... to procure insurance covering legal liability arising out of ownership
or use of such vehicles and also providing benefits to persons occupying
such vehicles and to persons injured in accidents involving such vehicles." 7 Accordingly, this Act defines the minimal coverage required of
1. Sayre, Coverage Problems Relating to the Polic' Terms "Arising Out Of The Use Of" and
"Using" A Vehicle, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 253 (1969).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Cameron Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see
generally Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance-Risks, 89 A.L.R.2d 150 (1963) (analyzing
cases in which courts have attempted to construe the "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" clause to determine whether an accident was within the coverage provision of an automobile liability policy).
5. 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986).
6. Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -720.
(1973 & Supp. 1985).
7. Id. at § 10-4-702.
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all automobile liability policies. The Act demands that insurers provide
coverage for damages "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle."
Many automobile insurance policies contain language similar to the
"arising out of the use" clause. Consequently, this terminology has become standardized in the automobile insurance industry9 and insurance
contracts should be construed in accordance with this custom or trade
usage. 10 Furthermore, when confronted with statutory authority that
automobile insurance coverage is extended to accidents "arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," a complying
policy must provide for legal liability coverage in light of these statutory
requirements." Thus, by operation of law, the minimal statutory re2
quirements must be read into all automobile insurance contracts.'
B.

Standard InterpretationsGiven to the "Arising Out of the Use" Clause

When the language of an insurance contract is susceptible to different interpretations, a liberal interpretation that favors the insured will
be preferred. 13 Consequently, the inherent ambiguity in the phrase
"arising out of the use," has been construed to be a broad, comprehensive term meaning "originating from," "growing out of," or "flowing
from,' 1 4 the use of the automobile. This is a more expansive interpretation than the words "caused by."' 15 The "arising out of the use"
clause, therefore, is intended to afford broad coverage to protect the
8. Id. at § 10-4-706(l)(a); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-7-413(l)(c) (1973 & Supp.
1985). This statutory provision similarly states: "The policy of liability insurance shall
insure every such person on account of the maintenance, use, or operation of the motor
vehicle . . . against lois from the liability imposed by law; for damages, ...
arising from
such maintenance, use, or operation .... "
9. National Merchandise Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In National, an automobile insurance policy explicitly provided coverage for "[Blodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an automobile accident." Id. at 529. Acknowledging that the
Florida statute dealing with insurance extended automobile liability coverage to accidents
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," the court stated
"[t]he law in existence at the time of the making of a contract forms a part of that contract,
as if it were expressly referred to in its terms." Id. at 531. Therefore, the court concluded
that the term "auto accident" must be construed to provide coverage for accidents "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." Id. at 533.

10. Id. at 531; see also 13 J.

APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 7388 at 189

(1976) which states: "[Ulsage of trade which is so well settled and generally known that all
persons engaged in such trade may be considered as contracting with reference to it, has
been regarded as forming a part of a contract of insurance entered into to protect risks in
such trade."
I. National, 400 So. 2d at 531; see Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227,
229 (Colo. 1984).
12. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
13. E.g., American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Soules, 288 Ala. 163, 169, 258 So. 2d 872, 878
(1972). See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance §§ 1-4 (1980). A basic rule of contracts is that when there is doubt as the meaning of a written agreement, it should be
interpreted against the party who has drafted it. Id. § 3, at 447.
14. E.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642,649, 139 N.W.2d 821,
826 (1966); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 19, 234 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1977).
15. E.g., Reliance, 33 N.C. App. at 19, 234 S.E.2d at 210; Note, Construction of the Clause
"Arising Out of the Use of" in an Automobile Liability Insurance Policy, 45 NEB. L. REV. 811
(1966) [hereinafter Note, Construction].
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insured against liability for damages resulting from acts done "in connection with," or "incident to" the use of a vehicle.16 There must, however, be some degree of causal relation or connection between the
injury and the use of the vehicle because the parties to an automobile
liability policy do not contemplate a general liability contract.17
Generally, "but for" causation is enough to establish the required
degree of causal relation or connection.' 8 Because coverage is extended if an accident would not have occurred but for the use of the
vehicle, 19 the "arising out of the use" clause does not require the vehi20
cle to be, in the strict legal sense, a proximate cause of the injury.
Rather, the events giving rise to the claim must merely "arise out of,"
and be "related to," the vehicle's use. 2 1 Such "use" of the automobile
must arise out of the inherent nature of the vehicle, 22 and the "use" may
not be one which is foreign to the vehicle's inherent purpose. 23 An injury arises out of the use of the automobile if it flows from a natural and
reasonable consequence of the use of the vehicle, even if the use is not
foreseen or expected.2 4 The injury does not arise out of the use of an
automobile if it was directly caused5 by some independent act totally re2
mote from the use of the vehicle.
Unlike the "arising out of the use" clause, the specific term "use"
has defied precise construction and definition. 26 Due to its inherent ambiguity, it has been described as a general catch-all term. 2 7 Use has
16. Note, Construction, supra note 15, at 811.
17. Sayre, supra note 1, at 253. See generally 12 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAw § 45:56 (1981) (describing the necessity of a causal relationship).
18. E.g., Norgaard v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 871, 875 (N.D. 1972) (quoting
1 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.22, at 1-57 (1987)).
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 194, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126
(1973). The court explained:
The question is not one in the field of torts of proximate cause of the accident,
but one in the field of contracts of coverage under the wording of an insurance
contract. While there must be a causal relationship between the insured use ....
and the accident, the question is not whether the insured [vehicle] was the cause
of the accident.
Id. (quoting from St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964)). See
generally 1 R. LONG, supra note 18, at § 1.24 (denoting the effect of the "arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use" phrase).
21. E.g., Sayre, supra note 1, at 254. See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 194, at
700-04 (illustrating what are accidents or injuries "arising out of" ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured automobile).
22. E.g., Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 178 Colo. 58, 61, 495 P.2d 554, 555 (1972).
23. Id. at 61, 495 P.2d at 555. See generally 6BJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4316, at
341 (describing the general construction of the specific term "use").
24. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 19, 234 S.E.2d 206, 210-11 (1977).
25. For example, in Raines v. Insurance Co., 9 N.C. App. 27, 175 S.E.2d 299 (1970),
an occupant, while sitting inside the parked vehicle, was playing with a firearm which accidentally discharged, killing the victim who was also sitting within the vehicle. The issue
was whether the victims' death was covered by an accident arising out of the use of the
parked vehicle. The court held that there was no causal connection between the discharge
of the firearm and the "use" of the vehicle. Thus, the shooting was the result of a "cause
wholly disassociated" from the use of the vehicle. For further examples of similar holdings, see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
26. Annotation, supra note 4, § 3, at 153.
27. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 365
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been construed to extend to any utilization of the insured vehicle in a
28
manner intended or contemplated by the insured.
A question frequently arising is whether the "use" of a vehicle includes the physical process of loading and unloading property from the
automobile absent any provision or exclusion in the automobile insurance policy. When the insurance contract specifically defines "use" as
including loading and unloading, the policy is understood to provide
indemnification for accidents or injuries that occur during loading and
unloading. 29 Furthermore, when a policy specifically fails to mention
loading and unloading, "use" has been given a broad interpretation that
30
includes these terms.
When interpreting the "loading and unloading" clause, courts have
developed doctrines which define the scope of coverage. 3 1 The majority
ofjurisdictions, including Colorado,3 2 have adopted the "completed operation" doctrine.3 3 This test contemplates that "loading commences
when the items to be transported leave their original location, and, conversely, that unloading does not cease until they have actually reached
their final destination."'3 4 Consequently, this doctrine embraces all activities necessary to effect a completed delivery. 3 5 Thus, an accident may
"arise out of the use" of a vehicle when the accident occurred as a result
36
of activities related to the loading or unloading of the vehicle.
Although there has been general agreement regarding the interpretation given to the "arising out of the use" clause, a problem arises in its
(Tenn. 1973). See generally Annotation, supra note 4, § 9(h), at 171 (citing cases holding
that the term "use" in the "ownership, maintenance or use" clause included the activity of
unloading the vehicle).
28. Travelers, 491 S.W.2d at 365. See generally Annotation, supra note 4, § 9(h), at 171.
29. E.g., Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 538, 468 P.2d 564, 565
(1970); Sayre, supra note 1, at 256.
30. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Exch., 63 Wis. 2d 148, 153, 216 N.W.2d 205, 210
(1974). See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 130, at 606-07 (the absence of specific
modifiers such as "loading and unloading" does not restrict what constitutes "use" of a
vehicle, rather, this absence demonstrates the broad interpretation given to the term
"use"). But see Kurdziel v. Pittsburgh Tube Co., 416 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1969) (the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Ohio Supreme Court had adopted an
opposing position by not recognizing the act of loading and unloading as part of "using").
31. E.g., Recent Decisions, Insurance - "Loading" Clause Of Auto Liability Policy Covers
Death By Accidental Discharge Of Shotgun, 21 MD. L. REv. 270, 271 (1961).
32. Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (1973); Colorado Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 35 Colo. App. 380, 540 P.2d 1112 (1975).
33. E.g., Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 271.
34. Id. The "completed operation" view therefore omits any distinction between
"loading" and preparatory activities or "unloading" and "delivery."
35. See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.2d 865,
867 (10th Cir. 1972) (where the temporary placing of a rifle on the tailgate of a camper did
not serve to terminate the unloading procedure and did not provide a basis for holding
that the policy did not provide coverage for an injury which occurred as a result of the
accidental discharge of the rifle).
36. Id. at 867. A second and more restrictive view is represented by the "coming to
rest" doctrine. This suggests that "loading" commences when the article has left its resting place and is in the process of being carried to or placed in the vehicle. Conversely,
"unloading" terminates after the item is physically lifted from the vehicle and has actually
reached its first resting place. See Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 271.
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application 37 in situations involving the accidental discharge of firearms.
The difficulty centers around the determination of whether the facts of
the particular case are sufficient to support the required degree of causal
of the vehicle
connection between the accident or injury and the "use" 38
as contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract.
C.

Colorado Cases: The Application of the "Arising Out of the Use" Clause

The earliest Colorado case dealing with the accidental discharge of
a firearm inside the insured motor vehicle is Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co.3 9 In Mason, teenagers were sitting in a car waiting for the insured driver to return from a class. While "toying with a pistol," it
accidentally discharged, killing one of the teenagers. The court held
that the accident did not arise out of a covered use of the automobile
and that there was not a causal40connection between the discharge of the
pistol and the parked vehicle.
. The next case dealing with the discharge of a firearm within an insured automobile is Azar v. Employers Casualty Co. 4 1 In this case, the parties were hunting rabbits along a public highway. The driver prepared
to fire a shotgun through the car window, but when another car approached, he brought the shotgun back into the vehicle where it accidentally discharged, injuring the passenger. The supreme court held
that the automobile liability policy provided no coverage because the
injury did not "originate from," "grow out of," or "flow from" the use
of the vehicle. 4 2 The court concluded that the act of hunting from inside a moving vehicle was not an inherent use of an automobile and
therefore that the injury "originated from,"43 "grew out of," or "flowed
from" the independent use of the firearm.
In the following year, the supreme court had another opportunity
to interpret the "arising out of the use" clause in the landmark case of
Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf.4 4 Although this case did not involve the
accidental discharge of a firearm, it does provide guidance concerning
what constitutes "use" of a motor vehicle for insurance purposes. In
Titan, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the "but for" test of causation with regard to interpreting the coverage clauses of Colorado motor
vehicle liability policies. 4 5 The court held that an insurer was liable to a
37.

See generally Annotation, supra note 4, at 150-73 (citing cases illustrating the diffi-

culty of applying the "arising out of the use" clause to varying fact patterns).
38. Id. § 2, at 153.
39. 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24 (1967).
40. Id. at 444, 423 P.2d at 25 (although the victim was sitting in the car at the time of
the accidental discharge, this was not a "use" of the vehicle as contemplated by the parties
to the insurance agreement).
41. 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (1972).
42. Id. at 61, 495 P.2d.at 555.
43. Id. The court determined that even though the vehicle was being "used" while
hunting, the primary item being "used" at the time of the discharge was the firearm itself.
The firearm was being handled for the primary purpose of hunting. Therefore, the "use"
of the vehicle was merely incidental to the use of the firearm.
44. 183 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (1973).
45. Id. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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worker injured by a falling brick. The brick was dislodged from the roof
of a building under construction by a pipe connected to a cement
truck. 46 The conclusion in Titan illustrates the broad coverage provided
by applying the "but for" test of causation. Although the truck appeared to only have a small degree of causal connection with the resulting injury, coverage was afforded because the accident would not have
47
occurred but for the unloading of the truck.
The most recent Colorado case, prior to Kohl, which involved the
accidental discharge of a firearm in an automobile, was Colorado Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. West American Insurance Co. 4 8 In this case,
the driver had placed his rifle on the front seat of the vehicle in preparation for travel from one hunting location to another. While reaching
either into the back seat for a pair of binoculars or reaching across the
front seat to unlock the passenger door, he lifted the rifle and it discharged, injuring another passenger. Acknowledging that "[t]he rifle
and the binoculars had been . . . [placed in the vehicle] and the victim

was waiting to load' or enter it," the court reasoned that "the accident
occurred between the time of commencement and conclusion of the
loading and unloading of the insured vehicle, and the accident would
not have occurred but for' that operation."'4 9 The court concluded that
the driver's continued involvement in the "loading" process constituted
a "use" of the automobile and thus coverage was afforded under the
insured's automobile liability policy. 50

In 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the concept of
"use" of a motor vehicle in the case of Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Drum.5 1
Although not a gun discharge case, Dairyland sets forth general guidelines to be followed in coverage cases. 52 The supreme court extended
the coverage of matters "arising out of the use" of a vehicle beyond the
court of appeals' restrictive interpretation of the term "use", by holding
that the driver of a vehicle towing another vehicle is "using" the towed
vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage. 53 The supreme court based
their decision on the principle that a "use" of the insured vehicle is
found where "the vehicle was dealt with in a manner that created or had
46. Titan, 183 Colo. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126.
47. Titan also established that Colorado adopted the "completed operation" doctrine
with respect to interpreting "loading and unloading" provisions contained in an automobile liability policy.
48. 35 Colo. App. 380, 540 P.2d 1112 (1975).
49. Id. at 384, 540 P.2d at 1114.
50. Id. The court followed precedent adopted in Titan which firmly established that
Colorado adopted both the "but for" test of causation and the "completed operation"
doctrine with respect to determining coverage in automobile liability policies.
51. 193 Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977).
52. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
53. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Drum, 37 Colo. App. 222, 546 P.2d 1283 (1975), rev'd, 193
Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977). In Dairyland, a vehicle being towed was temporarily positioned in the center of a highway as a result of the towing vehicle's attempt to make a Uturn. Consequently, a third automobile collided with the towed vehicle injuring the driver
and two other passengers of the third automobile. The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals' decision which held that the driver of the towing vehicle was solely "using" his
own vehicle for purposes of determining liability.
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the potential of creating an unreasonably dangerous situation." '54 The
Dairyland opinion adopted the reasoning of Baudin v. Traders General Insurance Co. 55 by applying the same set of tests to determine whether a
motor vehicle was "used" for purposes of liability coverage. 56 The tests
set forth in Dairyland further exemplify Colorado's adoption of the "but
for" test when determining the extent of coverage under automobile in57
surance policies.
A final Colorado case which illustrates the broad coverage provided
by applying the "but for" test is the case of Trinity Universal Insurance Co.
v. Hall.58 In Trinity, a woman was injured when a side awning attached
to a truck, being used as a refreshment stand, collapsed. The court held
that the injury "arose out of the use" of the vehicle reasoning that the
injury would not have occurred but for the use of the truck for the sale
of refreshments. 59 In discussing the "use" being made of the truck, the
court stated the "use" of a motor vehicle as contemplated in an insurance policy depends upon the factual context of each case. 60
D. Decisions From OtherJurisdictionsApplying the "Arising Out of the Use"
Clause to Cases Involving the Discharge of a Firearm
The judicial application of the "arising out of the use" clause has
not produced a clear cut pattern of interpretation. However, a close
examination of the factual distinctions that exist between cases involving
the discharge of a firearm will reveal that some degree of uniformity has
evolved. 6 1 The cases are categorized according to their underlying
facts.
The first category of cases illustrates fact patterns in which the acci54. Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522, 568 P.2d at 462.
55. 201 So. 2d 379 (La. Ct. App. 1967), rev'd, 423 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1982).
56. The court adopted the following tests to determine "use" for purposes of liability
coverage:
(1) The dangerous situation causing injury must have its source in the use of the
automobile; (2) The chain of events resulting in the accident must originate in the
use of the automobile and be unbroken by the intervention of any event which
has no direct or substantial relation to the use of the vehicle; (3) The accident
must be a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle for the purposes contemplated by the policy, although not necessarily foreseen or expected; (4) The accident must be one which can be "immediately"
identified with the use of the automobile as contemplated by the parties to the
policy; (5) The accident must be of a type reasonably associated with the use of
the automobile as contemplated by the contracting parties; (6) The accident must
be one which would not have happened "but for" the use of the automobile.
Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522, 568 P.2d at 462.
57. The Colorado Supreme Court stated its agreement with the reasoning employed
by the Baudin court which included the application of the "but for" test. Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court essentially reinforced the application of the "but for" test adopted in
Titan. Id.
58. 690 P.2d 227 (Colo. 1984).
59. Id. at 231.
60. Id. at 228.
61. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (creating
five principal categories for purposes of illustrating the factual distinctions between vehicle-gun discharge cases which determine the existence or nonexistence of coverage under
automobile insurance policies).
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dental discharge of the firearm occurred while an occupant of the vehicle was either "toying" with the weapon or was "handling" the weapon
while in the act of hunting. The previously discussed Colorado cases of
Mason6 2 and Azar 63 typify this fact pattern. These cases 64 uniformly
hold that no coverage exists under the "arising out of the use" clause
because no causal connection exists between the accidental discharge, of
65
the firearms and the inherent use of the vehicles.
The second category encompasses situations where the discharge
occurred during the process of placing or removing the firearm into or
from the vehicle. For example, in Viani v. Aetna Insurance Co., 6 6 the
owner of an insured pickup truck was injured by the discharge of a concealed loaded pistol while unloading camping gear from his vehicle.
The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that the "loading and unloading"
provision in the insured's automobile liability policy was an extension of
the term "use," and that the policy provided coverage for the injury
which occurred during the process of unloading the truck. 6 7 Cases involving similar fact patterns consistently hold that coverage exists because the term "use" includes the process of "loading" and
"unloading" the vehicles. 68
The third category involves fact patterns in which a physical portion
of the vehicle is used as a "gun rest." These cases do not reveal uniform
results. For example, in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lott,6 9 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found a causal connection between the use of the vehicle as a gun rest and the resulting injury to a passenger after the gun was
fired. 70 In the factually similar case of Norgaardv. Nodak Mutual Insurance
7
Co., ' the North Dakota Supreme Court reached a contrary result on the
theory that the use of the rifle constituted an independent and interven72
ing cause of the injury.

The fourth category consists of fact patterns in which the firearm
discharged as it was being positioned in or removed from a gun rack
attached to the vehicle. In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Walker, 73 the North
62. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 272, 445 P.2d 474 (1968); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 14 Wash. App. 541, 543 P.2d 645 (1975).
65. Cameron, 559 S.W.2d at 15. Courts have reasoned that the automobiles are simply
the "locus" of the resulting injuries.
66. 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706 (1972).
67. Id. at 32, 501 P.2d at 716.
68. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (insured's
shotgun accidentally discharged while he was ejecting shells from it in preparation for its
entry into the trunk of his vehicle); Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 468
P.2d 564 (1970) (owner of the insured vehicle reached into his car for his loaded gun
which accidentally discharged causing injury to another passenger).
69. 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960).
70. Id. (the roof of the vehicle was used as a gun rest).
71. 201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1972).
72. Norgaard, 201 N.W.2d at 876; see also National Farmers Union & Casualty Co. v.
Gibbons, 338 F. Supp. 430 (D. N.D. 1972) (use of the vehicle as a gun rest was foreign to
the vehicle's inherent purpose and therefore, coverage was denied).
73. 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E.2d 206 (1977).
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Carolina Court of Appeals noted that the presence of the gun rack established that the truck may be used for the transportation of guns.
Thus, the court concluded that "the shooting was a 'natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use' of the truck and was not the
result of something 'wholly disassociated from, independent of, and remote from' the truck's normal use." ' 74 Cases involving these fact pat-

terns "appear to pivot on the rationale that the presence of permanently
attached gun racks in vehicles establishes a significant causal connection
between the use of such vehicles and the accidental discharge of weapons carried therein, hence affording coverage ...
nes .... "75

for any resultant inju-

The final category highlights fact patterns where the discharge of
the firearm occurred inside the vehicle as a result of the movement or
76
operation of the vehicle. In Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Stevens,
a pistol accidentally discharged and killed a passenger when the vehicle
turned onto a bumpy, unpaved road. In accordance with decisions of
other jurisdictions, 77 the Georgia court found a causal connection between the accidental discharge of the firearm and the movement, i.e.
78
use, of the vehicle.
These factual distinctions display the importance of examining the
totality of circumstances surrounding an accident in order to determine
if the accident "arose out of the use" of a vehicle. By analyzing the
specific role of the automobile in the entire episode, courts are able to
establish whether coverage is afforded under the respective automobile
liability policy. 79 Each case must be determined upon its own facts according to the part the vehicle played in the entire occurrence. 80
II.
A.

KOHL V. UNION INSURANCE COMPANY

Facts

On October 12, 1980, Carol Ray Weaver, Phyllip Connelly, Terry
Clear, Rex Kohl, and Tony Martino, residents of Canon City, were returning from a hunting trip in the mountains of Colorado. At this point
in time, the parties did not intend to engage in any further hunting. 8 1
74. Id. at 20, 234 S.E.2d at 211; see also Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 593 P.2d 156 (1979) (the court stated that in similar fact patterns the
vehicle has been considered more than the mere "situs" of the injury and thus the "arising
out of the use" clause should afford coverage).
75. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
76. 142 Ga. App. 562, 236 S.E.2d 550 (1977).
77. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 109 Cal. Rptr.
811, 514 P.2d 123 (1973) (a pistol with a "hair trigger" accidentally discharged and injured a passenger when the vehicle hit a bump).
78. Stevens, 142 Ga. App. at 564, 236 S.E.2d at 551.
79. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Burris, 240 So. 2d 408, 409-10 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
80. Id.
81. Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino at 2, Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d
354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 82-0683), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134

(Colo. 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
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On the trip home, Weaver was riding alone in his jeep while the other
four were divided between two other cars. Weaver's hunting rifle was
positioned in a gun rack mounted above the dashboard of his jeep.
Weaver had installed the gun rack for the purpose of transporting his
rifle.82
Two hours into the trip, they stopped for refreshments at a store in
Cotopaxi, Colorado. When Weaver arrived at the store, his companions
were conversing in the parking lot. Weaver parked his jeep and then
joined the group in the parking lot. After a short conversation, Weaver
returned to his jeep intending to remove the keys from the ignition in
order to open a spare gas can. While reaching inside the jeep, Weaver
noticed his rifle and decided that he would "put it away." 8 3 Weaver
intended to remove his gun from the gun rack, unload it and place it in
its scabbard for the remainder of the trip home. 84 While positioned in
the gun rack, the loaded rifle was pointed toward the passenger side of
the jeep. As Weaver was removing the weapon from the gun rack, the
rifle discharged. Kohl and Martino were seriously injured and Connelly
was killed. Although Weaver states that it was possible for the rifle to
have bumped or touched something besides his hand, he cannot recall
85
whether that actually happened.
B.

Initiation of the Action

Kohl, Martino, and the estate of Connelly filed claims with Weaver's
automobile insurance carrier, Union Insurance Company (Union). In
response, Union filed an action for declaratory judgment to determine
whether the accident was covered by Weaver's automobile insurance.
Weaver's insurance policy provided that Union "will pay damages for
bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes
legally responsible because of an auto accident. '"86 All parties filed motions for summary judgment in the Jefferson County District Court. On
April 26, 1982, the district court granted Union's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that there was no causal connection between the
"use" of the automobile and the injuries, and therefore, no insurance
coverage under the policy. 8 7 From that ruling, Kohl, Martino, and the
estate of Connelly, appealed.
C.

Decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals

Affirming the trial court, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded
that Weaver's automobile insurance policy did not provide coverage for
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id. at 5. By operation of law, the term "auto accident" must be interpreted to
mean and given the same effect as the required statutory language "arising out of the use"
of the motor vehicle. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
87. Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d 354, 356 (Colo. App. 1984), rev'd sub non.
Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986).
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the injuries sustained by the victims resulting from the accidental discharge of Weaver's rifle. The court reasoned that the unloading of a
rifle inside a jeep is not within the inherent purpose for which a jeep is
used. Furthermore, the court agreed with the trial court that the defendants failed to establish the requisite causal connection between the
discharge of the weapon and the parked automobile. Considering
Weaver's statement that to his knowledge nothing other than his hand
was touching the rifle at the time it discharged, the court of appeals concluded that the vehicle did not contribute in any way to the discharge of
the rifle. Based upon this finding, the court determined that the injuries
arose out of the use of the rifle, rather than out of the use of the
88
automobile.
D.

Decision of the Colorado Supreme Court

Not persuaded by the court of appeals' reasoning, the Colorado
Supreme Court concluded that the accidental discharge of the rifle
"grew out of" the use of Weaver's vehicle for purposes of coverage
under his automobile insurance policy.8 9 The court held that Weaver's
use of his jeep to transport his rifle for the purpose of hunting was a
conceivable use of his vehicle which was not foreign to its inherent purpose. The court reasoned that the transportation of hunters and their
weapons is a conceivable use of a four-wheel drive vehicle. Weaver had
installed a gun rack in his vehicle to facilitate that use. 90 The supreme
court felt that Weaver's action in lifting the rifle out of the gun rack was
intimately related to his use of the vehicle as transportation for himself
and his rifle. Therefore, the court determined that the victims' injuries
were causally related to Weaver's use of his vehicle. 9 1
E.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Rovira, in a lengthy dissenting opinion,9 2 asserted that the
majority reached its decision by applying an incorrect analysis and consequently rendered a decision contrary to prior case law. Although the
dissent maintained that there must be a causal relation or connection
between the vehicle and the accident, the minority asserted that merely
satisfying the "but for" test of causation was not sufficient to establish
that the injuries sustained "arose out of the use" of the vehicle. The
dissent firmly contended that there must be a stronger causal relation or
connection between the vehicle and the accident.9 3 The dissent stated
that the "use" of the jeep did not contribute in any way to the accident.9 4 The only relationship between the vehicle and the accident was
the presence of the tortfeasor and the victims around the automobile at
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Connelly, 694 P.2d at 356.
Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
Id. at 139 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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the time of the accidental discharge. Explicit in the dissent's reasoning
was the notion that unloading a rifle, regardless of where it occurs, is an
inherently dangerous act.9 5 Thus, the dissent concluded that the resulting injuries did not arise out of the use of thejeep, but rather, out of the
96
use of the rifle.
III.

ANALYSIS

The difficulty in applying the "arising out of the use" clause
presents two issues. First, a court must determine whether the insured
was "using" the automobile within the terms of the insurance policy.
Second, the court must also determine if the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff "arose out of that use." 9 7 The Colorado Supreme Court, in a
well-reasoned analysis, resolved these issues by applying the correct
legal construction of the "arising out of the use" clause to the present
factual situation. In order to fully understand this ruling, it is necessary
to analyze carefully each argument developed by the majority as well as
each counter-argument raised by the dissent.
A.

Was the Insured "Using" the Automobile Within the Terms of the Policy?

The supreme court correctly concluded that Weaver's use of his
jeep for the carriage and transportation of his rifle for hunting purposes
was covered under his automobile policy since the use was not foreign
to the vehicle's inherent purpose. 9 8 Because of the broad interpretation
which must be given to the term "use," it must be construed to include
the use of a vehicle as a means of transporting not only persons but also
their property. 99 The use of a vehicle to transport a rifle on a hunting
trip is an entirely reasonable and foreseeable use of a vehicle, especially
a four-wheel drive jeep which is designed to perform on rough terrain
frequently associated with hunting areas.i 0 0 Based upon this reasoning,
the majority concluded that the transportation of hunters and their
weapons was a foreseeable use of a vehicle of this kind. Holding that
Weaver's "use" was covered under his respective insurance policy, the
majority had to further establish some causal connection between the
resulting injuries and the "use" of the vehicle.
B.

Did a Causal Connection Exist Between the Injuries
and the Use of the Vehicle?

The majority's careful analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the instant case clearly indicates that they understood how to
apply the legal construction given to the "arising out of the use" clause
95. Id. at 140 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
96. Id. at 141 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
97. See Note, Construction, supra note 15, at 811.
98. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136.
99. Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 19.
100. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136. The supreme court also noted that Weaver had installed a
gun rack in his vehicle to facilitate that use of his jeep.
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to determine whether an injury was causally related to the use of the
vehicle. Recognizing that the court of appeals failed to apply appropriate contract principles of causation, the supreme court followed the
guidelines announced in Titan 101 for determining whether such "causal
connection" exists. In this process, the majority correctly distinguished
tort rules of proximate cause from insurance contract principles of causation. 10 2 Consequently, the majority rejected the narrow "actual use"
test in which the "use" of the vehicle must be the efficient, predominating, or even proximate cause of the accident, 10 3 and applied the "but
for" test announced in Titan which requires a minimal causal connection
between the use of the vehicle and the accident. 10 4 The use of the "but
for" test to establish the existence of a causal relation is consistent with
the broad and comprehensive interpretation given to the "arising out of
the use" clause.

1 5
0

Applying this test to the instant case, this accident would not have
occurred but for the fact that thejeep was parked immediately adjacent
to the victims so that the loaded rifle resting in the gun rack was pointing in their direction. 10 6 Furthermore, but for the fact that Weaver engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the rifle for its continued
transportation, this accident would not have occurred. 10 7 The dissent
suggests that accidental discharge of firearms occurs regularly, and
therefore, this accident could have happened anywhere. 108 This reasoning ignores that this particular accident would not have occurred at this
time and place but for the transportation of the loaded rifle in the gun
rack of the jeep. Therefore, the majority appropriately applied the "but
for" test to determine that a causal connection exists.
Justice Rovira's dissent pointed out that, although the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted the "but for" test in Titan, the Titan court also
stated that this test should not apply when there is a lack of relationship
between the vehicle and the accident. 1 09 Rovira then asserted that in
Trinity, the court held that this relationship must be a "causal connection.,"1 0 Applying Trinity, Justice Rovira argued that "merely satisfying
the extremely broad 'but for' test is not enough; there must be a causal
101. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
102. For a more thorough discussion regarding the application of these principles to
the facts of the instant case, see Petition Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino, Union Ins.
Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d 354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 84-381), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union
Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986) [hereinafter Petition Brief].
103. Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 191, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1973)
(citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 403 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1968)).
104. d.
105. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
106. Petition Brief, supra note 102, at 5.
107. Id.
108. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 138 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citing Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188,
195, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1973)).
110. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227
(Colo. 1984)).
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connection between the vehicle and the accident."'"I Based upon this
interpretation, the dissent, like the court of appeals, required a more
rigorous standard of causation than that required by the Titan precedent. Consequently, Justice Rovira asserted that the injuries arose out
of the use of the rifle, rather than the use of the vehicle,' 1 2 erroneously
relying on the previous Colorado cases of Mason and Azar. By failing to
fully acknowledge all the factual distinctions between those cases and
the instant case, 1 13 the dissent ignored the obvious causal connection
between Weaver's "use" of his jeep and the resulting injuries.
By analyzing the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the instant case, it is evident that the predominant purpose, at the time of the
discharge, was vehicular transport of the rifle and Weaver himself. It is
important to understand that Weaver was not "using" the rifle at the
time it discharged for any purpose inherent in its being a rifle. In other
words, Weaver was not in the act of "hunting" per se, nor was he intending to "hunt" at the time he lifted the rifle out of the gun rack.
Furthermore, Weaver was not "toying" with the rifle. The sole reason
for removing the rifle was to provide for its safer transportation in his
jeep. Therefore, the discharge of the rifle in this situation, unlike other
firearm cases, related solely to the purpose of the rifle's continued
transportation.114
Clearly, this accident "arose" from the transportation of the rifle,
therefore, the resulting injuries were causally related to the "use" of the
insured vehicle. It may also be contemplated that the "use" of the jeep
may have combined with other causes in contributing to the occurrence
of this accident.' 15 Even this combination of causes clearly satisfies the
Titan test which holds that the alleged cause need not be the predomi1 16
nant or proximate cause of the injuries.
The majority could have further supported its conclusion by applying the set of tests adopted in Dairyland.117 Although the majority stated
that these tests were inconsistent with their opinion, 1 8 applying the criteria of the tests to the facts of the present case results in the conclusion
that this accident was causally related to the use of the vehicle.' 19 This
result is apparent by examining the following factors.
111. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 138 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 141 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. Unlike Mason and Azar, the Kohl case
was not a "hunting accident," nor was the accident the result of someone "toying" with
the gun. The totality of circumstances surrounding the Kohl case are factually different
and establish that the injuries were not merely coincidental to the use of the automobile.
114. Reply Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino at 9, Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694
P.2d 354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 82-0683), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d
134 (Colo. 1986).
115. Petition Brief, supra note 102, at 6.
116. Id. (citing Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 195, 515 P.2d 1123,
1126 (1973)).
117. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Drum, 193 Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977).
118. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134, 135 n.2 (Colo. 1984).
119. Each of the tests adopted in Dairylandfor determining "use" is consistent with the
facts of the instant case. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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First, not only was the jeep used to transport a loaded rifle, but it
was also parked in a position in which the rifle's muzzle was pointed in
the vicinity of the defendants. Therefore, the dangerous situation causing the injuries has its source in the use of Weaver's vehicle. Second,
the chain of events resulting in this accident originated in the use of the
automobile and were unbroken by the intervention of any event which
had no direct or substantial relation to the use of the jeep. All of the
actions leading up to the time of the rifle's discharge were directly and
substantially related to Weaver's use of his vehicle for the continued
transportation of his rifle.
Third, this accident was a natural and reasonable incident of the use
of the vehicle for the purposes contemplated by the policy although not
necessarily foreseen or expected. It is reasonable to expect that a jeep
may be used for hunting expeditions and that the transportation of
weapons and ammunition is a reasonable consequence of such use.
Therefore, the accidental discharge from Weaver's rifle was a natural
and reasonable incident of the use of his jeep to transport his rifle on a
trip.
Fourth, this accident can be "immediately identified" with the use
of the vehicle because the injuries sustained by the victims were very
closely associated with the use of thejeep as a means of transporting the
rifle. Fifth, this is a type of accident which one could clearly contemplate
when insuring a vehicle which may foreseeably be used for hunting expeditions. Finally, as discussed previously, this accident and the resulting injuries would not have occurred "but for" the use of the jeep to
120
transport the loaded rifle.
The dissent points out that Dairylandalso stands for the proposition
that a "use" of a vehicle could be established "where the vehicle was dealt
with in a manner that created or had the potential of creating an unreasonably dangerous situation."'' z Addressing this proposition, the dissent argues that the rifle, not the vehicle, was dealt with in an unsafe
manner. 122 This argument totally ignores the fact that Weaver was "using" his jeep for the primary and exclusive purpose of transporting himself and his loaded rifle which had been placed in a gun rack with its
120. For a detailed discussion concerning the satisfaction of these tests as they apply to
the instant case, see Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 8-12.
121. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 140 (Rovira,J., dissenting) (quoting Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522,

568 P.2d at 462).
122. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 140 (RoviraJ., dissenting). Noting that it is a crime to carry a
loaded rifle in an automobile, the dissent pointed out that if Weaver would have unloaded
his rifle prior to transporting it, this accident would not have occurred inside the vehicle.
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the use of the jeep was by no means causally related
to the resulting injuries. Id. This argument failed to acknowledge that:
[T]he mere fact that a vehicle may have been used unlawfully or an unlawful event
may have occurred during its use, considered alone, does not relieve an insurer
from liability if the accident is otherwise covered under the "ownership, maintenance or use" provision of the automobile insurance contract. If the rule was
otherwise, policy coverage would be invalidated if one ran a stop sign, was guilty
of speeding, or operating with defective equipment.
Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 25, 593 P.2d 156, 160
(1979).
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muzzle pointed toward the passenger door. Consequently, the use of
his jeep in this manner created the unreasonably dangerous situation
23
which resulted in the injuries.'
There are two additional principles of law which support the conclusion reached by the supreme court. First, there is the general rule
that the "use" of a vehicle includes its loading and unloading, even absent express language in the insurance policy. 124 Hence, the majority's
opinion is supported by Colorado's adoption of the "completed operation" doctrine,' 2 5 which has been defined to include in its coverage all
activities required to effect a completed delivery. 126 Finally, it is well
settled that injuries resulting from the adjustment of cargo are causally
related to a proper "use" of the vehicle. 12 7 The Kohl holding is consis28
tent with these established principles of law.1
The arguments set forth in the above analysis establish that the injuries sustained by Kohl, Martino, and Connelly "arose from," "grew
out of," and "flowed from" the insured's use of the vehicle, and therefore, Union Insurance Company was liable for the resulting damages.
The Colorado Supreme Court's careful analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the instant case clearly justify this conclusion.
CONCLUSION

The opinion in Kohl v. Union Insurance Co. reaffirms important principles regarding the interpretation and application of the basic automobile insurance agreement. First, it recognizes that the "arising out of the
use" clause demands a broad and comprehensive construction due to its
inherent ambiguity. Second, it illustrates that the court has been liberal
in finding the "but for" relationship and in allowing recovery against
automobile insurance companies. Finally, it emphasizes the importance
of examining the totality of circumstances surrounding or leading up to
an accident or injury when determining whether such accident or injury
arose out of the use of the insured automobile within the meaning of the
liability policy.
Sarah W. Dickinson

123. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 19.
124. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

126. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a review concerning the scope of
coverage provided by the "completed operation" doctrine. This principle of law may be
applied to Kohl by reasoning that Weaver was merely engaged in additional activities which

were necessary in order to make a safe and completed delivery of the rifle.
127. See, e.g., Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mouse, 268 P.2d 886 (Okla.
1953) (the court held that a driver who fell from his truck, while adjusting cargo, was
injured as a result of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of the vehicle). See generally 12
G. CoucH, supra note 17, § 45:69, at 308-09.
128. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 137 n.4 (the majority stated: "Our conclusion is consistent with
the settled rule that injuries resulting from the adjustment of cargo and the loading and

unloading of vehicles are causally related to a proper use.")
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A

RADICAL DEPARTURE OR A CONSISTENT

INTERPRETATION OF PRE-EXISTING EQUITIES
IN COLORADO CONDEMNATION LAW?
INTRODUCTION

The transformation of Colorado into a permanent home for millions of people has not left the wild frontiers of the past unscathed. In
fact, the developing communities' constant demands for electricity,
transportation and water inevitably create legal turbulence in areas that
were previously untouched by modern development. Compensating
property owners for the arduous transitions inherent in modernization
is a complex task.
On November 10, 1986, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided
three cases which explicate many problems faced by property owners
and their adversaries, the condemning authorities. ' All three cases-the
leading case being La Plata Electric Association v. Cummins 2 -involved
property owners who had portions of their land condemned by electrical
companies as easements for the construction of power lines. 3 The property owners sought compensation for the diminution in value of the remainder of their properties resulting from the unsightliness of a power
line, 4 loss of view 5 and aesthetic damage. 6 This comment first describes
the existing law in the majority and minority jurisdictions with respect to
compensation for the diminution in value of the remainder of property
taken in eminent domain. Next, it analyzes the development of condemnation case law in Colorado. Finally, this comment analyzes the impact
the La Plata decision will have on Colorado law.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Origins of the Dispute

In order to understand the cases involving the unsightliness of electrical power lines and the loss or impairment of view, it is helpful to
discuss general concepts with regard to condemnation. In eminent domain proceedings, real property is conveniently divided into two catego1. See La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986); Bement v. Empire
Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1986); Herring v. Platte River Auth., 728 P.2d 709 (Colo.
1986).
2. 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986).
3. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697; Bement, 728 P.2d at 707; Herring, 728 P.2d at 710. In
these cases, the condemning authorities developed the respective properties to improve
electrical services to the communities.
4. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
5. Bement, 728 P.2d at 706.
6. Herring, 728 P.2d at 709 (involved the construction of electrical power lines and an
electrical substation).
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ries. 7 One category consists of takings that condemn entire parcels of
property. The measure of damages in this category is the value of the
condemned parcel of property at the time of the actual taking. 8 This
established standard of recovery is consistent with the United States and
Colorado Constitutions which mandate just compensation for takings of
9
real property.
The second category of eminent domain proceedings consists of
property that is partially taken. Partial takings frequently occur as a result of the government's continuing struggle to accommodate the
changes inherent in developing communities. Just compensation for
partial takings is judicially determined in two ways. One test courts use
to determine just compensation is the "before and after" rule.' 0 This
rule measures damages by determining the difference between the value
of the whole property immediately before the taking and the value of the
remaining property immediately afterward." The second test courts
use in partial takings is often referred to as the "modified before and
after" rule.12 This rule requires compensation to property owners for
the fair market value 13 of the land taken and for the damages to the
remainder of the property. 14 Although the majority of courts allow
compensation for property owners in accordance with the "before and
after" rule, some courts do not allow compensation for consequential
damages. 15
La Plata, Bement and Herring firmly establish that Colorado follows
the majority rule with respect to valuation of property taken. These decisions allow parties to present evidence and to recover damages for the
diminution in value to their remaining property caused by the installa7. Goldstein & Goldstein, Aesthetic Damages and Loss of View, 197 N.Y.L.J., May 20,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
8. Id. at 2.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation."; see
also Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (stated that the
property owner is to be indemnified fully, as if property had not been taken); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (determined thatjust compensation includes the full and perfect monetary equivalent of the property taken).
10. See, e.g., Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal. 2d 282, 449 P.2d 737, 74 Cal. Rptr.
521 (1969) (permitted the jury to consider loss of view and beach access as factors in
determining severance damages).
11. Id. at 746, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 530. See generally Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compensability of Loss of View From Owner's Property- State Cases, 25 A.L.R.4th 671 (1973) [hereinafter
Annotation, Eminent Domain].
12. G. SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION
SCHMu-rz].

APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 97, 98 (1963) [hereinafter

13. The "fair market value" is the highest price at which a seller can sell property to a
willing buyer in the open market. It is assumed that the buyer and seller are acting freely
and exercising reasonable judgment. Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 608 (N.D.
1957).
14. SCHMUTZ, supra note 12, at 97.
15. See generally Annotation, Eminent Domain, supra note 11, at 689-93. "Consequential
damages" are damages to the remaining property arising from injuries caused by the construction of public improvements. United Power Ass'n v. Heley, 277 N.W.2d 262, 265
(N.D. 1979).
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tion and maintenance of electrical power lines. In order to properly analyze these cases, it is helpful to review the law in the jurisdictions which
allow recovery for consequential damages.
B.

The Majority View Regarding Compensationfor the Remainder

The evaluation of several cases reveals that the primary issue in eminent domain proceedings is whether property owners are entitled to
compensation for a diminution in value to the remainder of their property. In a partial taking, the majority of jurisdictions compensate property owners for the damage to the remainder of their property resulting
from the improvement. 16 This general rule is not limited to cases involving utility companies that condemn private property for the construction of power lines; instead, this rule applies to a variety of partial
17
taking scenarios.
Generally, there are three important arguments in favor of permitting the trier of fact to consider elements affecting the remainder of
property, such as impairment of view, beach access and freedom from
noise, in order to determine just compensation. The first argument contends that these elements, although not compensable per se under the
definition of property, 18 directly affect the property's fair market value,
loss of which is compensable. 19 Therefore, elements that increase or
decrease the value of the property must be considered in order to accurately determine the extent of compensation the property owner is entitled to recover. 20 Some courts hold that every factor affecting the value
of the property must be evaluated to properly satisfy the requirement of
2
just compensation. i
The second line of reasoning in favor of permitting the trier of fact
to consider elements affecting the remainder is based on the presumption that factors such as loss of view, unsightliness and aesthetic damages are bona fide elements of damage requiring compensation. 22 The
basis for this argument is not that these elements are unpleasant to
property owners; instead, the grounds for requiring compensation di16.

See, e.g., Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 411-13, 239 N.E.2d 708, 709-11, 293

N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-71 (1968) (reasoning that loss of privacy and seclusion, and impairment of
view, resulting from the construction of a highway are factors that determine consequential damages to the remainder).

17. E.g.,
Campbell v. United States, 226 U.S. 368 (1924) (land condemned by the
United States was used as a site for a plant that produced nitrates); United States v.
760.807 Acres of Land, 731 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1984) (land taken for the construction of a
safe harbor which was used to load and unload explosives).
18. See generally Bockrath, Aesthetics and Condemnation Awards: Problems in Preserving the

Aesthetic Environment Through Eminent Domain, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 621, 621-31 (1974).
19. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dehring, 34 Ohio St. 532, 533, 172 N.E. 448, 449 (1929).
20. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Hesselden Inv. Co., 84 N.M. 424, 426, 504
P.2d 634, 636 (1972) (all elements affecting the fair market value should be considered,
even though some of the damages are not guaranteed property rights).
21. Keinz v. State, 2 A.D.2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 505, appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d 815, 161
N.Y.S.2d 604 (1956).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. Rein, 369 I1. 584, 596, 17 N.E.2d 582, 588
(1938); Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Darst, 192 Ill.
47, 61 N.E. 398 (1901).
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rectly result from the potentially adverse effect these elements have on
potential buyers. 23 In short, the construction of an easement that is distasteful to a prospective buyer diminishes the market value of the property and, therefore, requires compensation. 24 This argument stems
from the constitutional requirement that a reduction in value should not
be borne by the owner whose property was taken for a public purpose
25
without his consent.
The final argument states that a sovereign power should be required to fully indemnify a property owner for proximate and consequential damages flowing from an act in condemnation. 2 6 The exercise
of eminent domain is based upon the theory that, while the taking of
property may greatly inconvenience the property owner, the resulting
improvements promote the welfare of the general public. 2 7 Therefore,
there is no reason why an individual property owner whose land is taken
in invitum28 should suffer financial loss that may be prevented by the
condemning authorities' award of proximate and consequential
29
damages.
The dilemma of determining diminution in value to the remainder
appears before the courts as an evidentiary issue. The condemnor bears
the burden of proving the value of the land taken and the owner bears
the burden of proving damage to the remainder.3 0 In the majority of
jurisdictions when a partial taking occurs, a landowner is not required to
show any peculiar damages to his property that are not suffered by the
community at large. 3 ' Instead, the landowner must prove that his land
32
was damaged as a direct result of the taking.
The value of the property taken, as well as the effect of the construction and maintenance of the improvement, are elements frequently
presented to the trier of fact by witnesses attempting to assist in determining the extent of damages. 33 The majority of courts hold that if a
property owner's view is partially obstructed by the construction of a
public improvement which effectively impairs the view, forcing the
viewer to look across a newly constructed improvement, the property
34
owner is entitled to compensation.
2d 207, 210, 367 N.E.2d 661, 663
23. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Westervelt, 67 Ill.
(1977).
24. Id.
25. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
26. South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Kirkover, 176 N.Y. 301, 303, 68 N.E. 366, 368 (1903).
27. Id. at 302, 68 N.E.2d at 368.
28. "In invitum" is a term applied to a proceeding against an unwilling party. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 704 (5th ed. 1979).
29. South Buffalo, 176 N.Y. at 302, 68 N.E.2d at 368.
2d 267, 271, 191 N.E.2d
30. Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Bloomer, 28 Ill.
245, 248 (1963).
31. See generally 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 14.01-.02 (J. Sackman
Rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter 4 P. NICHOLS].
32. City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 325, 69 N.W.2d 909, 912 (1955).
33. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, 32 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Mo. App. 1930) (the
court held that witnesses must present evidence concerning the damages incurred from
the taking of the property, which is not purely remote, speculative or conjectural).
34. Purchase Hills Realty Assocs. v. State, 35 A.D.2d 78, 312 N.Y.S.2d 934, 937, aff'd,
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The Minority View

The minority decisions, which do not allow compensation, are
based on three arguments. The first argument generally states that
every element of consequential damages in an eminent domain proceeding should not be considered by the trier of fact. The minority stresses
that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for consequential
damages resulting from an interference with an interest shared in common with the general public. In order to justify compensation, the
property owner must establish that the injury is special or peculiar to the
property; if the damage differs only in degree from that suffered by the
general public, it is not compensable. 3 5 Therefore, when an abutting
landowner shares the same impairment, a property owner is not entitled
to recover merely because a part of his property was needed to construct
36
the improvement.
The second argument states that there are certain inconveniences
37
which property owners must endure without monetary compensation.
The basis for this argument is that individual landowners must bear the
burden of modernization in order to promote the general welfare of developing communities. 38 Similarly, any rights a landowner possesses to
land abutting a public improvement are subordinate to the public right
39
to enjoy the improvement.
Lastly, the minority contends that courts should not consider elements such as aesthetic damage and unsightliness in fixing condemnation awards to the owner of the remaining land. 40 The minority reasons
that factors affecting compensable damages necessarily involve physical
disturbances of property rights. Subsequently, remote, speculative and
41
uncertain elements do not afford a basis for the allowance of damages,
42
but simply reflect the particular grievance of the landowner.
30 N.Y.2d 615, 282 N.E.2d 127, 331 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1970) (construction of a highway that
separated the remainder from a golf course entitled the property owner to recover consequential damages, despite the fact that the golf course could still be seen from the
remainder).
35. Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 411, 239 N.E.2d 708, 710, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68, 73
(1968); see generally 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 202 (1966).
36. See generally Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 NW. U.L.
REv. 587 (1961).
37. See, e.g., Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 227 N.E.2d 37, 40, 280 N.Y.S.2d 135,
139 (1967).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schiederer v. Preston, 170 Ohio St. 542, 546, 166 N.E.2d 748,
752 (1960) (raising grade of abutting street promoted the health, safety and welfare of the
community); State Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 202, 207 S.E.2d 870, 875
(1974) (the landowner's right of access to a public road was condemned pursuant to an
exercise of state's police power to regulate the flow of traffic).
40. Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Barnett, 338 Il1. 499, 501, 170 N.E. 717, 719
(1930).
41. Illinois Power Co. v. Wieland, 324 Ill. 411, 155 N.E. 272 (1927).
42. Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Peterson, 322 11. 342, 153 N.E. 577, 579 (1926).
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Colorado Case Law

In the landmark case of Lavelle v. Town ofJulesburg,4 3 the Colorado
Supreme Court established that a property owner cannot be compensated for damages shared by the general public. 44 In Lavelle, an owner

of three contiguous lots was denied compensation for noise, smoke, vapors and increased fire hazards resulting from the condemnation of an
adjacent lot which was used as a means of ingress and egress to the landowner's property. The court held that the owner of condemned property is entitled to recover damages to the remainder only if the property
45
owner can prove that the damages suffered were peculiar to the land.
Accordingly, the court denied recovery since the property owner could
not prove that he incurred special damages because the landowner's
46
damages were suffered by the general public.

The pertinent question raised in Farmers' Reservoir & IrrigationCo. v.
Cooper4 7 was whether the decrease in the fair cash market value of the
remainder resulted from the construction and operation of a canal. The
court stated that the interference with the property owner's use of water
necessarily depreciated the market value of the property; consequently,
the petitioner must be compensated to the extent of the interference. 48
In Cooper, the compensable damages were not awarded for the decrease
in value of the water appropriated, but were awarded as a result of the
canal which depreciated the value of the landowner's property by depriving the landowner of the use of his water. 49 The court held that in
condemnation proceedings, damages - present and prospective - that
are the natural, necessary or reasonable incident of a taking must be
assessed.

50

In a 1947 condemnation proceeding in which land was taken for
highway construction, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed an instruction which required just compensation for private property taken
for public purposes. 5' The court stated in Noble that the property owner
was entitled to recover the value of land taken as well as the damages to
the remainder. 52 The court also stated that in order to determine the
real value of the land and the damages to the remainder, men of ordinary prudence and judgment must not only consider the present condition of the property, but also any future, reasonable use of such
53
property.
In Mack v. Board of County Commissioners,54 the court reaffirmed the
43. 49 Colo. 290, 112 P. 774 (1911).
44. Id. at 300-01, 112 P. at 778.
45. Id.

46. Id.
47. 54 Colo. 402, 130 P. 1004 (1913).
48. Id. at 407, 130 P. at 1006.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 79, 184 P.2d 142, 143 (1947).
Id. at 79, 184 P.2d at 144.
Id.
152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987 (1963).
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test used in Colorado to determine if property has been damaged. 5 5
This test measures the diminution in value of the remainder by comparing the fair market value of the remainder of the property before and
after the actual taking. 56 Furthermore, the court stated that all natural,
necessary and reasonable damages resulting from the taking which affect
57
the market value of the remainder should be considered.
The first case in Colorado specifically dealing with impairment of
view as a basis for awarding compensable damages was Troiano v. Colorado Department of Highways.5 8 In Troiano, the landowner sought damages
for a highway viaduct constructed adjacent to her established motel.
The landowner argued that the newly constructed structure ruined the
eye appeal of the land and the land's affinity with the roadway, resulting
in the diminution in value of the property. 59 Despite these pleas, the
60
court, adhering to legal precedent, applied the "different in kind" test,
and determined that the property owner's loss of view was damnum ab6 1

sque injuria,

6 2

and therefore not compensable.

The court's reasoning was based on the "different in kind" test first
enunciated in City of Denver v. Bayer.6 3 According to this test, annoyance

or inconvenience suffered by the general public is not a compensable
property interest; rather, in order to constitute recoverable damages, a
property owner must establish that the damage was peculiar to his property. 6 4 In ruling that the operation of a business, such as a motel, does
not satisfy the requirements of the "different in kind" test, the court in
Troiano concluded that there was no rationale in the law for holding that
65
the mere presence of a structure requires compensation.
In State Department of Highways v. Davis,6 6 the state condemned a narrow strip of land to construct a service road for a highway. The salient
issues considered in Davis were the value of the property taken and the
extent of damages to the remainder resulting from the impairment of
55. Id. at 304, 381 P.2d at 990. See also Fenlon v. Western Light & Power Co., 74
Colo. 521, 223 P. 48 (1924); Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919).
56. Mack, 152 Colo. at 302, 381 P.2d at 989.
57. Id.
58. 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448 (1969).
59. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 448.
60. Id.
61. "Damnum absque injuria" is a loss which does not give one an action against the
person who caused such loss. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979).
62. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 455. See also Earl v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 241 Ark. 11, 405 S.W.2d 931 (1966); Blair v. State, 19 A.D.2d 937, 244
N.Y.S.2d 274 (1963); State ex. rel. Schiederer v. Preston, 170 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E.2d 748
(1960). According to these authorities, loss of light, air and ventilation constitutes general
damages and not specific damages. See Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 183
Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753 (1931); Probasco v. City of Reno, 459 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1969);
Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 A.D.2d 747, 253 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1964).
63. 7 Colo. 113, 118, 2 P. 6, 9 (1883); seealso Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry.
Co., 13 Colo. 501, 508-09, 22 P. 814, 816 (1889); Hayes v. City of Loveland, 651 P.2d 446,
448 (Colo. App. 1982).
64. Bayer, 7 Colo. at 118, 2 P. at 9.
65. Troiano, 170 Colo. at 501, 463 P.2d at 448.
66. 626 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1981), rev g 42 Colo. App. 250, 596 P.2d 400 (1979).
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access to the highway system. 6 7 The importance of this decision lies in

the supreme court's holding that an abutting property owner is entitled
to compensation only when a limitation or loss of access substantially

interferes with his means of ingress and egress to and from his property. 6 8 The Davis court stated that the inconvenience caused by the use
of a more circuitous route to gain access to his property does not constitute a substantial interference, since mere circuity in route is identical or possibly only differs in degree 69
general public.

II.
A.

to the inconvenience suffered by the

LA PLATA ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION V. CUMMINS

Facts

On May 19, 1981, La Plata Electric Association ("La Plata") filed a
petition in condemnation. 70 La Plata sought a fifty foot wide easement
through the middle of a 19.533 acre parcel of land owned by Buckley D.
and Laquita J. Wagner. The Wagner's land is located near the City of
Durango and commands a view of the city and the surrounding
mountains.
On July 14, 1981, the district court granted La Plata the use and
possession of .853 acres of land owned by the Wagners for the construction of an electric transmission line. 7 1 On June 7, 1982, the district
court entered an order appointing a Board of Commissioners to determine the amount of compensation the Wagners would receive for their
property. 7 2 At a hearing held by the commissioners, both parties stated
that the highest and best use 73 of the Wagner's property was for future
development. The parties, however, presented polar evidence regarding the value of the remainder of the Wagners' property.
La Plata's appraiser testified that the construction of the power line
caused no damage to the remainder of the property.74 Buckley D. Wagner and two appraisers testified that the value of the remaining property
was significantly reduced as a result of the unattractiveness of the power
lines and the impairment of view. 7 5 La Plata's objection to the admission of evidence, regarding the diminution of value caused by the loss of
view and aesthetic damage, was based on the theory that these causes
are not compensable according to Lavelle, Troiano and Davis. 76 La Plata's
objection was denied by the district court.
67. Davis, 626 P.2d at 663.
68. Id. at 664.
69. Id. at 664-65.
70. La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1985), aft'd, 728 P.2d
696 (Colo. 1986).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. United States v. 760.807 Acres of Land, 731 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1984); seegenerally
4 P. NICHOLS, supra note 33, at § 12.02[3].
74. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
75. Id.
76. Id. See supra notes 44-47, 59-70 and accompanying text.
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The district court, in accordance with the findings of the Board of
Commissioners, entered a judgment stating that the value of the property taken was $4,844 and the damages to the remainder of the property
was $5,000.

77

The trial court distinguished previous Colorado case law

on the ground that the contemplated use of the Wagner's property specifically and uniquely affects the remainder of the property. The power
line nearly bisected the Wagner's property, and the ensuing unattractiveness and loss of view did not generally affect any other landowner or
the general public. Therefore, the trial court held that evidence concerning the adverse effect on the market value of the remainder, resulting from the installation and maintenance of a power line, was
78
admissible.
On February 16, 1983, La Plata submitted to the Colorado Court of
Appeals a Notice of Appeal. La Plata's appeal was based solely on the
award of compensation for injury to the remainder of the Wagner's
property. On January 3, 1985, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling
79
of the district court.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals addressed the problem of
whether a property owner is entitled to compensation from a different
perspective. The court applied the "general damage/special damage"
distinction and determined that the reduction in value of the remainder
of the property, resulting from the erection of the power line, constituted special damages. 8 0 Consequently, the court allowed compensation for loss of view and aesthetic damages directly resulting from the
public improvement which adversely affected the value of the remainder. 8 1 The court of appeals held that in order to require compensation,
the special nature of the damages must be supported by evidence that
the diminution in the remainder's market value was caused by the
82
improvement.
B.

The Holding of the Supreme Court of Colorado

La Plata filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari which the Supreme
Court of the State of Colorado granted. Persuaded by the lower courts,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Justice Lohr, stating the majority's opinion, held that a property
owner is entitled to recover all damages that are the natural, necessary
and reasonable result of the taking, measured by the reduction in the
market value of the remainder of the property. 8 3 Furthermore, the
court held that a landowner may present any relevant evidence concern77.

Id. See generally CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-1-105(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (grants

statutory authority for the court to appoint a board of commissioners.)
78. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 697.
79. La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1985).
80. Id. at 594.
81. Id. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Simpson, 371 S.W.2d 673, 681 (Mo. App. 1963).
82. La Plata, 703 P.2d at 594.
83. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 696, 700.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

ing the diminution of the land's market value caused by the taking. 84
Finally, the supreme court stated that the lower courts did not err in
allowing evidence regarding the aesthetic damage and loss of view that
caused a diminution in value of the Wagner's property. 85 In short, the
court held that a property owner is entitled to present evidence and receive compensation for all damages to the value of the remainder result86
ing from a partial taking of real property.
Although the supreme court held in accordance with the lower
courts, it did not follow the lower courts' reasoning. Instead, the court
determined that the "general damage/special damage" distinction applied by the court of appeals had no validity in La Plata.8 7 The supreme
court applied the concept currently used in the majority ofjurisdictions,
simply, that a property owner suffering a diminution in value to his remaining property must be compensated. 8 8 The supreme court also
89
based its holding on the principles of fairness and economic reality.
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Rovira, joined by Justices Erickson and Vollack, wrote the
dissenting opinion which criticized the majority's holding for creating
additional problems rather than solving the existing obstacles regarding
compensation to the remainder.9 0 The dissent reasoned that the majority incorrectly departed from the requirement that compensable damage
to a property owner must be "different in kind" from the injuries suffered by the general public. 9 1 According to the minority, La Plata incorrectly overrules Lavelle because the majority held that the "different in
kind" test set out in Lavelle is not applicable when the diminution in
property value results from a partial taking. 9 2 The dissent argued that
overruling Lavelle is inconsistent with the general rule that a property
owner is not entitled to recover damages for impairments which are suffered by the general public and differ only in extent or degree.9 3 Furthermore, the dissent contended that the "different in kind" criteria is
established in Colorado case law, 9 4 and the factual distinction in La Plata
95
does not constitute an adequate reason to overrule this test.
The dissent also voiced their displeasure with the majority's excep84. Id. at 703.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id. See, e.g., Kamo Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Cushard, 455 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Mo.
1970).
89. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 701. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
90. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 706 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 704 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Hayutin v. Colorado State Dep't of
Highways, 175 Colo. 83, 89, 485 P.2d 896, 899 (1971) (traveling a circuitous route is the
kind of inconvenience that is merely different in degree, not in kind, from that sustained by
the general public and, as such, is not compensable).
95. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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tion to the "general damage/special damage" distinction. This test
states that an individual property owner must establish that the damage
incurred to his property is peculiar or special to his property; as a result,
it requires compensation that the general public is not entitled to recover. 9 6 The rationale behind the dissent's argument is that abolishing
the "general damage/special damage" distinction is inconsistent with
the Davis holding.
The dissent argued that the majority based their decision on the
fact that the majority of jurisdictions require compensation when the
land which is taken causes a diminution in value to the remainder. The
dissent concluded that, although the majority of jurisdictions does not
employ the "general damage/special damage" distinction, the construction of an electrical power line easement does not entitle property owners to recover compensation for partial takings. Instead, the dissent
contended that the holdings in Davis and Lavelle are controlling in a La
97
Plata scenario.
The dissent also based their argument on a different interpretation
of the fairness doctrine. According to the dissent, the majority arbitrarily singled out "lucky" property owners to receive compensation.9 8 The
dissent believed that if the damage suffered by the property owner is the
same type that the public suffers, a property owner should not be compensated simply because a portion of his property was condemned. 99
The dissent argued that it is inequitable to reward one property owner
simply because a portion of his land was taken when another property
owner, who does not have land taken and suffers from the identical infringement, receives no compensation. 100
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the majority's decision departed from the initial premise that the public should shoulder the costs
of improvements. Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority's
holding, which required compensation for damages that are natural,
necessary and reasonable, imposed a difficult standard. The dissent explained that the majority erred in not precisely defining the application
and contours of this standard; as a result, it created uncertainty for the
trial courts in determining the boundaries of such a broad proposal.101
III.

ANALYSIS

In La Plata, the Supreme Court of Colorado faced the difficult task
of determining whether a property owner is entitled to compensation
for damages and diminution in value of the remainder of real property
directly resulting from a partial taking. Extrapolating important issues
raised by the majority opinion enables the reader to wade through the
96.

Id. at 704 (Rovira, J., dissenting).

97. Id. at 705 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).

99. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
100.

Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).

101. Id. at 706 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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labyrinth of confusion and to focus on why the majority reversed Colorado case law and held that property owners must be compensated. By
analyzing specific arguments raised by the majority, distinguishing existing case law in Colorado and evaluating substantive arguments raised
by the dissent, the importance of this decision radiates through the confusion and explicates the precise meaning and scope of the La Plata decision. Such an analysis not only explains why the court ruled correctly,
but also explains the difficulty in understanding the opinion.
A.

Requiring Compensation For Damage To The Remainder

Two determinative arguments in La Plata which demand consideration are lost within the opinion. The first argument is hidden in the
shadows of both the "fairness" and "economic reality" theories espoused by the court. 10 2 The court addressed the problem of determining whether a diminution in value occurred by comparing a condemning
authority to a private person who is acquiring or selling a parcel of
land.' 0 3 The majority stressed that a person who is contemplating the
selling price of a portion of real property necessarily adjusts the price to
include the value of the land actually taken as well as the diminution in
value of the remainder. 10 4 The court reasoned that a condemning authority should be subject to the same burdens and benefits as a private
party; therefore, the condemning authority's liability should be the
0 5
equivalent of a private party's liability in the theoretical marketplace.'
An important result of the holding is that it puts reins on the condemning authorities' expansive power. The requirement of monetary
compensation forces condemning authorities to evaluate the most practical placement of improvements and to provide property owners, who
are unable to resist the partial takings, some relief. The concept of bridling the condemning authorities' discretion is one way to ensure that
the transitions of modernization occur smoothly. Without a requirement for compensation, the condemning authorities have a license to
further their goals with whimsical and selfish decisions that leave property owners with diminutions in value of their property and no
redress.

106

The second argument that demands consideration involves the specific criteria that serve as a condition precedent for an award of compensation in partial taking cases. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution unquestionably provide the foundation for requiring compensation in eminent domain proceedings. 10 7 Nevertheless, just compensation cannot be required
102. Id. at 701.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. See generally Groy, The Colorado Supreme Court Redefines Compensable Damages in
Condemnation Action, 16 COLO. LAW. 1829, 1830 (1987).
106. Brief for Appellees at 10, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo.
1986) (No. 85-82).
107. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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merely on a constitutional basis. The holding of La Plata mandates that
the elements required to bring cases within the realm of allowing compensation are a partial taking and a diminution in value of the remainder. 10 8 The majority's holding is difficult to understand because the
reasoning used to arrive at their decision is not precisely stated. In fact,
the majority's opinion is congested with extraneous material that overshadows the holding. 10 9 The confusion created in La Plata could have
been prevented and the holding could have been more forceful had the
majority explicitly stated the effect previous Colorado decisions had on
La Plata and limited its analysis to a comprehensive explanation of how
La Plata both overrules and accepts prior case law. It is essential to understand that the La Plata decision only applies to fact patterns involving
a partial taking combined with a diminution in value of the remainder.
B.

DistinguishingExisting Colorado Case Law

Had the Supreme Court of Colorado classified all partial takings
into one category, the precedent established by prior Colorado cases of
denying compensation would have been applied in La Plata. The court,
however, recognized that denying compensation to property owners suffering a diminution in value of the remainder is an undesirable result,
since it is contrary to consitutional requirements and to the notion of
fairness. Therefore, when analyzing the majority's distinction of prior
case law, it is important to consider the negative impact these cases
could have if applied to a La Plata scenario.
The first Colorado decision that requires consideration is Lavelle v.
Town ofJulesburg, i10 which held that a property owner could not be compensated for damages to the remainder for annoyance and inconvenience suffered by the general public. "'1The Lavelle court stated that if
damage to the remainder is to some right or interest solely affecting the
property owner then the owner is entitled to compensation as if the remaining property had been actually taken. 1 1 2 La Plata overruled Lavelle,
holding that the "general damage/specific damage" test is no longer
controlling in partial taking controversies. Overturning any case creates
turbulence in the courts; however, the holding in La Plata is more compatible with the notions of growth and progress. Harnessing the power
of condemning authorities and deciding who should bear the financial
burden of progress are modern issues the courts are forced to handle.
In La Plata, the court reevaluated the necessity of maintaining the "gen108. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703.
109. Undefinable phrases, such as "adverse aesthetic impact" and "aesthetic damages," hinder the reader's ability to understand the majority's confusing opinion. Furthermore, the majority erroneously focused their analysis on Colorado case law which proved
to be factually distinguishable from the instant case and, as a result, complicated the decision and retracted significance from the holding.
110. 49 Colo. 290, 112 P. 774 (1911).
I 11. Lavelle at 300, 112 P. at 778. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
112. Lavelle at 300-01, 112 P. at 778.
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eral damage/specific damage" test and determined that the test must be
altered to reflect the changes inherent in modern improvements.
The most pertinent argument raised by the dissent is the incompatibility of the supreme court's ruling in State Department of Highways v. Davis
with the majority's holding in La Plata. The Davis court sets forth two
rules which appear to make Davis irreconcilable with La Plata. First, the
Davis court stated that "whether or not property is actually taken is immaterial to the issue of damages to the remainder of property for loss or
limitation of access." ' "1 3 If compensation was required for loss of view
when there has not been a taking, any person with a view of an improvement would have a right to a lawsuit. This notion is clearly incompatible
with our present legal system. Secondly, the Davis court only required
compensation when the remainder has been damaged by a substantial
limitation or loss of access. 1 4 The court reasoned that any other result
would create serious problems of fairness to the landowners similarly
situated since the inconvenience suffered by the landowner is identical
in kind to that suffered by the general public.
If, at first glance, one were to interpret the rules enunciated in Davis
as controlling in a La Plata scenario, a landowner would not be compensated for a diminution in value to the remainder if the same injury was
suffered by the common public. However, the crux of the issue is not
whether the Davis holding is controlling in all eminent domain cases;
instead, the primary concern is how to factually distinguish the two cases
in order to preserve each individual holding. One of the most important
distinctions between Davis and La Plata is that in Davis, which dealt with
access to the landowner's property, the diminution in value of the remainder was not a direct result of a taking."15 The Davis court held that
there was no compensable damage since the damage incurred to the
landowner did not substantially interfere with his means of access to the
highway, but merely inconvenienced the landowner's former prime access. 116 Conversely, in La Plata, the partial taking was directly upon the
property itself; therefore, it diminished the value of the remainder.
This argument, however, does not adequately explain the underlying distinctions between the two cases. Another critical distinction is
that Davis is strictly a police action;' 17 whereas, La Plata is an electrical
power company taking a portion of property to construct an electrical
power line. In La Plata, a significant property right is taken as a result of
a condemning authority taking a portion of a landowner's property.
Whether this right is ambiguously labeled as a loss or impairment of
113. State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 665 (Colo. 1981). See supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
114. Davis, 626 P.2d at 665.
115. In Davis, the claim of damage was based on the loss of prime highway frontage
property; although the landowners retained two direct points of access onto the frontage

road, the taking forced the landowners to travel an additional 300 feet to gain access to the
highway.
116. Davis, 626 P.2d at 666.
117.

Id. at 664 (the court stated that a property owner's right of access to and from land

abutting a highway may be reasonably regulated for the public safety or welfare).
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view or aesthetic damage, the crucial point is that a property owner is
being denied the right to control the use of his property., 18
Similarly, Troiano v. Colorado Departmentof Highways 119 is distinguishable from La Plata. Although Troiano and La Plata appear to be similar
because of the alleged loss of aesthetic view, it is important to recognize
that in Troiano, unlike La Plata, the taking did not occur on the landowner's property. 120 Since the situation in Troiano does not satisfy the
first requirement of a partial taking set forth in La Plata, the Troiano decision is clearly distinguishable from La Plata.
C.

Evaluating Substantive Arguments Raised By The Dissent
1. Setting Aside the Different In Kind Test

In order to appreciate the significance of La Plata, it is essential to
analyze the dissent's arguments and the dissent's inability to focus their
criticism on the key elements of the majority's decision. The dissent argued that the "different in kind" test 121 should have been applied to La
Plata.122 In light of the previous discussion regarding the exact holding
of La Plata,1 23 it is more practical to determine the issue of compensation on whether there was a taking, rather than basing compensation on
24
the degree of damages suffered on the property owner's land.i
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority's statement that recoverable damages are "the natural, necessary and reasonable result of
the taking."' 2 5 The dissent apparently felt that this statement was ambiguous and was not supportive of the holding in La Plata. This criticism is hypocritical because the dissent's reliance on the "different in
126
kind" test appears equally ambiguous and lacks precise definition.
2.

The General Damage/Special Damage Test

The dissent, grasping for something concrete with which to rebut
the majority's opinion, argued that the majority failed to abide by the
"general damage/special damage" test. 12 7 The dissent reasoned that
rejecting the test resulted in an arbitrary distinction between landowners who have had portions of their property condemned, and therefore
compensated for their injury, and landowners who have not had portions of their property condemned, and therefore not compensated even
though they suffer the identical injury. However, the dissent was unable
118. La Phta, 728 P.2d at 701 n.4.
119. 463 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1970). See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
122. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. See Brief for Appellees at 9, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo.
App. 1985) (No. 85-82).
125. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 700.
126. See Brief for Appellees at 7, La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 703 P.2d 592 (Colo.
App. 1985) (No. 85-82).
127. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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to challenge the majority's opinion with sound legal arguments because
the distinction between special and general damages is arguably as arbitrary as the formulation adopted in La Plata.
3.

Fairness Arguments

The majority and the dissent partially based their decisions on their
own notions of what constitutes a fair result. However, the majority's
version commands the most attention because compensation is required
when a property owner's right to determine the fate of his property is
lost through condemnation. 12 8 Conversely, the dissent's version - a
property owner, suffering a diminution in value of the remainder of his
property from a partial taking, is not entitled to compensation since an
adjacent property owner, who is suffering from the same type of damage, is not entitled to compensation - is not forceful because it merely
appeals to one's emotions and lacks legal authority.129
V.

CONCLUSION

The La Plata decision enables the Colorado courts to make a definitive statement on how the law should be applied in partial taking proceedings which result in the diminution in value of the remainder.
Although the court ruled correctly, this creative opinion was far from
clear, due to the majority's failure to precisely explain how the court
reached its holding. As a result, the dissent was unable to comprehend
the opinion and to accurately rebut the reasoning behind the holding.
Nevertheless, this confusion and lack of clarity does not mar this decision which provides for the longevity of private property' 3 0 by limiting
the power of the condemning authorities.
David A. Shore

128. La Plata, 728 P.2d at 701 n.4.
129. Id. at 703 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 703 (Rovira,J., dissenting).

